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PREFACE 
Men and women who agree about a wide range of moral issues can still disagree about the 
status of the rules to which they appeal.  Some hold that they are mere rules of thumb, some hold 
that they are exceptionless norms, some that their position is somewhere in between (say strongly 
entrenched prima facie rules or virtual absolutes).  People who believe in exceptionless norms 
disagree about the spheres of morality in which they are to be found:  some find them primarily in 
sexual ethics; others in political principles such as that protecting freedom of speech; others in rules 
protecting human life.  Adherents of absolute rules also differ about the source of such rules:  some 
of them regard such rules as divine commands, but others seem them as requirements of practical 
reason, direct intuitions of conscience, or perhaps even deeply entrenched social conventions.  It is 
with the existence of exceptionless norms, not their content or source should they exist, that I am 
here centrally concerned.  A cognate issue is whether we can ever have infallible moral knowledge:  
whether we might be required to revise, in the light of further insights, our belief that it is wrong for 
parents to kill their children because they find their continued existence inconvenient.   
The issue received its most intensive discussion around 1978, when, as it happens, the 
author's Ethics of Homicide was published.  But it continues to be of importance, as may be gleaned 
from the recent Papal Encyclical on moral issues (John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, 1993), and from 
the recent anthology edited by Joram Graf Haber (Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics, 
1994).    It is my hope that this book will at least move the argument forward, though not that it will 
resolve the many moral problems around which the debate has turned.   
In addressing questions of moral theory, I shall make the minimum teleological assumption that 
ethics is concerned with happiness -- whether the happiness at issue is the agent's own or that of 
others, whether happiness is thought of in welfarism or perfectionist terms, and whether it is to be 
found in this world or the next.  A moral position, I shall assume, is unacceptable if its observance 
means misery without compensation (here or elsewhere) for all concerned.  Hence moral rules, 
including any absolutes we may discover, must in some wide sense be justified by their utility.  But 
I take into account the utility of rules as well as that of acts; and, in judging questions of utility, 
invoke goods such as knowledge and friendship as well as pleasure and desire-satisfaction.  Hence 
my argument will escape consequentialism, at least in its simplest forms. 
My conclusion is that there are exceptionless moral norms, but it is not possible, at least for 
a philosopher, to formulate them with any precision.  (A possible exception:  One ought never to 
intend that another do wrong, either by his own lights or by one's own, though it is legitimate to 
persuade him to change his mind or attempt to overcome a merely emotional resistance to some 
proposed action.)  The most one can do on philosophical premises is to identify danger zones, in 
which agents and moralists must proceed with caution.  And we may hope to formulate principles 
that, though we do not know them to be absolutes in the strict sense, still may be treated as absolute 
for all practical purposes.  As ordinary people put it, "There are limits," "We have to draw the line 
somewhere," and "Some things are sacred and not to be treated lightly." 
The need for, and the difficulty in formulating, moral absolutes arises from the same 
consideration -- namely the complexity of situations and the multiple sources of moral judgment.  
Against the powerful consequentialist influences that bear on our moral judgments, two sorts of 
argument that might support moral absolutes are available, but these arguments do not altogether 
converge.  One emphasizes the bad consequences, e.g., of conventional rules authorizing the police 
to kill citizens whenever it seems on the whole best to do so.  The other emphasizes the 
incommensurability between, e.g., life itself and its various possibilities.  A world without me is a 
radically different place from a world in which my life prospects are in some way diminished.  
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Another source of incommensurability arises from the fact that we create ourselves by our actions -
- though this is true also of the consequences we accept and of the risks we take.  In short, the need 
for absolutes, and the difficulty in believing in them, arise from the same source -- the complexity 
of human moral experience. 
Such crosscurrents produce considerable turbulence in our moral consciousness.  
Sometimes I think my conclusion is mere common sense.  Sometimes I think it so paradoxical that 
I cannot hope that others will take it seriously.  Such is the fate of a philosopher in these times -- 
and especially of one who attempts to honor the complexity of human experience without 
succumbing to postmodern despair, and in the process to remain in dialogue with as wide a class of 
persons as possible. 
My argument for moral absolutes is a transcendental one.  Given the open texture of moral 
language, the diversity and messiness of moral situations, and the twistiness of the human mind, a 
morality without absolute limits would be unable ever to reach the firm conclusions we need, 
especially in a world in which the adherents of any morality are likely to find themselves 
beleaguered.  There is an analogous position on the cognate issue of infallibility:  there may be 
standards about which a moral community could not be in error and still claim to provide a reliable 
guide to life; but it is not possible, except perhaps very tentatively, to distinguish these teachings 
from those about which the community claims only to be right. 
A longer version of the argument to come follows.  In Chapter 1 I address the fact that 
moral issues, particularly those thought to engage moral absolutes, are largely debated within 
religious communities, and attempt to sort out philosophical from theological arguments.  Chapter 
2 displays the multi-dimensional complexity of the situations moralists and morally responsible 
persons face, and Chapters 3 to 5 consider the various strategies employed to resolve them, 
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including the claim that the incommensurability of goods means that we have no way of 
challenging or overriding moral rules such as that against contraception.  Chapter 6 argues that the 
case for moral absolutes, and the case against them, can be made to converge in a way suggested by 
Kant's solution to his antinomies:  there are moral absolutes, but we do not know what they are.  
Chapter 7 attempts to locate moral absolutes, with the help of the concept of the sacred, and 
suggests that there are virtual absolutes that may serve for practical purposes. 
One limitation on my argument is a relative neglect of virtue, with the important exception of 
prudence, to which I devote Chapter 4.  As Christina Sommers among others has emphasized, 
discussion of virtue is of great importance, particularly in pedagogy, because it avoids the 
impression, that emphasis on controversial issues and moral dilemmas is likely to create, that 
morality is primarily concerned with conflict, whether among human beings or within a given 
human being.  On the contrary, the range of actions about which moralists of every school agree is 
quite large, and the issue frequently is not discovering one's duty, but finding the strength to 
perform it.  And overemphasis on social policy undermines individual responsibility, and obscures 
the fact that even the best policies require officials gifted with integrity as well as prudence to carry 
them out.   
Nonetheless, even the most virtuous people face situations in which it is difficult to discern 
the right course, and it is worthwhile asking how much guidance a defensible moral code is able to 
give them -- in particular whether a moral code can contain exceptionless rules.  We may ask, for 
example, whether a just judge or sheriff will ever, whatever the circumstances, frame an innocent 
man.  I regard principles and virtue not as rivals, but as complementary approaches to moral and 
ethical issues. 
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One outcome of my argument is that people of faith are entitled to hold more stringent 
moral views than is common, and cannot be convicted of unreasonableness for so doing.  Nor can 
they be rightfully kept, say on grounds of "public reason," from acting on their views as citizens.  
But I do not have an answer to the problem of Abraham  -- of a person who, for reasons of faith, is 
led not to stiffen the requirements of common morality, but to breach them. 
It has become the custom for authors of scholarly works to declare their interests.  The 
author is a Roman Catholic, though not of the "ultra" sort, committed to the project of harmonizing 
faith and reason -- however difficult this project may seem in practice.  My indebtedness to the 
tradition of Catholic Christianity extends to influences refracted through persons, at least from the 
time being, alienated from it.  My work may be of interest to those who exercise pastoral and 
magisterial functions within the Church, as well as to those who advise them, but I have no desire 
to usurp pastoral or magisterial authority.  In any case -- though I presume generally Christian 
moral intuitions -- this is a philosophical work addressed to reasonable men and women, rather than 
an in-house argument addressed only to Catholics.  (Like many serious Jews, I dislike the 
expression "Judeo-Christian tradition."   But Jewish and Christian approaches to morality do have 
important similarities.) 
A sketch of the argument of this book is forthcoming in Argumentation.  An NEH Summer 
Institute under the directorship of Ralph McInerny, held at Notre Dame in 1985, did much to 
advance my thought on the issues considered here.  I am indebted to James O'Rourke of St. Anselm 
College for suggesting that I focus my work on ethical theory on the question of absolutes, to 
Joseph Boyle of the University of Toronto for help in understanding the positions of Finnis and 
Grisez, and to Patrick Walker of Scranton, Pennsylvania and Michael Wreen of Marquette 
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University for many relevant discussions.  (Patrick also helped with the proofreading.)  My debt to 
Celia Wolf-Devine of Stonehill College is as always immeasurable. 
I use he in the sense of he or she, except where the context requires a male individual.  Recent 
examples of the use of he or she (and she or he), not to mention him or herself (and her or himself), 
convince me that the attempt to be sexually egalitarian in this way only increases the gap between 
author and reader a difficult argument creates in any case.  The capital He for God is also to be read 
generically. 
Philip E. Devine 
Bath, Maine 
Providence, Rhode Island 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND LAW 
The subject of this book is moral absolutes, i.e., kinds of action forbidden or required by 
morality whatever the circumstances or consequences.i Positive moral absolutes (e.g., Provide for 
your family, no matter how) swallow up all other moral requirements, and are for that reason hard 
to defend.  And even negative absolutes must be few in number; otherwise we should be paralyzed.  
Nonetheless, moral absolutes, should we be able to discover them, would have considerable 
strategic importance, since they place limits on how moral judgments can diverge and thus allow 
moral reasoning to proceed without having to evaluate an endlessly widening range of options 
(usually on consequentialist grounds).  If I do not have to consider killing my wife when she is in a 
bad mood, I will find moral judgment quite a bit simpler. 
1.1. Ethics and Morals 
I have become skeptical of the philosophical casuistry attempted in my Ethics of Homicideii 
-- which is not the same as withdrawing the conclusions reached there.  Philosophers who address 
social issues find themselves in the thick of political conflicts and messy personal situations to 
which the somewhat abstract forms of reasoning they favor are less than adequate. Contemporary 
practices need to be judged in the light of the expectations and understandings of those who take 
part in or are affected by them, which will supply premises that narrow the range of philosophical 
disagreement on issues of special ethics.  The question of affirmative action, for example, makes 
sense only against the background of what one of the more astute writers on the issue frankly refers 
to as "the American Dream" -- i.e., the understanding of justice at which many citizens of the 
United States have arrived in the Twentieth Century.iii   What is of greatest importance in 
discussions of applied ethics is not the conclusions reached by this or that writer, but what issues 
are taken as open for discussion.  We take the wrongness of slavery for granted when we discuss 
surrogate mothering, but in fact the issue was only settled in America by a bloody Civil War.   
Casuistry, carried out in independence of religious belief on the one hand, and settled laws and 
mores on the other, quickly turns into a merely rhetorical exercise, in which one manipulates 
concepts to reach a foreordained conclusion.  A philosopher cannot count on enough agreement, in 
advance of argument, to make possible a persuasive argument concerning controversial issues.  
One can always choose a narrower subset of one's contemporaries for one's audience, but -- except 
for some religious communities -- one is left to define that subset essentially for oneself.   
It is necessary to distinguish morals, or the inherited principles of conduct to which we with 
varying degrees adhere, from ethics, or philosophical reflection on such principles.iv  Some people 
have strict morals; others have loose morals, and others no morals at all (and those who are strict on 
one set of issues may be loose on another), well before anyone reflects systematically on moral 
issues.   There are many people who have moral codes but have never reflected on their 
philosophical justifications or implications, whereas ethics without morals is impossible (though 
some professional ethicists are reputed to approximate this condition).  Morals were taught long 
before ethics arose, both in the life of the species and the life of the individual.  Philosophical ethics 
is organized according to principles, whereas morals are organized by topic:  communication, life 
and death issues, sexual morals, and so forth.    
The experience of diversity of morals suggested a conclusion that Socrates and Plato strove 
to combat, that the moral code of any society is a conspiracy of the weak to keep the strong in line, 
which the superior person will happily disregard.  But refuting sophistic egoism is not the same 
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thing as deriving a code of conduct, and Plato's reasons for his striking practical proposals are 
notoriously cryptic.  Appeals to the privileged intuitions of the philosopher-king (or queen) only 
raise the issue, who is to count as a genuine philosopher, and who as a counterfeit.  Even if we 
settle on some overarching moral theory and attempt relentlessly to apply it to concrete cases, we 
will quickly discover a looseness of fit between ethics and morals that interferes with our endeavor.    
Let us now suppose that we have somehow justified a moral code, and need only to apply it to the 
messy circumstances in which we find ourselves.  The language we use in formulating that code, be 
it abstract like utility or concrete like adultery, is open-textured, and requires judgment in its 
application.  Philosophers are no better at making the prudential judgments involved in applying it 
than are men and women of other sorts.  And the same is true about the predictions about 
consequences (including the consequences of changes in our laws and mores) that play a large role 
in moral and political reasoning.     . 
Sometimes concrete cases are invoked to test abstract theories.  But philosophers have been 
prepared to defend even the most repellent conclusions.  The constraints on moral argument here 
are social -- and for that reason historically conditioned -- rather than philosophical, though they 
still may represent the ordinary person's grasp of moral truth rather than the de facto conventions of 
a given group. 
A recurrent skepticism about ethical theory has a significant effect on moral reasoning, 
especially in the practical contexts (institutional review boards, for example) in which some 
philosophers find themselves these days.  No longer -- or so many philosophers argue -- should we 
accept a top-down model of moral reasoning; on the contrary the interpretation of what has 
happened so far in the group in which the problem arise, and what its possible futures may be, plays 
an essential role in deliberation.  In short the moralist needs to construct a description of the 
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problem situation, place the conflicting views of the parties within it, and thus point the way toward 
a resolution that will take into account the legitimate concerns of everyone involved.  On this view, 
the moralist is no longer an expert in applying some moral theory, but is one among other 
participants in a process. 
But even a perfect process may have a deficient, perhaps even a gravely unjust, result; 
moral philosophers dare not renounce the transcendence of moral obligation lest they end up 
sanctioning Nazism and the like.  Still, no process is in fact perfect:  those who believe a result to 
be deficient can always point to a deficiency in the process:  either some interest has been 
systematically neglected, or one or more parties are ideologically closed to dialogue with the 
others, or indulge in systematic irrationalism.  And examination of the issues that arise in 
contemporary society discloses that not only our particular understandings, but also the larger meta-
narratives in which these narratives are embedded, are contested.  For this reason moral disputes 
are as interminable on the process view as on any other. 
Saints and martyrs are more important to the moral life than are philosophers.  Even a 
philosopher like Socrates can find himself bound in conscience to oppose the dominant forces of 
his society, even if his reasons for so doing transcend the capacities of philosophical argument.  
One does not stop being a citizen or a moral agent, with an obligation to take a stand against evil, 
just by reading Wittgenstein.  But we need somehow to distinguish saints and martyrs, even saints 
and martyrs with whom we disagree, from crackpots.  One way of attempting to do so is their 
ability to appeal to a moral rule, for example that against the killing of innocent people, which we 
ourselves accept although we may not apply it as stringently as they do.    
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1.2.  Philosophy and Theology 
One philosophical tradition dismisses religion as morally irrelevant.v Such an approach has 
some plausibility if we believe we can discover a fundamental moral principle, by which inherited 
codes can be evaluated and, where necessary, revised.  But those of us who have grown skeptical of 
such a project have no alternative but to begin with the morality we have inherited from our 
ancestors, will ourselves transmit, in improved or impoverished form, to our descendants.  And this 
morality is religiously entangled, so that those who wish to preserve something approximating 
traditional morality, while rejecting its accompanying religion, face a somewhat difficult problem.  
Belief in moral absolutes is particularly tied to the belief that moral requirements are divine 
commands, which we dare not violate for any reason.  But other widely held moral principles, such 
as the inherent dignity of all persons, also have religious roots.    
I here use Christian ethics as my example of religiously influenced moral reasoning, since I 
know the Christian tradition best.  It does not seem appropriate, however, in a philosophical essay, 
to make acceptability to Christians a criterion for judging ethical theoriesvi.   Though one never 
escapes one's skin, a clear-headed Christian thinker still needs to distinguish between discourse 
addressed to fellow believers, and discourse addressed to all reasonable people -- even when 
reasonableness is understood as including a respectful attitude toward tradition. 
Our moral tradition is a mixed affair, in which Christian elements exist alongside elements 
drawn from many other sources, including the Enlightenment and the Romantic Movement.  A 
believing Christian will hope that the Christian elements in our tradition will prevail in a fair 
contest, but the contest still remains to be fought.  Moreover, the implications of Christian belief for 
ethics (and for many other branches of philosophy) are now contested among self-described 
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Christians:  what interpretations are acceptable is a matter for the Christian community (in exactly 
what way is itself contested) rather than for a philosopher.  
The intuitive case for accepting some moral absolutes is strong, even without appealing to 
distinctively Christian notions.  One critic of Joseph Fletcher's "new morality" cites "the rule 
against rape or ... using violence against an invalid, or babies, or the aged ... or peddling dope to 
children."vii Groups that question such examples, say on the ground that one can benefit children by 
using drugs to liberate them from social convention, are nonetheless likely to hold moral absolutes 
(or virtual absolutes) of their own, say against informing on one's comrades to the enemy (for 
example, to the police).  As Joram Graf Heber sums it up, "the appeal of absolutism lies in the 
value of the convictions we hold and our obstinate unwillingness to give them up.”viii  
«USIX»One argument for traditional morality (including traditional moral absolutes) has a highly 
pragmatic character.  One cannot invent a moral code even for oneself, and the constraints on doing 
so for a society, many of whose members are not given to reflection, are even more severe.  And 
the evils that arise if we do not control our instincts and appetites are very grave.  Hence we need to 
accept strict moral rules from our cultural background, and accept whatever losses adherence to 
them in difficult cases may entail.  Nonetheless, many people, and not only philosophers, have 
affirmed, on the basis of a reflective consideration of experience, that all moral rules have 
exceptions.  So the debate about moral absolutes is hardly over.     
1.3.  The Relevance of Moral Theology 
Moral issues continue to be debated in relatively conventional religious contexts.  And the 
families and informal communities, in which they also arise, are in significant ways like religious 
communities, though their lack of a formal doctrinal structure changes the character of the resulting 
discussions.  But many of our religious and informal communities, including those, which at one 
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time had a reputation for solidarity of opinion, are now deeply divided.  And the members of such 
communities are in disagreement, not only about the merits of particular issues, but also about the 
appropriate methods of moral reasoning and the range of legitimate opinion within the community.  
They also disagree about the question addressed in this book, whether there are sorts of actions that 
are wrong regardless of circumstances or consequences. 
One should not expect theology to provide lucid solutions to problems left open by philosophy.  
For legalists and antinomians -- to use the polemical terms each uses for the other -- both have their 
favorite proof texts,ixand their favorite hermeneutical strategies.x The issue is not one that divides 
Roman Catholics and Protestants,xi or corresponds to community boundaries of any other sort, but 
one that afflicts all reflective men and women.  Hence not only the Bible, but also subsequent 
expressions of our various traditions, and "natural law" authorities such as Aristotlexii and the 
common morality of the Westxiii are all open to multiple interpretations.  Moral theology is of 
interest to philosophers in rather the way the law is, as the application of norms to actual human 
problems within the context of some particular community.  In the case of the law, we are 
concerned with the settlement of disputes and the imposition of sanctions on transgressors.  In the 
case of moral theology we are concerned with moral exhortation and the counseling of persons of 
troubled conscience -- all carried on within a community's whose self-understanding is expressed in 
ritual and (in a non-derogatory sense) myth.  And both law and moral theology bring out a feature 
of moral discourse not always salient for ethical theory:  the utility of clear and firm rules of 
conduct, to help us avoid both endless scruples of conscience and unlimited rationalizing.  
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1.3.01.  Styles of Interpretation 
An important methodological issues concerns interpretation, especially of authoritative texts 
such as the Bible and the Constitution; or of vaguer traditions such as the American way of life.  
Views on interpretation are to be understood as impulses and rhetorical strategies first, and as 
doctrines and methods only second. 
At one end of the spectrum, fundamentalismxivresponds to challenge by hardening doctrine 
and drawing the lines between those within and those without the community with increased 
sharpness.xv Fundamentalists hold that the interpretation and application of such texts is self-
evident to any "right-thinking" person,xvi and that those who would adapt them to the felt 
necessities of the time are in bad faith.  (A typical bit of fundamentalist reasoning, frequently cited 
in the literature, is as follows:  Psalm 110 must have been written by David, since Jesus so quotes it 
-- ignoring the possibility that Jesus was simply using the customary name of the book of Psalms.)  
Usually the fundamentalist appeal is to some earlier, supposedly pristine, state of their tradition, but 
one sort of Catholic fundamentalism responds to challenge by making extreme claims for the 
authority of the (present) Pope.   
Taken seriously (or, if you will, literally), fundamentalism leaves a community without 
capacity to adapt to changed circumstances, including advances in knowledge.  But in fact 
fundamentalists have shown considerable capacity for innovation; their common sense is -- as is 
often the case with human beings -- better than their logic.   
At the other end of the spectrum, deconstructionists hold that authoritative texts and 
traditions can be made to mean whatever an individual or group wants to make of them (and 
consequently are without effective authority).  Deconstruction leaves a community without any 
norms, especially for the guidance of the rising generation, and thus invites a fundamentalist 
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response.  Deconstruction and fundamentalism thus reinforce one another.  For both assume that 
once space has been created for what Richard John Neuhaus calls "hermeneutical legerdemain"xvii 
there are no limits to its operation.xviii    
1.3.02. Revealed Norms 
Christians, like Jews and Moslems, traditionally hold that God has set forth certain moral 
standards (the Ten Commandments, for example).  And God is immune to the limitations that 
afflict human legislators and those who formulate customary codes.  Hence -- it might be thought -- 
believers can quickly conclude that some moral norms, i.e., those revealed by God, are absolute.  
Even in the most religious of moralities, moral absolutes must be the exception rather than the rule.  
But there is no absurdity in God's having revealed certain prima facie duties.    And although God is 
immune to error and limitation, His human interpreters are not.  Hence flexibility in the application 
of norms -- in technical language, equity -- is not excluded by appeal to their divine origin.  The 
Ten Commandments do not recognize exceptions, but they do not include a no-exceptions clause 
either.    
1.3.03.  Infallibility 
Many believers hold, not only that God has revealed certain norms, but also that these 
norms have been infallibly expressed in the documents of their tradition.  The precise extent of this 
infallibility is disputed:  some Catholics affirm,xix whereas others deny,xx that the teaching against 
contraception formulated in «MDUL»Humanae Vitae«MDNM» (1968), and other concrete 
teachings of the same sort, are infallible.  Some people hold that we can reach infallible judgments 
about moral issues, without appeal to the collective judgment of some community, by examining 
the actions themselves or our individual consciences -- possibly, but not necessarily, thought of as 
the voice of God.xxi 
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Questions of infallibility and exceptionlessness are not the same.  We may have an infallible 
source for prima facie duties, or for moral rules that become obsolete as a result of historical 
changes.  And exceptionless norms may rest on the authority of the individual's fallible conscience.  
But the two issues manifest the same deeper question:  whether (and if so how and to what extent) 
it is possible to entrench our moral standards against the vicissitudes of historical and personal 
circumstance.  
1.3.04 Judging the Heart 
A maxim of Christian ethics that has become part of our common moral consciousness is 
Judge not, lest you be judged.  This does not mean that we should cease to have moral standards, 
nor that we should not apply them to one another's conduct.  Nor does it mean that, in cases of 
dispute, the more permissive interpretation of a rule is always to be favored.  But it does bar any 
inference that the more rigorous position is for that reason alone the more virtuous one, as well as 
positions that exclude or minimize the possibility of good faith moral error. 
The most important implication of the maxim against judging is that it requires a distinction 
between a person's deepest intentions and dispositions -- which are known to God alone -- and the 
behavioral and consequential features of his actions, which for social purposes may (and indeed 
must) be subjected to scrutiny.  And self-examination has an important social dimension.  Hence an 
approach to moral issues that neglects the behavioral and consequential features of our actions, and 
focuses entirely on an agent's orientation of reason and will, either is socially useless or breaches 
the precept against judging others. 
Philosophers under the influence of Wittgenstein will argue as follows.  Intentions and 
dispositions are meaningless unless somehow tied to behavior -- though necessary and sufficient 
behavioral conditions for their presence are not required.  It is nonsense to suppose that someone 
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whose every visible act shows a deeply evil disposition is somehow good at heart, or that someone 
whose every visible act is that of a saint is nonetheless a deep-dyed scoundrel.  We may lack 
knowledge of a person's circumstances and temptations, but when these are fully known, there is 
nothing else to know. 
But we are here dealing with a maxim of Christian morality, however secular the context in 
which it may sometimes appear.  Hence it is legitimate to point out that, according to the Christian 
faith.   God knows our deepest intentions and dispositions, and is entitled to judge us, as our fellow 
human beings are not.  And from a human point of view, we never know everything about a 
person's circumstances and temptations.  Moreover, in our understanding of the human personality, 
a small detail may turn out to make a very large difference.  Humility in judging others can 
therefore be argued for, at least in part, on secular grounds.   
1.3.05. Love and Law 
The formulation, interpretation, and application of moral rules will be informed by one's outlook on 
human beings and their world.  If one is a Christian, one's moral understanding will be shaped by 
the centrality of unselfish love.  But the tempering of the Law in the interests of love is not to be 
confused with a permissive interpretation of the Law.  Questions about moral absolutes cannot be 
resolved by invoking a desire to make life easier for troubled people.  In fact, the denial of moral 
absolutes may make life more difficult, in that it makes it more difficult to know what one ought to 
do.« 
1.3.06. Grace 
No serious morality can long avoid the question of grace.  For whether our morality is 
customary, religious, philosophical, or personal in its origins, some people will find its 
requirements too hard to keep.  Peter Singer plausibly -- though not necessarily correctlyxxii-- 
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derives from utilitarian premises an obligation to a\observe a vegetarian diet, and to live on next to 
nothing and send one's surplus to people in Africa.   But some people are as incapable of this way 
of life as they are of celibacy.  And the same sort of incapacity exists for standards resting on 
individual self-interest, such as abstention from alcohol by recovering alcoholics.   
In such a situation, there are two unappealing possibilities.  One of them is to make a 
compassionate exemption from the moral law in favor of those who find it too hard to keep -- a 
strategy that quickly leaves us without any moral standards.  For human beings can have an 
orientation to any form of behavior whatever, including rape and murder.  Or we can declare those 
incapable of keeping the moral law ("hardened criminals," for example) moral outlaws -- exempt in 
principle from all moral requirements, even those they do not find initially difficult.  Respectable 
people will protect themselves against such persons, both physically and psychologically, but will 
not attempt to address them in moral terms.  Only what Charles Taylor has called a "moral 
source"xxiii a Power capable of overcoming moral impotence and empowering us to put into 
practice the principles to which we adhere in theory -- can resolve the discrepancy we experience 
between the demands of our conscience and the limitations of our nature. 
 1.3.07.  Sin 
The antitype of grace is sin, not in the sense of specific transgression, but of deeply ingrained 
alienation from God (or -- more broadly -- whatever else one takes as one's moral source).  
Theological liberals tend to deplore the influence of St. Augustine on the morality of the West, but 
he identified a strain in human nature that it would be dangerous to forget.  There is abundant 
evidence for a perverse, even demonic, strain in the human make-up:  perhaps the Saint located it 
too much in the region of the pelvis, but it is there.  (It may not even be malice, in the strict sense of 
a desire to do evil for its own sake:  a delight in the use of one's powers, and a corresponding 
impatience with any constraint however necessary, will have many of the same practical 
consequences as malice.)  This strain in our nature, and the need of any morality to control it, 
means that the most superficially reasonable moral position is not always in fact the most 
reasonable one.  For a superficially reasonable moral argument make may dangerous concessions to 
the dark side of human nature. 
  1.3.08.  God's Friendship 
When a religious moralist says that an action offends God, he does not mean only that, 
unless the agent repents, he will be damned.  He also means that it entails a present breach with 
God which the agent -- as in the case of a tragic sinner -- may recognize and regret, although he is 
unable to free himself form it.xxiv  Such alienation differs from alienation from a friend or a human 
community in that -- if theism is true -- it can never be justifiably incurred.  But, for reasons I 
explain later, never offend God does not count as a moral absolute in the sense employed in this 
book. 
1.3.09 Reward and Punishment 
The possibility of divine reward and punishment, especially punishment after death, has often been 
pictured in luridly hedonistic terms.  It is difficult to integrate such rewards and punishments into 
ordinary morality -- to avoid, for example, the conclusion that it is a good deed to kill a newly 
baptized infant, whose salvation will thereby be assured.  One cannot appeal to the threat of hell 
fire to support the assertion that otherwise innocent actions are wrong.  For a Power that punished 
and rewarded human beings at random could not be believed when It purported to reveal Its 
intentions. 
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 1.3.10.  Dostoevsky's Maxim 
The best-known claim that morality and religion are essentially linked is Dostoevsky's 
maxim, If God does not exist, then everything is permitted.  This maxim does not mean that atheists 
are without moral principles, or even that moral discussion cannot proceed, at least for a while, 
without appealing to theological considerations.  In its most defensible sense, it means that morality 
without God will reveal its incoherence under pressure. 
More specifically, morality without God breaks down in the following ways.  (1) The 
morality discovered by examining our considered moral judgments is heterogeneous in character, 
and includes both consequentialist and deontological elements.  We must find some way of 
avoiding the conclusion that this morality is inconsistent, for if we accept the doctrine of most 
logicians, that from a contradiction everything follows, such a morality will enable us to justify 
whatever we might desire to do.xxv The alternative is to wall off inconsistencies through a variety of 
ad hoc devices. 
(2) Moral standards need to be independent both of the mores of society and the inclinations 
of individuals, even when both of these have been purged by reflection.  Moreover, unlike 
mathematics, the standards of morality have an imperative character that sometimes conflicts with 
custom and inclination.  Kant's Categorical Imperative, hanging in metaphysical midair, is not a 
satisfactory articulation of this phenomenon.xxvi If moral standards derive from or express the 
judgments or attitudes of human individuals or groups, there is no reason to expect them always to 
be consistent.  Nor is there any reason to expect them always to override, even in principle, the 
preferences of individuals and the mores of society.  But if they derive from a wise and benevolent 
God, we can both exclude incoherence and account for the imperative character of moral judgment. 
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 1.4.  Legal and Political Aspects 
  The civil law may seem to provide at least a partial answer to the questions of this book.  
For its norms are relatively clear, and its sanctions, though not perfectly reliable, are less 
mysterious than those which religion supplies.  Moreover, there are serious arguments that some 
legal norms, for example those protecting free expression, should be held as absolute, even when 
observing them has significant costs.  Free expression, it is argued, is so vital to the welfare of our 
society that it is worthwhile accepting such costs rather than making exceptions to the rules 
protecting it.  And in general it may be highly useful to take certain matters off the political agenda, 
even "for good and all," so that men and women can live together in the confidence that their rights 
in such matters will be respected. 
But, in some circumstances, a virtuous citizen will act outside the law and sensible officials 
ignore his violations, regardless of any formal authorization to do so.xxviiAnd if this is true of 
citizens, how much more will it be the case of officials sworn to preserve and protect the 
institutions of their society in times of stress.  Thus rules protecting free speech are by their very 
nature subject to one exception, that when the survival of the society that sustains free expression is 
at issue, all bets are off.   (Though cautions against decisions taken in panic are always in order; 
domestic Communists did not in fact pose a "clear and present danger" to America's survival during 
the 1950s.)  The subordination of free speech to the common good does not mean that it protects 
only one's political friends, only that sufficiently extreme circumstances may require exceptions to 
all merely political rules.xxviii Yet liberal theorists have never been happy with the pragmatic status 
their principles must have on their larger assumptions.   John Rawls, for example, begins his 
Theory of Justice with a ringing declaration of faith: 
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Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.  A theory 
however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws 
and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if 
they are unjust.  Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the 
welfare of society as a whole cannot override.xxix  
But in subsequent writings he has based his views on justice on an appeal to "overlapping 
consensus" that undercuts his invocation of the peremptory claims of truth.xxx  Nonetheless, he 
persistently attempts to protect liberal principles against revision or exceptions by ruling out 
potentially disruptive sorts of considerations from reasoning about justice and political liberty.xxxi 
Crucial to Rawls's finished argument for political absolutes is his conception of public 
reason, i.e., of a constrained form of reason to which we are limited, at least when we discuss 
central constitutional issues.  This conception of reasonableness limits not only the deliberations of 
legislators and judges, or the dialogue among citizens, but even the private reasons on which an 
individual citizen votes.  As Rawls puts it, "the ideal of public reason not only governs the public 
discourse of elections insofar as the issues involve those fundamental questions, but also how 
citizens are to cast their vote on those questions" (p. 215). 
This sort of constraint disenfranchises many voters, for it denies their right to vote their 
convictions.  To ask Catholics, feminists, or Mormons to ignore their beliefs when voting, or to 
refrain from joining with others like themselves to express shared concerns in the public arena, is 
on its face both repressive and, in a generally open society, absurd.  
Rawls defends his strategy by appealing to civic fairness (p. 217).  But fair-mindedness 
requires us to listen to men and women whose positions may require us to modify our conception 
of public reason, at least as if they are expressed in a reasoned manner.  Rawls in fact concedes that 
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citizens like the abolitionists and Martin Luther King may appeal to their comprehensive views, so 
long as the end result is to strengthen public reason (Lect. VI, § 8).  Moved perhaps by piety, he is 
even prepared defend Abraham Lincoln's "Second Inaugural with its prophetic (Old Testament) 
interpretation of the Civil War as God's punishment for the sin [of] slavery, falling equally on 
North and South" on the ground that "what he says has no implications bearing on constitutional 
essentials or matters of basic justice [!]"  (p. 254). 
A sort of benign Machiavellianism is possible.  Persons exercising authority are entitled not 
to recite the exceptions to norms whenever they invoke them -- at least if there is no plausible 
reason to suppose that such exceptions obtain in the case at hand.  Imagining foreign invasion when 
nothing of the kind is occurring, except perhaps in the overheated imaginations of partisans, is a 
dangerous proceeding.  But may we go further and deny exceptions that we in fact fully intend to 
and expect to make (and regard ourselves as entirely justified in making)?  I should say not, except 
insofar as lawxxxii is regarded as a mere array of rules, from which any reasonable person would 
depart from upon occasion.  For to introduce an element of deceit into the fundamentals of social 
life has devastating implications.  I have in mind the citation of moral considerations to warrant 
one's own actions and criticize those of others.  If one's morality is treated as a fact about one's self 
like one's ancestry, lying about it, say to the Nazis, presents a different question. 
I conclude by attempting to state in what sense this book represents a philosophical inquiry, 
as opposed to a theological reflection or an explication of the «MDUL»mores«MDNM» of late 
twentieth century America.  While I presume the acceptance of at least vaguely Christian moral 
views, believing Jews, agnostics, and atheists are among my intended readers.  I am particularly 
interested in addressing the sort of agnostic who wishes to maintain the broadly Christian character 
of our moral tradition, on the ground that this is the only sort of morality a society such as ours can 
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be brought to accept.  On the other hand, the moral sensibility of my own time is too incoherent to 
be susceptible of the sort of reconstruction I attempted in The Ethics of Homicide.  Hence my 
argument is intended to appeal to men and women of reflective conscience, who may frequently 
find themselves required to take a critical attitude toward the mores. 
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 2 
SITUATIONS 
Human beings are diverse and complex; so our philosophy, and even more so our literature, 
constantly inform us.  Life was not simple in ancient and medieval times, but our awareness of its 
complexity is in some ways a modern phenomenon -- though one recognized by many writers 
before the coming of the modern age.  Some writers would press this insight to the metaphysical 
level, and assert with Sartre that man is that creature who lacks a nature or essence of any sort.  But 
such a move is self-destructive, since it makes a claim about human nature, i.e., that human beings 
are entities who lack a nature.  Thus we do best to retain our awareness of human complexity and 
diversity without turning it into a metaphysical dogma. 
Still, modern insight creates problems for moral thought -- problems that account in part for 
the persistent strain of anti-modernism in our culture.  Complex and diverse human beings create, 
and find themselves in, complex and diverse situations, in which stock moral terms like adultery, 
theft, and murder may not seem adequate to the needs of moral judgment.i  Yet it is necessary to 
make some firm moral judgments, say against killing human beings by reason of their ancestry, if 
decent social life is to be possible.  In this chapter I display the full complexity of moral situations, 
before discussing the strategies employed to resolve moral questions. 
Writing in a bioethical context, Carl Elliot has described the phenomenon to be analyzed 
very well: 
A person's moral judgment is reflected in what he chooses to include in a description:  
whether he mentions that the patient's wife has visited her critically ill husband only twice 
over the past three weeks, whether he reports a bed shortage in the I[ntensive] C[are] U[nit], 
if he notes that the patient's children stand to inherit their dying man's estate, how he 
describes the patient's prognosis, whether he brings up the option of palliative care, if he 
notes that the nursing staff feels strongly that treatment should be stopped, whether he 
mentions that the patient was an I[ntra]V[enous] drug abuser.  One of the most interesting 
and disturbing discoveries to be made in a medical ethics case conference is how one's 
moral intuitions change as each player in the drama says his piece, as another perspective is 
added to one's own.ii 
2.1.  The Varieties of Moral Judgment 
The triad obligatory-permissible-forbidden is not adequate to the needs of moral judgment.  
Theologians distinguish between mortal and venial sins, lawyers between felonies and 
misdemeanors, secular moralists between serious offenses and peccadilloes.  Less formally, there 
are actions which are "within our rights," or for which no one would blame us, which are less than 
admirable or heroic. 
Nor does the evaluator always stand in the same relationship to the act or proposed act in 
question.  The most central form of evaluation concerns acts under consideration by the evaluator 
himself:  thus Kant imagines an unhappy man contemplating suicide, who asks first whether his 
proposed action can be squared with the requirements of morality.  At a remove from decision itself 
is the role of the moral adviser, who usually can abstain from judgment, with the help of an 
expression like Follow your conscience. 
There are actions over and done with, such as the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, the evaluation of which lacks the practical urgency of the first two sorts.  About such 
actions the agent himself, a friend or spiritual counselor, and a third party all may make judgments.  
And the culpability of the agent may be as important (or more so) than the legitimacy of his act. 
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Our argument must also address the judgments moral teachers, including parents, moralists, and 
religious leaders, must make.  Such teachers need to combine honesty, responsibility, and concern 
for the well being of those whom they are instructing.  For those who are incompetently instructed 
may rebel against the requirements of morality if too many demands are placed upon them, and 
they may also regard with contempt a morality that is presented as pliant to their every felt need. 
In such circumstances the most important distinction is that between justification and excuse -- a 
distinction habitually neglected by those who would go easy on others.  But some excuses are 
agent-relative -- inexperience for example -- and others, such as duress, involve mitigating 
circumstances that are sometimes almost as good as justifications.    
 2.2.  Action Kinds 
Sorting out relevant from irrelevant detail is the first task of the moral evaluator, and this 
task is both challenging and has important implications for subsequent moral judgment.  There is an 
important gap between a messy real-life situation and a "case of conscience" in which the problems 
of Titius and Bertha present themselves in neatly ordered fashion. 
Most moral judgments use "thick" act-descriptions such as adultery, theft, and murder; as 
well as more recent coinages such as racist and irresponsible. To condemn an act just as (morally) 
wrong is quite rare.  The precise range of thick moral concepts is open to dispute, but there are core 
cases where users of such expressions concur in their judgments.   That the Nazis murdered 
millions of Jews and others is a correct description of their conduct, though it would be rhetorical 
exaggeration to say that they murdered the soldiers the German army killed in combat.  (On the 
other hand, murder is sometimes used to describe the wanton killing of a brute animal.)  
But such descriptions conceal a complex background.  Adultery and theft are only possible within 
institutions of marriage and property.  These institutions vary from time to time and from place to 
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place, and their present versions have been criticized, rightly or wrongly, on a number of grounds.  
Nothing follows immediately for personal morality from such criticisms.   An institution of "half-
open" marriage, in which the husband but not the wife is conventionally held at liberty to engage in 
extramarital relations, is unfair to women.  But this unfairness does not immediately imply that 
husbands who take advantage of their liberty are guilty of adultery, or that women who respond in 
kind are not so guilty.  Nor do criticisms of existing property relations, however justified, imply a 
license to steal.  Yet to assert an absolute obligation to accept the definitions imposed by unjust 
institutions is to help guarantee their permanence. 
Murder is somewhat different from adultery and theft.  The distinction between living and 
dead, and between human beings and things (or brute animals) the concept of murder presupposes 
are not socially constructed in the same way the institutions of marriage and property are.  But the 
concept of a person has a conventional aspect, while the institutions of marriage and property have 
at least some basis in nature.  All we can say at this point in the argument is that our moral world 
has both natural and conventional aspects, that one aspect or the other may be more evident in a 
given situation.   
We must also address the question«of nominalism:  whether human acts form natural kinds, 
or whether descriptions such as murder, theft, and adultery are assigned to human behavior by 
convention.  For many subcultures describe what are in some sense the same actions in very 
different terms, such as weeding out the unfit or eliminating the king's enemies, liberation (say, of a 
book from a shop), and courtly love.  The metaphysical perspective adopted here is "safety net 
Platonism":  the vagaries of our language and social practice are constrained by an objective 
structure, but we have no reason to suppose that this structure corresponds to that recognized by 
any natural language.  On no account can an individual or a society by giving a previously 
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forbidden form of activity a pleasing name, escape the bad consequences to which it or its 
toleration may lead.   
John Finnis objects to the ordinary language/phenomenological approach to these issues:« 
Common speech [he writes], which is not systematically oriented toward precise moral 
understanding and is impressed by behavioral and consequential similarities and by legal 
categories is not a safe guide.  It uses the action-related terms, including even act and 
intention, with an ambiguity which can be overcome only by careful attention to the 
importance of the end and means united in a proposal shaped by intelligent deliberation 
(however rapid), and adopted by choice.iii  
And in particular he insists that what behavior looks like has little or nothing to do with its moral 
acceptability. 
The physical behavior and causality and outcome can be exactly the same, when completely 
different acts are done.  ... Equally, acts can be identical in every way relevant to a moral 
absolute's nonevaluative act-description, even though the physical behavior differs very 
noticeably.iv 
  Against the behavioral and consequentialist emphases of common speech, even when it 
identifies acts as of a certain kind, he insists on a tradition that identifies acts by their objects, i.e., 
by their intentions, including the subordinate intentions called "means to an end."v  But God alone 
knows a person’s deepest intentions: (§ 1.3.04): for purposes of social life, we need criteria of 
intentionality that include, among other things, the look of an action and its expected 
consequences.vi 
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 2.3.  Consequences 
Consequentialists hold that a favorable balance of consequences is the sole (or decisive) 
criterion of right conduct; that traditional moral language embodies useful rules of thumb, but that 
these rules should be neglected whenever one can calculate the consequences coolly, and finds that 
they favor a forbidden action.  Not only the advocates of moral absolutes reject consequentialism: 
but also, from a different angle, by believers in what Samuel Scheffler has called, "an agent-
centered prerogative" or "dispensation to devote more attention to one's own welfare than to the 
welfare of other people."vii But one not need to be a consequentialist to take consequences into 
account:  most moral codes contain rules that can be overridden to avoid sufficiently bad 
consequences (respect for civil law is a plausible example), and hold that it is wrong to incur (or 
even seriously risk) very bad consequences except for a morally worthy end.   
The consequences of our actions are complex and varied, and for some of our actions 
extend indefinitely forward in time.  Those who beget or give birth to children are causally 
responsible for everything their remote descendants do.  In the same way, those whose ideas gain 
acceptance are causally responsible for the uses to which they are put, even when (as is common) 
they would have regarded these uses with horror.  And even more ordinary-seeming actions 
sometimes have unexpected long-range consequences. 
In moral judgment we invoke, not just any consequences, but those consequences that the 
agent foresaw or ought to have foreseen.  But what consequences we foresee, or believe that others 
ought to have foreseen, depends on our worldview and in particular on the kinds of causal relations 
we are likely to find probable.  When we discuss the causes of war, crime, economic depression, 
totalitarian government, or epidemic disease, our explanations reflect our differing conceptions of 
people and their world.  Nor are all consequences on the same moral level.  Both law and morals 
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understand consequences differently when the action of another person intervenes.viii A related 
example is effects that depend on the emotional reactions of the agents or others, which are under 
varying degrees of voluntary control. 
I now consider six sorts of consequence of special importance for moral judgment.  The first 
are the consequences of proposing or accepting a moral rule (or principle, or ideal, or...), either for 
oneself or for some community in which one has an authoritative role.  Such rules, if accepted and 
adhered to within a group, have effects different from those of their acceptance by a series of 
individuals, and even more so from that of the behavior the rule would counsel if not embodied in 
an accepted practice.  Moreover, such rules have a certain independence from the considerations 
that motivate their acceptance.   For that reason, there can be a slippery slope, by which an 
apparently minor departure from previous understandings has consequences, good or bad, far 
exceeding the intentions or expectations of its proponents.   
A second set of consequences has to do with the abandonment of a conventional principle 
previously accepted, for example the tacit understandings that make a written constitution possible.  
All conventional rules are sometimes violated, but if enough people, or enough important people, 
violate them with impunity they cease to have conventional force.  The customary principles of a 
group form at least a rough system, though some social scientists have exaggerated their coherence.  
Hence conventional rules tend to lose their force together.  The violation of one conventional rule 
provokes the violation of others -- whether in retaliation, in self-protection, or by virtue of the 
maxim, If they can do that, we can do this.  The resulting condition is remedied only by the 
development of fresh conventions, variously related to the old ones.  This development is always a 
difficult process, and sometimes a highly painful one.  It may be somewhat less so, however, if we 
can believe that the norms established reflect something more than individual or collective will. 
 
The Search for Moral Absolutes  29  Philip E. Devine 
If our conventions were entirely beneficent, their collapse would be an unmitigated disaster; if they 
were entirely malignant, their collapse would be a good (and the fact that an act was in breach of 
social convention a reason for doing it).  In fact the conventions of all societies, our own included, 
are in part beneficent and in part malignant:  if they were entirely malignant, no one would support 
them; if they were entirely beneficent, no one would challenge them -- except perhaps for 
transparently base motives.   Nonetheless, since our conventions are, whatever their merits, the only 
conventions we have, considerable prudence is called for in dealing with proposals to displace or 
revise them. 
Let us suppose that we should accept the present system of conventions  -- or reform them 
only so far as the system of conventions itself makes reform possible.  The issue then arises, how 
great a burden may be placed on individuals to sustain a system of conventions, particularly when 
these individuals have been unjustly disadvantaged by these conventions.  In practice, there is no 
clear correlation between social advantage and felt loyalty to a society and its practices.  But where 
such loyalty exists, it includes a devotion to the norms of a society greater than their 
consequentialist basis alone would warrant. 
Third, there are costs of deliberation.  Deliberation that explores the full complexity of 
moral situations risks paralysis -- the more so, the more appreciative of such complexity we are.  
Even if we do not dither until the occasion for action has passed, expenditure of time and energy on 
prolonged deliberation has significant costs.  Certain sorts of deliberation also entail special costs:  
a society in which politicians routinely deliberate about the elimination of their opponents suffers 
significant harms independent on their acting on their deliberations.  For those who engage in such 
deliberations will assume that others are doing the same thing, and protect themselves accordingly.  
 
The Search for Moral Absolutes  30  Philip E. Devine 
A climate of distrust will be the inevitable result.  Hence there can be benefits to entrenching a 
moral rule against possible revision of any sort. 
Fourth, every decision we make has an effect on the sort of people we are.  To respond to a 
situation in a certain way, say to yield to a temptation, is to become the sort of person who responds 
in that way.  In part this is metaphysics:  we define ourselves by our acts.  But in part the 
contingencies of habit-formation are involved.  But this effect results not only from our intentions, 
and but also, though to a lesser degree, from the risks and the foreseen bad consequences we 
accept. 
  Fifth, there are consequences that arise, not from the facts as such, but from people's 
opinion of the facts, including the conclusions they are likely, unless well schooled in "advanced" 
mores, to draw from certain circumstances.  For example, if a woman visits a man in his hotel room 
after midnight, he is likely to conclude that she has consented to intercourse, although she may not 
in fact have done so. 
Sixth, consequences flow from people's opinions of what is good and right, even if this 
opinion is in fact misguided.  If I do something another person believes to be wrong, and he learns 
of it, I may make it easier for him to follow suit -- perhaps by doing things that are wrong apart 
from his opinions.  The same is true of myself, insofar as my pre-reflective attitudes are not entirely 
within my power.  These considerations also operate on an abstract level, insofar as emphasis on 
the complexity and ambiguity of human situations may make it easier for people to rationalize 
actions that are in fact unambiguously wrong. 
Hedonism evaluates consequences in terms of pain and pleasure; it supposes that all 
pleasures and all pains can be assimilated for methodological purposes to the simplest items within 
each class -- the pleasure of an infant playing with a glass of water in the one case, toothache pain 
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in the other.  A more adequate account of subjective vales shows that they are diverse, 
incommensurable, and unstable.  Something that pleases a person intensely may leave him with a 
feeling of weariness and disgust.ix  We may be drawn to an experience in one part of our souls, 
while repelled by it in another.   Other forms of welfarism -- say those that define the good as 
desire-satisfaction -- are open to objections of the same sort. 
"Perfectionist" moral philosophers have appealed to a plurality of objective goods, such as 
knowledge and friendship, to escape these problems; the problem of comparing these goods for the 
purposes of moral reasoning then becomes acute.  And the shift from welfarism to perfectionism 
complicates moral reasoning in many other ways as well. (For example, Rawls's "Maximin" 
strategy makes no sense on perfectionist premises, though the claims of equality may be felt in 
some other way.)x 
 2.4.  Intention 
The most popular distinction among non-consequentialist moralists is that between foreseen 
and intended consequences, enshrined in the principle of double effect.  This distinction makes it 
possible to argue that it is legitimate for a physician to give a dying patient morphine that will 
shorten his life, and to omit life-preserving measures judged extraordinary (say open-heart surgery 
on someone suffering from Alzheimer's Disease); but not to do something with the specific 
purposes of hastening a patient's death.  These arguments are most naturally addressed to those 
making decisions, who are presumed to be aware of their own intentions and plans of action.  For 
purposes of third-person morality, the distinction between acting and refraining provides a rough 
guide to the deeper moral distinction.xi 
But the intention/foresight distinction conceals a number of complexities.  It is legitimate to 
give morphine to a person dying in great pain, but not to remove his head to ease pains in it, not 
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because (or not only because) death is more certain in the second case than in the first.  Rather, 
decapitation just is killing while giving medicine for pain has a different significance.  Decisions 
such as to cease giving water and nutrients through tubes require more discussion, but the examples 
given are the reference points from which the relevant arguments can proceed.   
Two theoretical questions arise from such discussions.  First, whence arise the limitations 
on redescription of actions necessary to the argument?  Second, to what extent are such limitations 
permanent features of human life, and to what extent do they change as history unfolds?  Thus we 
reach, by another route, a question crucial to this study:  whether the conditions of human life can 
be limitlessly re-described to advance our agendas; and if not what the limits are, how they are 
grounded, and how they can be found. 
I have said that human beings are presumed to be aware of their own intentions and plans of 
action.  This is not quite so: muddle and self-deception about one's intentions are as possible as are 
muddle and self-deception about one's affections.  Sometimes muddle of this sort is especially 
pertinent to double-effect issues.  If there is an effect I should welcome but which I cannot in good 
conscience pursue, say the death of an elderly and troublesome relative from whom I expect an 
inheritance, it will be easy for me to conceal from myself the extent to which my patterns of 
behavior tend toward bringing it about, and even are shaped by a desire for it.  There are people, 
like King David, who have a knack for getting others to do their dirty work for them while avoiding 
personal responsibility.  Hence while a morality of consequences opens all the problems of an 
uncertain future and of comparing incomparable goods, a morality of intentions opens all the 
mysteries of the human heart. 
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2.5.  Symbols 
One of the more frustrating features of moral and political debate is the persistence of issues 
about which men and women feel strongly, but which the skeptical mind is likely to dismiss as 
trivial or as a mask for something more serious.  The American obsession with skin color, which in 
some ways afflicts anti-racists more than it does racists,xii is one example; concern about hair 
length in men, and skirt length in women, is another.  Religion has generated many disputes about 
details of observance -- precisely how one receives Communion, for example -- with which the 
worldly are impatient.  Scholarship, too, has its petty issues:  whether footnotes belong at the 
margin or at the end of the text (or in both places) for example. 
A form of Marxism that has many conservative adherents holds that economic issues are 
central, while other issues (styles of dress, for example) are peripheral.  But attempts to find the 
"real" issues behind apparently trivial questions encounter many difficulties.  Economic motives, 
such as the desire to support a family, economic institutions, such as money and property, 
technologies, such as birth control pills, and economic phenomena, such as the behavior of the 
stock market -- all have significant cultural and psychological dimensions.   
Brecht said, Erst kommt das Fressen, but human eating (Essen as opposed to Fressen) has an 
enduring cultural dimension:  people have to be more than ordinarily hungry to eat dog-food, and 
those whose diet is adequate and even healthy, but cannot afford a special meal to celebrate a 
holiday, are importantly deprived.  And eating other people's leavings is felt to be degrading, even 
though it is neither immoral nor (necessarily) unhealthy.xiii 
Considerations of sanitation apart, the disposal of human remains might seem a trivial issue.  
But the way we deal with a person's corpse defines our relationship to him, which continues to be 
morally important after his death.  Creon and Antigone were fighting about something real, not just 
attempting to exert power over one another.  Sex, too, has a powerful symbolic dimension,xiv not 
reducible to the sensations experienced at orgasm (or anything else).  One reason for this fact is that 
men and women have the power to create new life -- a fact about human sexuality that affects our 
feelings even when reproduction is unlikely or impossible.xv 
Finally, controversy about the details of religious observance cannot be dismissed as minor.  
A service is not merely entertainment for the laity while they wait to receive the desired 
theological, moral, or political message (or are dispensed valid sacraments).  A service may also 
convey an undesired message of its own, e.g., that the doctrines preached are fantasies designed to 
console the losers of this world but to be ignored in "real" life.xvi  
 2.6.  Tradition, Convention, and Change 
The social environment of action affects moral judgment in a number of ways.  In the first 
place, the language in which we frame moral issues  -- not only the language of "Ten 
Commandments" morality, but also philosophers' expressions such as duty and happiness -- is both 
conventional and traditional.  It carries with it a freight of conventional understandings that can be 
canceled only with difficulty.  Expounders of Aristotle have constantly to explain that for him 
virtue does not mean chiefly sexual self-restraint, and prudence does not mean chiefly caution.  Nor 
is the word morality innocent:  it carries with it a possibly undesired suggested that sexual issues 
are the most important moral questions. 
Second, the consequences of our actions depend in part on how others interpret them.  An 
otherwise innocent act may be wrong because another person will interpret it in a morally 
corrupting way; this consequence is traditionally called scandal 
Third, insofar as an action has a symbolic dimension, its moral acceptability depends on the 
conventions of meaning prevalent within one's world.  Whether it is a lie to describe a jolly 
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heterosexual as "gay" depends on one's time, place, and audience.  Likewise the symbolic 
ramifications of sexual practices, and of ways of disposing of human remains, depend in part on 
how the agent and others understand them.  Conventions affect even what a person can intend:  I 
cannot say, "Jones is a depraved criminal who ought to be extirpated for the good of society," or 
spit in his face, while intending to express my love and admiration for him.  
Fourth, not everyone can do everything.  Human beings have responded to this problem by 
defining a number of social roles, including those of husband, mother, and social critic, 
performance of which can be assessed according to common standards.  What these roles are, and 
what the requirements of the role morality attached to each of them is, depends largely on 
convention. 
Finally, our conventions and traditions may preserve moral insights.  On any account sifting 
is required, but to reject the wisdom of the ages altogether is to give oneself the impossible task of 
creating the moral and social world afresh.  In morality as in science we are sailors who must repair 
our vessel on the open sea:  there is no Archimedean point outside our practice from which our 
morality can be re-evaluated.  Hence methodological conservatism is the only alternative to a 
paralyzing skepticism:  criticism, however radical, must begin with an examination of the status 
quo.   
But people begin in very different places.  And many people these days suggest that our 
ship has sprung so many leaks that it is beyond the possibility of repair, indeed that it was un-
seaworthy from the beginning.  Only an examination of the difficulties and of our resources 
(personal as well as collective) for meeting them can begin to provide an answer to such critics.xvii I 
have not so far distinguished between three different elements in our social norms.  One is the 
ephemeral domain of taste and fashion.  The second consists longer-lived conventions such as 
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political constitutions, which nonetheless have limited span of life.  The third includes those even 
longer-lasting traditions for which their adherents claim permanent validity.  On any account, 
identification of the third class requires selectivity; those who defend traditional sexual morality do 
not mean to include the view that, since boys will be boys, it is just as well that there is a class of 
loose women for them to be boys with.  There is nothing wrong with this procedure, but it requires 
principles of evaluation and not just the citation of authorities. 
Not everyone is the beneficiary of the same tradition.  The whole world is now Western, in a 
trashy, least common denominator way, but beneath this surface a multitude of local, communal, 
regional, and national traditions persist.  Each agent must make the best of what is given him, but 
what is given each of us varies from individual to individual. 
All societies change, but one can imagine a society in which change took place so slowly 
that human beings were unaware of it, or so quickly and decisively that memory of former ways of 
life was lost.  But we live in a world in which both change and the consciousness of change are all 
pervasive.  To examine other possibilities is merely to underline how different we are from people 
in a highly traditional society, for example.  We stand rather in an uncomfortable relationship to our 
cultural and religious past, as witness our surfeit of translations of the Bible. 
What is crucial for present purposes is the different ways people react to change.  Some 
embrace it with enthusiasm, and endeavor to drive others, sometimes brutally, "kicking and 
screaming into the Twentieth Century."  Others seek a refuge from the modern world, secured 
among other things by stringent moral rules.  Still others attempt a more discriminating response.  
And such divergent responses lead to the classic situation of ideological deadlock, in which 
considerations A finds persuasive B finds irrelevant, or even supportive of the opposite conclusion. 
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An exchange between Finnis and his liberal opponents, on the cognate issue of infallible teachings 
on moral issues, illuminates the considerations at work here.  The liberals adduce the complexity of 
modern moral problems to cast doubt upon the possibility of finding definitive answers to modern 
moral problems by appeal to revelation.  Finnis sees an argument from some to all here, or more 
exactly an argument from 
(1) Some moral issues are too complex for definitive judgment. 
 
(2) All moral issues are too complex for definitive judgment. 
And he concludes, "Glassanding non sequiturs which seem more at home in politics are to be 
found, remarkably, in serious theological books, and they serve for a time"xviii -- an example, no 
doubt, of the nonpolitical style he thinks appropriate for theological reflection. 
But the liberals' point is not a mere non sequitur, though it is not as decisive as they perhaps 
think.  Modern problems are not only complex but interacting:  the sort of family structure we have 
(or ought to have) is in part a function of the sort of economic structure we have (or ought to have), 
and vice versa.  And education, government, and other aspects of our collective life also have an 
impact on families.  Under such circumstances, one might well doubt the capacity of human beings 
to fix for all time moral requirements concerning marriage, or to discover that God has done so.  
But one might also conclude that, without infallibly taught moral norms, moral judgment would be 
impossible.  And the same argument will apply to exceptionless norms. 
2.7. The Heterogeneity of Morality 
Charles E. Larmore argues "we do best to see morality, at its deepest level, as a motley of 
ultimate commitments.  As a result we should acknowledge that moral conflict can be ineliminable" 
(xi).xix Hence the possibility of a moral blind alley, in which I can honor one of my ultimate 
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commitments only by breaching another, haunts contemporary reflection on moral issues.xx  
Larmore believes that his observation supports a self-consciously modern approach to moral and 
political issues. 
But in fact Larmore's recognition of complexity undermines his response to Alasdair 
MacIntyre's anti-modernist arguments.  Uncharitably attributing a foundationalist moral 
epistemology to MacIntyre, Larmore maintains that "contextualism -- the view that a disputed 
belief is sufficiently justified if justified by appeal to other beliefs not challenged by the particular 
dispute" (29) -- is as reasonable an epistemology for morals as it is for science.  This may be so, but 
it does not answer MacIntyre.   
For MacIntyre is contending that the context of modern morality has been shattered -- that 
the rise of the officially neutral state and the sundering of morality from its religious setting, as well 
as the decline of Aristotle's influence in philosophy, have created a world in which emotivism, 
whatever its flaws as a philosophical theory, is a correct description of how moral argument 
actually proceeds.  When we find ourselves in disputes which threaten to widen until our entire 
picture of the universe is at issue, standard liberals put an end to reflection by invoking a ban on 
"imposing one's values" on other people.    
Examination of our considered judgments reveals three sorts of standard:  consequentialist 
standards, which hold us responsible for how the world goes, so far as that is within our power; 
deontological restrictions on action, such as the prohibition on lying; and partial commitments to 
friends, family, and (for example) colleges and universities.  These principles stand at a 
considerable remove from the rules of "Ten Commandments" morality; two or three of them, and 
possibly other considerations as well, may support a single commonsense rule.  Conflicts between 
each of these requirements and any of the others are possible (ch. 6).  In the absence of a general 
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theory of how to resolve such conflicts, or a belief about the world that limits their possibility, we 
are faced with two unappealing prospects.  One is a possibly unlimited assemblage of moral blind 
alleys; the other is a morality composed entirely of situational judgments.xxi In either case the 
deconstruction of the Western ethical tradition is well underway. 
 2.8.  Individual Variation 
A common attempt to defend actions other people think wrong goes as follows.  Such 
conduct would be wrong if ordinary people did it, but I -- and a few others like me -- are different 
in ways that make it permissible (and perhaps sometimes even obligatory) for us.xxii This argument 
will not do as it stands, since it means that any moral requirement whatever can be evaded by 
pleading individual difference.  And, while human beings differ enormously in temperament, they 
do not group themselves into psychological types such that principles that apply to persons of one 
type cannot be applied to persons of another.   
Homosexuality, to use the most common example of radical human difference, is a highly 
various phenomenon, associated with a variety of other personality traits, and in the production of 
which differing mixtures of choice, genetic difference, and environmental influence combine.  And 
many of those who take part in homosexual relations, or are tempted to do so, will come to prefer 
the opposite sex upon maturity or release from prison, or would have preferred the opposite sex but 
for bitter personal experiences. 
In addition to differences of desire of the sort just mentioned, people also differ in the sorts 
of person they admire and want to become.  These differences of ideal are at least partly moral in 
character, though they lack the purity of Kant's reverence for the moral law.  Some people are more 
capable of sophisticated moral analysis than others, and of acting on conclusions that conflict with 
their own inclinations or the mores of society.  People also differ in decision-making styles:  some 
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people cut through difficulties on the way to their ends, whereas others multiply complications for 
fear of having left out any relevant consideration.  These differences extend also to the sphere of 
morals: some people are temperamentally lax, whereas others are temperamentally scrupulous.  
Finally, people stand in different relations to the conventions and traditions of society:  they differ 
in background, subsequent moral influences, and present situation of comfort or disadvantage.  The 
bad Catholic, the non-practicing, unbelieving Jew, and the agnostic Protestant are very different 
sorts of people. 
The simplest way in which we take differences among human beings into account in moral 
judgment is in admitting excuses -- some of which almost, though not quite, count as justifications.  
Some people, for reasons not their fault, find some rules of morality hard to recognize or, if they do 
recognize them, hard to observe.  If we think of moral requirements as analogous to penal laws, the 
difference between excuse and justification will tend to disappear, since that many people find a 
criminal law too hard to keep is a reason for repealing it (though of course not always a decisive 
reason).  But this analogy has distinct limitations; moral standards are not only methods of social 
control, but also describe elements of a life worthy of a human being. 
It is not, however, possible to limit the impact of human differences on morality to 
questions of excuse.  The advisability of self-improvement campaigns, diets for example, depends 
in part on a person's capacity to follow through with them -- and thus on his (and his adviser's) 
estimate of his probable future actions.  One might well hesitate to end, or to urge another to end, a 
monogamous though from a moral point of view less than ideal sexual relationship, if the result 
were to be a life of promiscuity.  A crucial issue is how far this line of thought can be pressed 
without exempting some people, by reason of their peculiar personalities, from observing the 
requirements of morality. 
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2.9.  Concluding Remarks 
It is now possible to cut back the complexity of moral situations a little.xxiii  It is not 
necessary to formulate moral rules to cover naturally impossible situations, such as those involving 
kittens injected to produce super-cats with human intelligence;xxiv or which presume knowledge 
that human beings cannot have, such that if I have sexual intercourse now, my great-great-grandson 
will be a mass murderer (and I will not have a great-great-granddaughter whose good deeds 
outweigh his crimes). 
There can be no practical need for rules covering such cases, and any result one reaches for 
them will sound odd, if only because of the oddness of the situation envisaged.xxv Moreover 
capacity for moral judgment arises in the world as it is, and there is no reason to suppose that it 
extends to possible worlds other than our own.  Hence a moral code will be sufficiently defended if 
it applies satisfactorily to all naturally possible situations, including only those forms of knowledge 
of which human beings are naturally capable. 
It is possible to strengthen this conclusion, and exclude from consideration even some 
naturally possible situations.  Ursula K. LeGuinxxvi imagines a race of intelligent androgynies, each 
of which is capable of both begetting and bearing a child.  These beings undergo an estrus cycle, 
and have no institution of marriage.  (Their only important conventional rule about sexual behavior 
requires "brothers" to separate after one of them has given birth to a child.)  Such beings may be 
naturally impossible, say for reasons involving hormones, but even if they are possible we need not 
worry about them when we formulate our principles concerning sex, reproduction, and family life.  
For we have no practical dealings with such creatures, and they are structurally discontinuous with 
us in respects relevant to these domains of morality.  The same would not be true, however, of our 
 
The Search for Moral Absolutes  42  Philip E. Devine 
principles governing violence and deceit, procedural principles such as Accept traditional rules that 
withstand scrutiny or general moral principles as such Never use a rational being as a mere means. 
Actual situations are unsettling enough, without the help of science fiction.  Hence we need 
not be concerned here with a contention such as Kai Nielsen's, that “As the world goes, there are 
good grounds for holding that judicial killings [of innocent people] are morally intolerable, though 
... if the world (including human beings) were very different, such killings could be something that 
ought to be done.”xxvii  For our moral rules -- including those which traditional morality designates 
as absolute -- are tied to a world similar, at least in its most important aspects, to our own. 
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3 
AXIOMS, CASUISTRY, ELITISM 
In order to criticize some actual or proposed action, John cites a moral rule of the Ten 
Commandments variety ("Thou shalt not commit adultery," for example).  Mary can reply that her 
act is not one of adultery, or that adultery in her books is not a sin.  But she can also reply, "Life is 
more complicated than you think:  adultery, though ordinarily wrong, is acceptable under these 
circumstances."   
John has a choice of replies: 
(J1) "Yes, life is complicated, and whether adultery is wrong is a matter for case by case 
judgment.  In this case, it is legitimate (or wrong, as the case may be)." 
(J2) "No, life is not complicated, or not as complicated as you think.  Adultery is always 
adultery, and as such always wrong.  Those who think otherwise, in G.E.M. Anscombe's 
phrase, 'show a corrupt mind.'" 
(J3) "Adultery is sometimes justified (and in fact is justified in this case).  But those of us 
who are intelligent enough to discern the cases where adultery is acceptable ought also to be 
prudent enough to keep quiet in front of those whose control over their instincts, and whose 
capacity to make moral distinctions, is weaker than ours." 
(J4) "Yes, life is complicated, but its very complexity requires that some possibilities be 
excluded from moral deliberation.  Married life is complicated enough as it is, without 
admitting adultery as a legitimate possibility." (Those who reject answer J1 or J4 for 
adultery may still accept it for murder, rape, or selling dope to children.) 
By examining John's replies we will be evaluating not only ways of resolving moral 
questions, but also ways of sustaining or challenging moral absolutes.  The argument of chapters 2 
and 3 suffices to refute answer J2, which denies the complexity of human life.  But it is not evident 
what is the best way of dealing with life's complexity:  answer J4 admits complexity while 
preserving the norm.   In this chapter and the two following, I survey the various moves made in 
disputes about moral absolutes, beginning with appeal to some moral axiom. 
3.1. Axioms 
Consider the following propositions: 
(A1) One ought always do good and avoid evil. 
(A1a) One ought always to produce the greatest net good. 
(A1aa) One ought always to produce the best possible balance of pleasure over pain. 
(A2) One ought to act only on those maxims that one can will as universal laws (of nature). 
(A3) One ought always treat humanity as an end in itself, never as a mere means. 
(A4) One ought always observe the mean, as defined by the man (or woman) of practical 
wisdom. 
(A5) One ought always obey the conventions of one's society (so far as these can be 
rationally defended). 
(A6) One ought always to perform the duties of one's station. 
(A7) One ought always to do the most loving thing possible (toward God and neighbor). 
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(A8) One ought always act in accordance with the constant teaching of the Church or the 
plain meaning of Scripture. 
(A9) One ought never offend God. 
Such propositions -- call them moral axioms  -- purport to govern all of our conduct.  All 
are sometimes defended with the claim that they provide the sole alternative to "moral" judgments 
that reflect nothing but the inclinations of the individual or the prejudices he has absorbed from his 
group.  Judgment is required in their application.  Axiom A1aa -- the principle of utility interpreted 
in a hedonistic sense -- comes closest to implying concrete rules for conduct.  But it                      
can also be challenged by appeal to intuitions reflecting a deontological or partialist perspective.  
Why should I kill, deceive, or inflict pain upon my wife or mother, just because the greatest net 
happiness will be advanced, perhaps only slightly, by my doing so? 
And all moral axioms can be challenged in a more fundamental way, by arguments 
supporting an anti-theoretical approach to ethics.  The first step in the argument for anti-theory is 
the fact that -- whatever else it may be -- morality is a feature of human social life before it is a 
matter of philosophical reflection.  Unless we already had a conception of happiness and right 
conduct, or of virtue and rights, at work in our moral language, moral philosophers would have 
nothing to work with.  It is perhaps possible to imagine a world in which no one ever asked whether 
inherited conceptions of the good and the right were defensible, but hardly one that consisted only 
of philosophers proceeding on principles that they had adopted after critical reflection.  The latter 
kind of society would contain no children. 
Michael Oakeshott (ch. 8)i distinguishes between morality as a habit of affection and 
conduct, and morality as the application of criteria (including the self-conscious pursuit of moral 
ideals and the reflective observance of moral rules).  And he concludes that, while the second sort 
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of morality may be an appropriate endeavor for an individual, only the first sort is proper for a 
society.  In his own words, "human life is a gamble; but while each individual must be allowed to 
bet according to his inclination, society should always back the field" (p. 186). 
There is, however, something absurd about Oakeshott's undertaking.  One cannot decide, in 
advance of the situation, how much either an individual or a society should rely on habitual 
responses, and how much on reasoned reflection, in making decisions.  Oakeshott may be right in 
complaining that “the predicament of Western morals ... is first that our moral life has come to be 
dominated by the pursuit of ideals ... and secondly that we have come to think of this dominance as 
... an achievement of which we should be proud“ (pp. 202-3).    But he has not produced a 
persuasive argument for this conclusion. 
Nonetheless, some philosophers have regretted the fact that they exist as members of 
society before they begin to criticize its practices.  Descartes goes so far as to complain that 
Given the fact that we were all children before being adults and that for a long time is our 
lot to be governed by our appetites and our teachers... it is almost impossible for our 
judgments to be as pure or solid as they would have been had we had the full use of reason 
from the moment of our birth and never been led by anything but our reason.ii 
To reject such a position is to advance the discussion a little. 
 The next step in the anti-theoretical argument is a critique of philosophical attempts to 
define an extra-historical starting point from which inherited standards can be critically evaluated.  
Here Wittgenstein's work is helpful.  For he introduces the human element by way of an a priori 
reflection on the nature of knowledge.  He concludes that what is given in cognition is not sense 
data but practices -- what he calls "forms of life" or "language games."  Hence he rejects the 
priority of the first person singular advocated by Descartes, in favor of a perspective that makes 
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knowledge depend on a language that enables one to share one's conclusions with others, and 
enables others to scrutinize and correct one's results.  And the only languages available for this 
purpose are those transmitted from past generations, though each generation modifies its 
inheritance in some way.iii Applied to ethics, Wittgenstein's argument supports an approach like 
that of Hegel.  As Hegel sums it up with uncharacteristic lucidity, "When a father inquired about 
the best method of educating his son in ethical conduct, a Pythagorean replied, 'Make him a citizen 
of a state with good laws.'"iv  For only such a state -- or rather, only such a community,  -- will 
support the full array of concepts, practices, and motivational incentives needed for sound moral 
reasoning and the putting of its conclusions into practice.  But no more for Hegel than for 
Wittgenstein is the essential argument about education.  Hegel's contention is that a morality of 
abstract principles is empty until filled out by the concrete morality of a community, transmitted 
through its moral language.  (Such a community need not, despite Hegel, be the nation-state, but 
can range from a pair of friends or lovers to the human race as a whole.)  Words like theft, murder, 
and love make possible concrete moral and evaluative judgments. 
 The third and final step is an observation concerning the nature of inherited morality, one 
that makes it resistant to restatement in axiomatic form.  Human beings pursue a multitude of 
goods, by way of a multitude of practices governed by a multitude of norms.  (The phrase by way of 
should not be allowed to conceal that many of the goods human beings pursue -- friendship for 
example -- are internal to the practices by which they pursue them.)  And they admire, and try to 
practice, a multitude of virtues.  That business, friendship, family life, politics, education, religion, 
and art should all be governed by the same principle, or short list of principles, is credible only to 
those committed, on a priori«MDUL»«MDNM» grounds, to the existence of such principles. 
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 There is a large gap between any proposed fundamental principle and the concrete decisions 
that form the moral life.  In order, for example, to establish contact between the consequentialist 
axiom A1 and the moral life it is necessary to apply it not only to individual acts, but also to 
attitudes, rules, institutions, and methods of moral education.  And since the effects of any one of 
these will depend largely on the character of the others, we will end up evaluating entire ways of 
life.  Or rather, since it is not possible to create a way of life out of nothing, we will need to 
evaluate proposed changes in our way of life, taking into account the fact that both change and 
failure to change may have unexpected and sometimes unwelcome effects.  We have thus moved 
very far from the prospect, originally presented by utilitarianism, of reconstructing our moral 
tradition from without.  The same argument will apply to any other moral axiom -- including those 
I have listed at the head of this section -- that one might use for such a purpose.  
 The conventionalist axioms A5 and A6 might seem to yield a more determinate result, at 
least if one ignores the possibility of radical critique of existing conventions.  But we must 
distinguish between conventionalism as a moral theory and the moral judgments of conventional 
people, which are sometimes accompanied by a non-conventionalist moral theory or, more often, 
by none at all.  To apply conventionalist moral theories, one has to identify one's group and then 
discern its conventions.  Both operations present problems, the second as much as the first.  Even 
for the most conventional among us, public opinion polls are no way to settle moral issues; those 
who attempt to settle them in that way are called "politicians" and held in little respect by the rest of 
us. 
 Stuart Hampshire has pointed out the complex, even quirky, character of the inherited rules 
and attitudes with which the reflective moralist must of necessity deal.«USSX» 
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Every natural language [he writes] flaunts its idioms and inconsistencies, because they lend 
the language, spoken and written, its distinctive flavor and spirit.  In some important areas 
of morality, which are least regulated by rational calculation, the rules that support a 
particular way of life, and its determinate conception of the human good, will be 
particularly stringent rules. (p. 152) 
But the issue immediately arises, whether this defense is not available for the most blatantly 
irrational institutions.  In overtly racist societies like the Old South, intercourse between a black 
man and a white woman, even in marriage, was strongly tabooed, whereas intercourse between a 
white man and a black woman, though not in marriage, was regarded as a normal part of a young 
man's education.   
Some people attempt to step outside the mores of society and evaluate them is an essential 
part of our moral tradition.  When we undertake the critique of institutions and mores we find 
irrational, we invoke principles that look very much like moral axioms.  These have, to be sure, a 
certain conventional standing, but those who employ them claim on their behalf a supra-
conventional force.   
The anti-theoretical movement in ethics is sound so far as it cast doubt upon the project of 
producing an axiom (or short list of axioms), standing outside the moral tradition of our culture, 
from which moral conclusions can be drawn by applying it to "value-neutral" facts.   But to go 
further, and to reject moral theory as an enterprise, is to condemn oneself to one of two unpalatable 
positions.  Either one must accept the mores of one's society without question, however stupid or 
brutal they appear; or else moral argument turns into a partisan enterprise, subordinate to 
Polemarchus's principle:  Help your friends and hurt your enemies.  Another possibility is a 
religious morality, in which one's personal relationship to God or Christ takes precedence over 
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principles of every sort.  But, even on such a view, reflection will be necessary to help us discern 
what the requirements of this relationship may be.v 
 
 
3.2.  Casuistry 
Casuistry attempts to apply received rules and principles to novel situations (and all 
situations will in some respects be novel).  Causistical reasoning consists in the expansion or 
contraction of received norms in territories under dispute, in order to resolve contested moral 
issues.  It responds to motley of considerations. 
First, each of our crucial moral terms has a descriptive core and at least vague descriptive 
limits.  This observation is consistent with the fact that they are defined with the help of value-
laden terms such as marriage and property.  A happily married man away from his wife on a 
journey sleeps with a woman in order to relieve his boredom and frustration:  to defend such 
conduct means abandoning the concept of adultery in its modern, monogamous sense.  And -- 
however much someone may disapprove of such conduct -- cheating on one's income tax is not 
adultery, gambling is not cruelty to animals, and contraception is not murder.   
But moral terms have more flexibility than literal-minded people might think:  St. Thomas 
Aquinas argued that in cases of extremity all property is in common, so that one who takes what 
appears to be another's goods to ward off starvation is not guilty of theft -- not that his theft is 
excusable or even justifiable.  And the possibility remains that the sense and reference of our moral 
language is entirely a historically contingent matter.   Some people might think that our moral rule 
against murder requires massive revision under conditions of overpopulation. 
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Second, outside the descriptive core, but within the descriptive limits, of the application of a moral 
word every morally relevant consideration is pertinent.  Even if we do not accept utilitarianism or 
consequentialism, it remains the case that whether we consider a wide range of acts murder is in 
part a function of whether we deem it advisable to do so.  But in the case of murder the value we 
place on human life and on the uniqueness of each individual will be an important part of the 
relevant considerations.  And there are powerful prudential reasons not to redefine 
«MDUL»murder«MDNM» or other crucial moral terms to meet every passing moral or political 
agenda. 
Third, the casuist, as opposed to the ethical theorist, works within a framework of rules and 
principles that he receives but does not create (though this distinction is one degree).  The resulting 
diversity of starting points means that casuistry will be, at least in a broad sense, a theological 
activity, i.e., the interpretation and application of some authoritative tradition, if only the 
humanistic tradition of the West. 
Fourth, the coexistence of communities with differing moral and cultural traditions requires 
two sorts of casuistry.  On the one hand, the representatives of each community attempt to elaborate 
its tradition in order to deal with novel situations.  On the other hand, there must be rules of 
coexistence -- what John Courtney Murray calls "articles of peace" -- among these groups, if their 
relationship is not to be one of endless war.  And these rules will require interpretation and 
application, to questions of civil disobedience for example. 
These two forms of casuistry cannot proceed in isolation from one another.  The 
representatives of a community must be concerned with the possibility that the surrounding social 
world may become increasingly hostile or indifferent to its concerns, and engage in subtle or overt 
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forms of persecution as a result.  And those who elaborate the norms of a pluralistic society cannot 
be indifferent to the possibility of communities at war with the rest of society. 
One important causistical tool is the principle of double effect:vi A classic formulation of 
this principle is that of J. -P. Gury, S.J.: 
It is lawful to actuate a morally good or indifferent cause from which will follow two 
effects, one good and the other evil, if there is a proportionately serious reason, and the 
ultimate end of the agent is good, and the evil effect is not a means to the good effect.vii 
 Those who adhere to moral absolutes require such a principle.  For there are circumstances 
in which, whatever one does, an innocent person will die, someone will acquire a false belief as a 
result of one's speech or silence, or some other result one is forbidden to produce directly will 
follow.  One needs to be able to say, in such cases, that one is not doing evil that good may come of 
it, but rather doing good from which evil unfortunately follows.  Hence a physician may prescribe 
pain relievers that, as a regretted or at least an unintended side effect, shorten the patient's life. 
But it is not necessary to believe in absolutes in the strict sense in order to accept the principle of 
double effect.  Some moralists, without believing in moral absolutes in the strict sense, believe in 
virtual absolutes (see § 6.3.) or in acts intrinsically evil in the weak sense -- namely that, though 
they may sometimes be justified, they always require a justification.viii   Such moralists also can use 
the principle of double effect.  So long as it makes a difference whether one is doing evil or 
accepting it as a side effect of one's action, the principle of double effect is a necessary causistical 
tool. 
The credible use of this tool of casuistry requires three conditions.  First, there need to be 
action-kinds resistant to elision into either desired or foreseen consequences.  If one can say, "I am 
not committing adultery, only securing my release from a concentration camp so that I can rejoin 
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my family," the principle of double effect will be superfluous.  And if one is required to admit that 
one is killing those people whose suicide results from one's literacy campaign, the principle of 
double effect will have no application. 
Second, the fact that the bad consequences of one's acts are regretted or at least unintended 
must have some effect on one's behavior.  We must be prepared to take real care, and in the process 
take real risks, to avoid killing noncombatants if we are to claim that we do not intend the deaths of 
those who die as a result of our military actions.ix  Likewise, if we decide not to try to prolong the 
life of a dying person or a severely damaged infant, we must, in order to support our invocation of 
the principle of double effect, show respect for the patient in other ways (including ways whose 
importance is symbolic). 
Third, the application of the principle of double effect requires a background ethics of "my 
station and its duties," although this ethics need not be immune to overriding or revision, say on the 
ground that it reflects a gravely unjust set of institutions (slavery, for example).  Failure to do one's 
conventionally defined duty, or acting in accordance with a defensible interpretation of that duty, 
has a different intentionality than does the intervention of a stranger. 
Two pairs of examples developed by Shelly Kagan make the crucial point:x 
(SK1a) A philosopher expected to win a prize that cannot be awarded posthumously is 
being kept alive on life-support systems.  A rival disconnects him, he dies, and the rival 
then wins the prize. 
(SK1b)  A severely injured boy is also being kept alive on life-support systems.  His doctor 
concludes that recovery is impossible, and after consultation with the boy's family, 
disconnects him.  The boy then dies. 
(SK2a)  Parents fail to feed their children, who then die of starvation. 
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(SK2b)  I fail to feed a homeless person, who then dies of starvation.  
Most of us would say that in cases SK1a and b, the rival philosopher kills and the doctor 
only allows death; and that in cases SK2a and b, the parents kill but I only allow death.  And since 
at least one criterion for imputing intention in difficult cases is the distinction between action and 
inaction,xi we are also likely to say that the rival philosopher and the parents intend the deaths of 
their victims, whereas doctor and I merely foresee them (at least in the absence of further reason for 
imputing intention in these cases).  But central to our judgments in these cases is the fact that the 
doctor is fulfilling a conventionally defined role, and the parents are failing to do so.  If all such 
roles are presumptively illegitimate, then these moral distinctions will cease to make sense. 
 
 3.3.  Elitism 
 One possible source of difficulty is the contemporary belief that all men and women, 
including those who used to be called the "vulgar," are equally entitled to take part in moral 
discussion.  But a tradition represented by Plato,xii Sidgwick,xiii and Roger Scrutonxiv suggests that 
there is a significant difference between two classes of moral agents -- the common people and the 
enlightened few. 
One way of spelling out this difference is as follows.  Moral judgments are matters of 
convention, and these conventions rest ultimately on will and force, by which superior persons (or 
the majority) impose their agendas on their inferiors (or the minority).  We may add that the 
element of force and will underlying our morality should be kept from the majority with the help of 
pious lies.  Some such position was attributed to a wide range of other writers by Leo Strauss, and 
may have been in fact have been that of Strauss himself.xv  In another form, this tradition allows a 
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select class of morally sensitive person to make highly discriminating situational judgments, while 
leaving the mass of mankind to strict deontological norms. 
On such views, religion and conventional morality are fictions necessary to keep the masses 
in line -- or, more politely, to maintain »social order.  Meanwhile philosophers, who have seen 
through the swindle, are entitled to pursue their ends without regard to inherited moral codes, 
though they may have codes of their own which place some constraints upon their actions.  This 
strategy makes ample provision for Machiavellianism:  philosophers can advise their rulers (and 
those among their students who seem destined for rule) to depart from communal codes ruthlessly 
when necessary to preserve the community that sustains them; they can also supply sophistical 
arguments as necessary to refute indiscreet skeptics.   
The hypocrisy required by this strategy renders it unacceptable.  Moreover it ignores the 
fact that there is now a substantial "trickle down" from elite to mass attitudes.  Lastly, it supposes, 
contrary to fact, that philosophers are immune to the physical, intellectual, and emotional 
limitations that afflict ordinary people.  Philosophers as much as ordinary folk are subject to social 
pressures, including the various forms of "political correctness."  Philosophers who undertake 
propaganda for Machiavellian reasons are likely to end up believing their own lies for the same 
reason ordinary people are.  Philosophers as much as ordinary folk often fail to live up to their own 
convictions; philosophers as well as ordinary folk must die.   
Nonetheless, those who insist, as I would, on the public character of moral judgments,xvi 
must admit one important qualification.  There are strong social conventions against direct 
expression of disapproval of other people's behavior.  Disapproval is usually expressed obliquely, 
often with qualifiers like "it's all right if that's what they want ...."  Only when the person making 
the judgment has a personal interest in the matter (including an interest such as raising his children 
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"right"), or else has an institutional position, say as religious leader, which entitles him to speak out 
on moral issues, is direct expression of moral disapproval considered appropriate.  How far 
politeness can qualify honesty in moral matters is itself a matter of casuistry, which nothing in the 
present argument enables or requires me to resolve. 
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 4 
ANTI-PROPORTIONALISM 
Ethical theories can be roughly arranged along a spectrum, according to the extent to which 
they admit moral reasoning in the form of a calculus, such as Bentham proposed.  On the "Right" 
end of this spectrum stands an important school of contemporary conservative Roman Catholic 
moral thought led by John Finnis and Germain Grisezi which rejects calculative methods, or even 
rougher comparisons of competing goods, except insofar as we are engaging in merely technical 
reasoning.  While we may call the doctrines of this school either "the new natural law theory”ii or 
"the new rigorism," a more accurate expression for its position is "anti-proportionalism."   But 
while anti-proportionalism includes a polemic against utilitarianism and all its cousins, it is also an 
affirmative contribution to the long-standing tradition which attempts to discover fundamental 
ethical principles with whose aid it is possible to resolve disputed questions of morals, 
The anti-proportionalist movement is not exclusively Catholic, however.  The views of the 
Methodist Paul Ramsey are in some respects similar to those of Finnis and Grisez, though not in the 
same way reducible to a master argument.iii  Nor is this way of thinking the exclusive preserve of 
religious moralists.   Phillipa Foot argues that "the concept of 'the best state of affairs' should 
disappear from moral theory, though not ... from all talk in moral contexts,”iv where such talk can 
be given definite meaning by appeal to some virtue.  I shall argue below that the virtue of prudence 
yields an acceptable meaning for this expression, though not one that warrants the generalized 
overriding of inherited moral rules. 
By "proportionalism" is meant the weighing and balancing of disparate goods in order to 
resolve moral questions, and in particular to warrant departures from inherited moral rules (or 
indeed to support adherence to them).v Proportionalism may be distinguished from 
consequentialism (or utilitarianism minus hedonism), in that a proportionalist takes into account 
considerations other than consequences in the usual sense, such as that each of us shapes his 
character by his choices.   
Finnis and Grisezvi reject proportionalism, not only as the sole or sovereign method of 
moral reasoning, but even as one method of prudential judgment among others; in fact, they regard 
it as meaningless, except as a way of rationalizing decisions made on other, and very likely 
questionable, grounds.  In doing so, they evade an argument that many writers on ethics have found 
very powerful, one that has been formulated by Samuel Scheffler as follows:  "Anyone who resists 
consequentialism seems committed to the claim that morality tells us to do less good than we are in 
a position to do, and to prevent less evil than we are in a position to prevent."vii  For, they hold, 
there is no such thing as "less good" and "less evil" in the relevant senses of the words. 
The resulting approach to moral issues has now been embodied in an impressive body of 
literature, including works of Thomistic scholarship,viii freestanding moral philosophy,ix legal and 
constitutional theory,x and moral theology (FC, MLA, WLJ).  Finnis and Grisez have also 
discussed of a range of special moral issues:  these discussions center on such traditional Catholic 
concerns as sexual moralsxi and medical ethics (A, LDLJ), but include also an argument rejecting 
nuclear deterrence on the grounds that it requires a morally impermissible intention to take innocent 
life (ND).  Arguing against ("artificial") contraception has been a central preoccupation of Grisez at 
least, ranging from the early Contraception and the Natural Lawxii written before the controversial 
encyclical Humanae Vitae (1968), through the recent collaborative effort The Teaching of 
Humanae Vitae and beyond.   
Anti-proportionalism is of interest both to ethical theorists and to those interested in moral 
controversies within particular communities.  Two different impulses -- not altogether in harmony -
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- are at work in Finnis and Grisez's program.  One impulse starts with a philosophical thesis, that 
values are incommensurable and sound proportionalist reasoning therefore impossible, and turns to 
the Christian (and especially to the Catholic) tradition, restrictively interpreted, to reinforce this 
conclusion.   
The other impulse undertakes the defense of traditional Catholic moral teachings against 
external critics and internal dissidents (or "revisionists" as they are unfortunately called); and finds 
in philosophical anti-proportionalism a welcome ally.  Finnis especially represents that side of anti-
proportionalism whose primary appeal is to tradition.  For treats what he calls the "high tradition" 
(MA 32, 34) as a moral authority, and goes so far as to accord a privileged intellectual position to 
the medieval Latin word homicidium (MA 37), in preference to the English word homicide and 
murder.  Presumably the ground of this distinction is that medieval people embodied the "high 
tradition" in a way moderns do not.xiii I begin with Finnis and Grisez's master argument.  After a 
theological interlude, I then consider, first, their use of that argument to protect traditional moral 
teachings against criticism; and, second, their use of that argument in deriving moral conclusions of 
their own. 
 
4.1 A Master Argument 
Finnis and Grisez share two assumptions that for present purposes need not be defended or 
elaborated further.  We human beings are free, but the goods that shape our choices are independent 
of our will.   There are intelligible goods independent of human preference, though not of human 
beings.  Moral judgments are to be justified in terms of these goods, rather than by a categorical 
imperative independent of persons or by arbitrary determinations of the will.  (It does not matter 
whether "will" here is divine or human; and if human, individual or collective.)  The issue that 
 
The Search for Moral Absolutes  67  Philip E. Devine 
remains, once we accept these assumptions, is how we should proceed when the requirements of 
two different goods, or of the same good in two different manifestations, appear to conflict. 
Anti-proportionalism, while only one aspect of Finnis and Grisez's thought, nonetheless is what 
makes their thought distinctive within the broader natural law tradition.  The two share a master 
argument that further expresses their distinctive contribution to ethics.  This argument maintains 
that, since goods are incommensurable, proportionalist moral reasoning is impossible (and not just 
dangerous). 
The exclusion of proportionalism is therefore to be taken strictly, as barring this style of 
moral reasoning in any context.  As Finnis puts it, 
Once a moralist accepts a proportionalist method, even as one methodological principle 
amongst others, he can produce arguments in favour of any solution which he already 
favours.  All such arguments will be illegitimate, i.e., mere rationalizations.  Moreover, to 
the extent that he seeks to deny his proportionalist method the exclusive status which it has 
in the classic utilitarian and other consequentialist systems, he can find no grounds for so 
restricting it which are not either (a) rationalizations or (b) grounds for excluding the 
proportionalist method altogether. (FE 95) 
Or, as Grisez puts in a popular work, "proportionalists speak in measured, rational terms about 
greater goods and lesser evils, but in the final analysis their system, like the judgments it purports 
to justify, has no rational basis" (FC 71).  For the attempt to weigh and balance competing goods is 
for Grisez inevitably a mask for an arbitrary decision or the promptings of appetite. 
Finnis and Grisez conclude that, since every possible reason for rejecting stringent moral 
norms can be refuted with the help of their master argument, a morality that commands 
unconditional respect, in each and every act, for each and every basic human good, is for that the 
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only rationally available option.  Merely technical (means-end) commensuration, however, they 
admit as legitimate (e.g., FE  §IV.3).   
Grisez at least uses the anti-proportionalist method to argue that, once the claims of Church 
authority are admitted even prima facie, no reason however strong suffices to override them, at 
least about moral issues (WLJ ch. 1, q. C). 
  For there is no way of arguing as follows:  adherence to Church teaching is an important 
consideration for the moral theologian, but except in the case of infallible teachings the claims of 
such teachings can be overridden by other considerations.  In practice Grisez admits that some 
magisterial pronouncements -- such as those pre-Vatican II papal statements hostile to religious 
toleration -- are "noninfallible" and thus open to development (WLJ 126), though on his account 
this development cannot involve proportionalist reasoning.  For if proportionalist reasoning is 
impossible, neither the Pope and bishops, nor the Church collectively can engage in it any more 
than can private individuals or dissenting moral theologians. 
Grisez understands his proportionalist opponents as asserting that the degree of 
consideration to be given a good is independent of the moral character of the agent, so that once a 
person undertakes to assess conflicting moral requirements in proportionalist terms, the correct 
answer inevitably follows.  Hence, he argues, the proportionalist cannot satisfy two requirements 
that any moral method must meet:  giving results, and making moral error possible.  In Grisez's 
own words: 
If the first condition is met and the morally wrong action could be chosen, then its morally 
acceptable alternative must be known.  Otherwise one could not choose wrongly, for one 
chooses wrongly only when one knows which option one ought to choose and chooses a 
different option.  But when the first condition is met, the second cannot be.  The option 
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which promises the definitely superior proportion of good to bad cannot be known by a 
person who chooses an alternative which promises less.  If the superior option were known 
as superior, its inferior alternative simply could not be chosen. (WLJ 132) 
Moreover, he argues, if proportionalism were true, there would be no freedom of choice, since to 
see the greatest good would be do it; in his own words,  
All that proportionalists really say is that it would be wrong to choose precisely that which 
`practical judgment (as they understand it) would exclude as a possibility for free choice, 
namely an alternative measurably inferior in terms of the relevant goods and bads. (WLJ 
chap.  6, q. F, § 7).xiv 
There are some striking similarities between anti-proportionalism and the tradition of 
ethical skepticism represented by Hume and Nietzsche.  Against proportionalists, Grisez holds that 
the relative claims of various goods, though not their status as goods, is determined only in choice.  
In his own words, "choice does determine which good henceforth will be considered greater and 
which evil lesser, because the good which one identifies in choosing becomes part of one's personal 
scale of value" (WLJ 157).  Thus, apart from moral constraints, he is committed to Hume's maxim 
that it is not irrational to prefer the destruction of the entire universe to the scratching of one's little 
finger. 
We can also discern positivist influence on Grisez is his understanding of the Galileo affair.  
He understands the conflict between science and Church authority in terms of a strongly drawn 
contrast between empirical issues on the one hand and those of theology and morality on the other 
(WLJ 10, 899-900).  Since Galileo was a scientist, he had persuasive reasons to prefer his own 
conclusions to the official teaching of the Church of his day, but contemporary critics of official 
sexual morality cannot have such reasons.  Unfortunately for Grisez, Galileo's theories were shaped 
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by an understanding of what the world was like and what an adequate scientific theory 
consequently must be like, which did not derive entirely from observation or experiment.xv 
In any case, Grisez has created a false dilemma here.  On the one hand, the character of the person 
doing it affects moral reasoning.  A selfish person will systematically neglect to see the claims of 
other people, an ungrateful person the claims of gratitude.  On the other hand, to reduce our 
evaluation of a moral judgment to a judgment of the character of the person making it is to invite a 
sort of pharasaism against which the New Testament preaches more vigorously than it does against 
any form of sexual irregularity.  Virtue ethics has an indispensable contribution to make to our 
understanding of the resolution of moral problems, but so does our understanding of the state of 
affairs external to the agent. 
A more adequate view holds that goods impose a vague and unspecified hierarchy of claims 
on us before choice, and by that our choices we give this hierarchy a clearer structure.  Defects in 
temperament or moral education for which the agent is not to blame may lead to good faith moral 
error, which we can understand as a failure of perception.  But habitual wrongdoing, understood at 
least initially by the agent as such, can also warp his moral capacities; this is traditionally called the 
darkening of conscience.  Choice between good and evil is possible, because either past decisions 
of the agent or conditions of human life for which the agent is not, as a discrete individual, to blame 
("original sin") have muddled our understanding of the order of goods.  (How human beings not so 
afflicted could choose wrongly seems to me a mystery; perhaps anti-proportionalism would be true 
within the gates of Eden.)  But reasoned decision is possible because careful reflection, given a 
generally virtuous disposition (and, a theologian would say, God's grace), will illuminate the moral 
situation and enable us to appreciate the proper hierarchy of goods.  It is not possible, on this view, 
to give a general answer to the question whether a person ought to undertake a proportionalist 
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judgment, or to act on it once he has made it. Much depends on the danger of misperception, either 
on the agent's part or on the part of other people influenced by him. 
Such an account avoids Grisez's difficulties with the notion of blameless moral error (WLJ 
91).  Failures of perception are not necessarily blameless; at least in the present world, the failure to 
give any importance whatever to the interests of whole classes of people is unlikely to be so.  But 
when a multitude of considerations are at stake, it is easy to see how an intelligent person, in good 
faith, could get the answer wrong.  Nor need we suppose the least laxity in any department of 
morality necessarily threatens the whole system. 
In short, an adequate account of moral judgment must include both the contribution (and 
hence also the responsibility) of the agent and the sense of external constraint under which agents 
labor.  Such an account will lead us to recognize the lumpy, grainy, texture of value, in contrast 
with the smooth, homogeneous texture supposed by consequentialists and the rocky, unyielding 
texture supposed by their militant opponents. Moralists need to learn to respect the differing 
qualities of the moral terrain, as agriculturists need to learn to respect the differing qualities of the 
soil, some parts of which are in greater need than others of what Wendell Berry calls "kindly use." 
4.2 An Appeal to Heaven 
I now consider an argument of a rather different character, one directed only to theists.  
Finnis appeals to the belief that God governs the world by His providence in defense of the 
existence of moral absolutes.  As Finnis has put it, 
Divine providence involves permission of evil (of any and every kind) only so that out of it 
God may draw a somehow greater good.  So that if the supreme or decisive moral 
responsibility is to pursue a state of affairs embodying greater good, the moral norm in 
every problem-situation would be, quite simply, try anything.  That is, Do anything you feel 
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like!  For if you accomplish what you attempt, you can be certain that what you chose 
tended toward overall long-run net good (since God's providence permitted), whereas if you 
fail in your attempt, you can be certain that your failure tended toward overall net good 
since God's providence excluded the success of your effort. (MA 15-16) 
But this argument threatens to destroy all forms of religiously motivated morality.  Any 
morality must suppose that it is better that human beings should observe its requirements than that 
they should breach them.  And if "all manner of things will be well" whatever I do -- if even my 
damnation, if that is the result of my action, is good because it contributes to the glory of God -- 
then radically antinomian conclusions follow.  If, on the other hand, we call upon Providence to 
make the consequences of adhering to a moral rule come out right, despite appearances to the 
contrary, "the motivational sinews of consequentialism are left intact, and are qualified only 
extrinsically."xvi 
4.3 Getting Down to Cases (1) 
It is now time to consider the way Finnis and Grisez handle concrete moral issues.  I begin 
with their critique of the arguments made by critics of traditional moral absolutes, since their theory 
was first forged in concrete moral controversy of this sort. 
Finnis is guilty of a rhetorical and methodological error, which may have adverse effects 
even on the substance of his conclusions.  He starts with a controversial sexual example 
(remarriage following divorce [MA 7]), and thereafter heavily emphasizes contraception.  If he had 
begun instead with rape or torture, his case would be more persuasive, but one might also expect 
different concrete results, say a lesser stringency about sexual morals and a greater stringency about 
killing (for example, about capital punishment). 
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An example of Finnis's methodological difficulties is his use of the ancient art of casuistry 
to defend moral absolutes is his support for an absolute prohibition on artificial contraception, but 
one understood as permitting Natural Family Planning.  He maintains,  
The system of identifying fertile times and avoiding intercourse at those times can ... be 
ffollowed by couples who form no intention to impede the coming-to-be of a new child, and 
who in following that system of avoiding intercourse intend only to avoid the bad side 
effects which having a baby may bring about. (MA 86).    
But that such couples avoid offspring by abstaining from intercourse does not resolve the 
question of their intentions.  For they take active measures (discovering the woman's fertile period, 
for example) to achieve their goal, i.e., to enjoy the other goods involved in sexual intercourse 
without producing offspring.  (Paul VI himself speaks of Natural Family Planning as a way of 
"controlling birth," i.e., of preventing births at inappropriate times, and urges scientists to determine 
"a sufficiently secure basis for the chaste limitation of offspring."xvii And one can manifest an 
impermissible intention by inaction, e.g., by failing to provide a prisoner with food. 
The central difficulty for Finnis's argument has to do with the concept of intention.  The 
root question is to what extent differences of intention can be cashed in terms of overt action, and 
to what extent very different intentions can be expressed in to what to all appearances is the same 
act (to use another example, in giving a person dying in great pain a substantial dose of morphine). 
Finnis both displays and conceals the central difficulty in this concept when he writes: 
Aquinas puts the point starkly when he says that a conjugal act of intercourse and an act of 
adultery are acts of different types even though the behavior, the physical and 
psychosomatic activity, may be identical. And he does not mean to make the logical, empty 
point that the two types of act are morally right and morally wrong. Rather, he is saying that 
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the reason that there can be this profound moral difference is precisely that, despite their 
physical identity, they are different types of human act:  the wills of the parties relate to the 
human goods at stake in intercourse quite differently. (MA 38)xviii 
But there are is no reason to suppose that all married, all unmarried, or all adulterous, lovers relate 
their wills to the goods involved in sexual intercourse in the same way.   
Finnis is aware of the complexities involved in applying notions such as intention.  He has 
for example written: 
Too generalized or rule-governed an application of the notion of "double effect" would 
offend against the Aristotelian, common law, Wittgensteinian wisdom that here "we do not 
know how do draw the boundaries of the concept" -- of intention, of respect for the good of 
life, and of action as distinct from consequences -- "except for a special purpose." (RWA 
143-4)xix 
But he appeals to the judgments of "those whom Aristotle bluntly calls the wise" to resolve difficult 
cases for the application of these concepts (RWA 144).  And he never explains how is possible for 
the wise to do so, without some implicit proportionalist judgments concerning the relative 
importance of the goods and evils at stake in each choice. 
The closest thing to an answer to this difficulty is to be found in the following passage: 
To judge one's option right, one must consider all morally relevant circumstances -- bonum 
ex integra causa. But one can judge an agent's action wrong as soon as one identifies a 
morally significant defect in one's motivation, or an inappropriateness in relation either to 
the circumstances or the means involved in that option -- malum ex quocumque defectu.  
(MA 16-17) 
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«USNX»But it is not to be taken for granted that, in every problem situation, a solution free from 
every "defect" is possible.  And, if not, the principle of the lesser evil will be an inescapable feature 
of our processes of moral reasoning, despite Finnis and Grisez's objections. 
4.4 Getting Down to Cases (2) 
Similar problems arise when Finnis and Grisez attempt to defend moral judgments in their 
own right.  Grisez formulates the core anti-proportionalist moral principle (or in his own language, 
"mode of responsibility") as follows:  "One should not be moved by a stronger desire for some 
instance of an intelligible good to act by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede some other 
instance of an intelligible good" (WLJ 216).  I shall call this mode of responsibility the principle of 
respect for human goods.  In defense of the principle of respect for human goods, Finnis and Grisez 
reasons as follows:  proportionalist reasoning is always fallacious, so that there can be no possible 
warrant for rejecting the claim of any intelligible good in any situation.   
Hence, Grisez reasons, artificial contraception is always wrong, since it involves a direct 
attack on the basic good of reproduction (or on the good of life in its procreative aspect).  In what 
may be fairly regarded as a manifesto of the anti-proportionalist school, The Teaching of Humanae 
Vitae, Grisez and Finnis join Joseph Boyle and William May in arguing that "contraception should 
be regarded as homicide is regarded," citing as authority a provision of Catholic canon law no 
longer in effect (THV 37).  Many people will regard this result as so absurd as to warrant the 
rejection of any moral theory from which it is drawn.  For, if artificial contraception is morally 
speaking a form of homicide, it is hard to see why there is so much difficulty about legalized 
abortion, since very few people believe that contraception should be a crime (for Grisez's view, see 
A 438).   
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Grisez could argue that contraception, like suicide, though morally speaking homicidal, 
does not involve injustice.  (Compare LDLJ.)  But our reason for rejecting the claim that 
contraception involves injustice is also a reason for rejecting the claim that contraception is a form 
of homicide, or to be regarded as such.  It is that we cannot specify who is being unjustly treated 
when a couple practices contraception, unless we are prepared to say that there are souls in Heaven 
waiting to be conceived, who may be wronged even by a decision to abstain from intercourse.   
This may not be a decisive objection for Finnis for, as we shall see below, he separates the order of 
justice from the good of individual persons. 
Likewise, suicide is always wrong on anti-proportionalist premises.  For it involves a direct 
attack on the basic good of life.  Somewhat surprisingly, however, the new rigorists admit the 
legitimacy of killing in self-defense, including the somewhat controversial case of abortion to save 
the pregnant woman's life.  (Grisez acknowledges some tension with official Catholic teaching 
authority at this point [A 345-6].)  As Grisez puts it, 
The justification is simply that the very same act, indivisible as to its behavioral process, 
has both the good effect of protecting human life and the bad effect of destroying it.  The 
fact that the good effect is subsequent in time and in physical process to the evil one is 
irrelevant, because the entire process is indivisible by human choice and hence all aspects 
are equally present to the agent as he makes his choice.  (A 340) 
In other words, it is possible in such cases to choose the preservation of the woman's life, while 
accepting the child's death as a regretted side effect, even when what is at issue is the crushing of 
the child's head.  But this very compact reading of the agent's intentions, for the purposes of the 
principle of double effect, supposes a background judgment that leniency on this issue does not 
threaten the general principle of respect for life (as would for example approving decapitation as a 
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remedy for headache).  In short, principles like that of double effect are helps to prudence rather 
than substitutes for it, and proportionalist reasoning is involved in the construction of intention and 
not in the requirement of proportionate reason alone. 
Finnis and Grisez differ in their application of the neo-rigorist to capital punishment.   Such 
punishment takes the death of an individual as an end in a way (individual or collective) self-
defense and possibly even abortion do not:  even on the wildest science-fiction hypothethicals, if 
the convicted criminal survives, the execution has failed.  Nonetheless, Finnis defends the death 
penalty on the grounds that "the defining and essential ... point of punishing is to restore an order of 
fairness which was disrupted by the criminal's criminal act" (FE 118).xx  The missing premise here 
is that the "order of fairness" outweighs this criminal's life in the scales of moral reasoning  -- a 
contention that looks proportionalist to me.  Hence Grisez seems to have the better of the argument 
when he expresses the hope that Christian doctrine will develop in such a way as to exclude the 
death penalty (WLJ ch. 8, q. H, § 10).   
It seems that Finnis and Grisez would be pacifists if they were consistent, on the grounds 
that all killing in war intentionally destroys human life.  Enemy soldiers as such are surely not 
criminals, nor are their deaths a requirement of justice of the sort Finnis invokes.  The background 
prudential judgments that prevent many people from reaching this conclusion are not necessarily 
wrong, but it is hard to see how Finnis and Grisez are entitled to make them. 
In any case, applying Grisez and Finnis's principle of respect for human goods requires 
proportionalist judgments.  Consider for example the prolongation of human life.  The more 
invasive or expensive a therapy is, the easier it is to justify its omission; the less invasive or 
expensive it is the harder it is to do so.  For example, the conclusion that we are not engaging in 
mercy-killing, but only using good medical judgment, if we decide to omit invasive and expensive 
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treatment of a patient suffering from Down's Syndrome, or to give a dying patient normally 
unacceptable doses of pain-relievers, involves a background of proportionalist reasoning. 
Again:  reproduction is a basic good.  Suppose that a fertile man with a barren wife finds 
himself attracted to a fertile woman.  If he reins in his sexual desires because he wants to remain 
faithful to his wife, it would seem that he is at least "impeding," if not exactly "damaging" or 
"destroying," the basic good of reproduction.  Only a sense of the overriding value of marital 
fidelity could lead us to say that one is not exactly choosing, in such a case, to impede that good.  
But this way of reasoning has an inescapable proportionalist element.  To be sure, this particular 
problem could be evaded by deleting the word impede from the principle of respect for human 
goods, with the result that the principle would permit at least temporary sterilization. 
Friendship is also an important human good.  Like human lives, friendships are unique and 
irreplaceable, so that it is not sufficient to say that someone in a difficult situation can always make 
a new friend.  But friends, being imperfect, sometimes injure or corrupt one another.xxi  It is not 
sufficient to dismiss a dangerous friend as no friend at all, or to rely on "love's knowledge"xxii to 
avoid the possibilities of exploitation and degradation inherent in human relationships.  A person 
may decide to break with a friend whose influence he finds corrupting, and a parent may for the 
same reason interfere with a child's associations.  Such decisions are always painful, but cannot be 
excluded by a prohibition against ever acting directly against the good of friendship.  Nor can the 
system of Finnis and Grisez deal with the conflicts of loyalty to friends or groups of friends 
(including national communities) which for many people are the most important source of moral 
anguish, and which in the nature of the case cannot be resolved in absolutist terms. 
Grisez concedes that virtuous people sometimes make what look like proportionalist 
judgments: for example a woman subjected to sexual harassment might reason:  "Certainly it was 
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bad to be let go, but it would have been a lot worse to behave like a prostitute in order to keep 
working there " (FC 64).  But he is forced to argue that such proportionalism is somehow spurious. 
Politics too makes proportionalist judgment indispensable, even for those with strong 
deontological convictions.  Suppose we are citizens of the West like Finnis and Grisez who 
conclude, at the height of the Cold War, that nuclear deterrence is an immoral strategy (ND).  If, as 
seems likely, we see no hope of getting our moral judgments accepted as a basis for public policy, 
we still have to make prudential decisions about conventional warfare and such things as "Star 
Wars."  And while political issues present some technical aspects, they also involve decisions (E.g., 
about risk assessment), which cannot be understood either in merely technical terms or by appeal to 
the unconditional requirements of human goods. 
In arguing for their principle of respect for human goods, both Finnis and Grisez invoke 
atrocities defended on proportionalist grounds.  Although they hold that proportionalism is 
meaningless, they still have a pretty good idea of the sorts of behavior it will be used to justify:  
"the Allied terror bombing belatedly condemned by Vatican II, ever more widespread resort to 
abortions of convenience, and the killing of defective children" (BE 9) as well as the nuclear 
holocaust that has not, yet at least, taken place (A 346).   
Even if we grant that proportionalism is the culprit in these cases, this argument proves self-
destructive.  For on Finnis and Grisez's showing, proportionalism cannot logically imply approval 
of such behavior.  And if causal relationships are the issue, then the evil done on proportionalist 
grounds needs to be balanced against the good so done -- for example the abandonment of 
religiously grounded prohibitions on anesthesia during childbirth.  Finnis and Grisez might argue 
that any principle even invoked to defend terror bombing or elective abortions is discredited by that 
fact alone, but all principles can be, and sometimes are, misapplied.  And their argument implies 
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that we can never rationally strike a balance between the advantages and disadvantages of 
accepting a moral principle. 
The new rigorists are Catholic moral theologians as well as philosophers. And both Finnis 
(BE) and Grisez (THV 7-32)xxiii are on record as calling for solemn ecclesiastical condemnation, of 
a sort not customarily invoked in moral matters, of views advocated on proportionalist grounds.  
Before taking such advice, the Pope and the bishops are surely required to weigh, not only the truth 
of the matter, but also the effect of such condemnations on the well being of the Church.  Since 
popes and bishops are -- like it or not -- political as well as spiritual figures, any other course would 
be irresponsible.   
Again, all moralities distinguish between more and less serious offenses.  For Finnis and 
Grisez, this distinction takes the form of a distinction between mortal and venial sin.  To be more 
precise, it is the distinction between light and grave matter: the "subjective" requirements of mortal 
sin -- sufficient reflection and full consent -- are not presently at issue. I here consider Grisez's 
detailed discussion in The Way of the Lord Jesus. 
Grisez would make life easier for himself if he subordinated the concept of light matter to 
that of sufficient reflection and full consent, and held that minor sins, though they could 
conceivably involve a deliberate rejection of God, are relatively unlikely to do so.  He attributes 
such a view to the theorists of "fundamental option."  On this approach, grave matter is the sort of 
thing, which is likely to be an occasion for making or reversing one's fundamental option.  Actions 
not likely to affect one's basic orientation toward or against God are light matter. (WLJ 385).xxiv   
Such a view would fit better with his theoretical outlook than the one he adopts, since it reduces his 
need to distinguish between graver and lighter offenses in terms of the external damage they do.  
(Recall here the otherwise unintelligible contention that contraception is tantamount to homicide.)  
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But even on such a view he would need to explain why, on anti-proportionalist premises, genocide 
involves greater damage to the good than does adultery or missing Sunday mass (and thus is more 
likely to be a mortal sin).   
In fact Grisez undertakes to defend a tradition in which the distinction between grave and 
light matter is maintained "rigidly" rather than adapted to the vagaries of individual psychology and 
cultural formation.  But in specifying what this is, he is reduced to appealing to the judgment of the 
Church, "which perhaps defies easy articulation" (WLJ 396), but which cannot on his premises be 
proportionalist.  This judgment is surely not an example of the merely technical commensuration 
whose possibility and legitimacy the new rigorists admit.   
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Finnis and Grisez are right to warn us of the dangers of proportionalist reasoning in ethics.  
It can be, and frequently is, used to rationalize decisions made on other, often highly questionable 
grounds.  But there are serious objections to attempting to do without proportionalist reasoning 
altogether. 
If Finnis and Grisez were more consistent, they would depart from Catholic tradition as they 
understand it in at least three ways.  They wound accept absolute pacifism, since any killing 
involves an infringement on the basic good of life.  They would adopt a fundamental option view of 
moral responsibility, since on their view there is no way of distinguishing graver from lesser 
offenses in terms of the gravity of the harm done).  They would defend an anti-political (radical 
Reformation) view of the Christian community, since Christians on their view cannot make 
judgments of political prudence.   
 
The Search for Moral Absolutes  82  Philip E. Devine 
It is easy to draw from their theory further consequence contrary to Catholic tradition, e.g., 
that vows of celibacy, which imply a permanent renunciation of a person's procreative capacities, 
are morally wrong.  Moreover, Finnis and Grisez's rhetoric of a church in crisis, which supports 
their calls for anathemas, is in sharp contrast with their professed willingness to accept bad 
consequences, in the hope that God will work things out eventually. 
  Even the appeal to tradition is questionable on anti-proportionalist grounds, unless one 
believes that God has revealed a complete system of casuistry.  For unless human beings can learn 
from moral experience, there can be no such thing as the wisdom of the ages.  While Grisez affirms 
the development of moral doctrines (WLJ ch. 36, q. G, §§ 1-5), he cannot admit that this 
development can take place by way of either greater insight into the effects of forms of human 
behavior (say slavery) or greater insight into the relationships among the goods sought in the forms 
of human life (say marriage).  Neither will it be possible, on his premises, to fashion fresh moral 
doctrines to deal with urgent problems about which absolutes are not available, such as 
unemployment or the fouling of the environment.   
In short, anti-proportionalists, by reason of their unwillingness to assume a hierarchy of 
values at least to some degree independent of choice, are unable to reach the sorts of judgments 
required by the tradition with which they are most closely associated, and which its arguments are 
designed to support (as well as by any other tradition of which I am aware).  On the contrary, I 
conclude, proportionalist judgments are both necessary and possible, and for that reason sometimes 
legitimate.   
But there is no reason to suppose that proportionalist judgments are always possible, let 
alone always legitimate, and considerable reason to suppose that they are sometimes barred.  For 
they frequently baffle our understanding, and are frequently used to justify atrocities.  We require 
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prudence (in the Aristotelian sense of virtue using its head) in order to know when to take a firm 
stand for a moral principle, and when to make a more accommodating situational judgment.  But 
prudential judgment is difficult both to practice and to understand.xxv 
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xi Ronald Lawler, O.F.M.Cap., Joseph Boyle, and William E. May, Catholic Sexual Ethics 
(Huntington, Ind.:  Our Sunday Visitor Press, 1985). 
xii Milwaukee:  Bruce, 1964. 
xiii Finnis neglects the fact that, in the high Middle Ages, during which the Catholic tradition is 
usually thought to be at its peak, canonists (including Popes) addressed the problem of crime 
prevention in markedly utilitarian (though not quite Benthamite) terms.  See Robert M. Roher, 
"Preventing Crime in the High Middle Ages," in Popes, Teachers, and Canon Law in the Middle 
Ages, James Ross Sweeney and Stanley Chodorow eds. (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1989), 
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and Olaf Tollefsen, Free Choice (Notre Dame:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1976). 
xvThomas Kuhn has written of "paradigms" here; more adequately, Imre Lakatos has written of 
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Programmes," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. with Alan Musgrave (Cambridge:  
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xvii Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, §§16, 24.  Trans.  in Claudia Carlen, I.H.M. ed., The Papal 
Encyclicals, 1958-1981 (N.p.:  Consortium, 1981), pp. 227, 230.   
xviii The reference is to St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia IIae, q. 18, a. 5, ad 3. 
 
xix This is a relatively early essay; Finnis's position may have stiffened since. 
xx He is here responding to Grisez, "Towards a Consistent Natural Law Ethics of Killing," 
American Journal of Jurisprudence10 (1970): 67-70. 
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xxii Title of a book by Martha Nussbaum (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
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xxiv For an actual example of a fundamental option theory, see Bernard Häring, Free and Faithful in 
Christ, vol. 1 (New York:  Seabury, 1978), pp. 211-5, 396-410. 
 
xxvThis chapter benefited from the comments of an anonymous reader. 
5 
 PRUDENCE 
In all moral systems, rules and principles sometimes fail to give us the guidance we need.  
And the problem of reaching reasonable judgments where rules and principles are insufficient 
arises, not only in morality, but also in the philosophy of science, in critical theory, and in the 
attempt to deal intellectually with the relationship between rival cultures.i  The sort of judgment 
then required has gone by various names.  One such word is discernment, but its aesthetic and 
theological overtones are best avoided at this stage of the argument.  Prudence is better but requires 
some elucidation.   
For mainstream English speaking philosophy understands prudence as that virtue concerned 
with promoting one's own interests,ii or even as one self-regarding virtue among others (distinct, 
for example, from courage).iii  But prudence in the proper moral sense takes into account the 
interests of other persons, at least insofar as virtue requires attending to them in our decisions.  A
one requirement for an adequate account of prudential reasoning is to avoid (or at least minimize) 
the quantitative language that bedevils prudential reasoning
nd 
.   
 
 5.1 Understanding Prudence 
Our first task must be to understand, as adequately as possible, the prudential judgments human 
beings make.  I begin with some examples, and then examine the contribution of Aristotle and his 
followers. 
5.1.01 Some Examples 
1. The following sort of thing might have happened at Oxford between the two World Wars.  
A frustrated and lonely man, call him "Joseph," discovers that a younger friend, call him 
 "Kevin," desires him sexually.  Joseph feels a conventional repugnance to homosexual 
practices -- a repugnance that includes elements of fascination -- whose moral standing and 
whose motivational force for Joseph are so far untested.  He is unwilling, despite the 
conflicts which Kevin's advances trigger in him, to sacrifice a friendship to which he 
accords great value.  Joseph recalls the ideal of Platonic love, and casts himself in the role 
of Socrates and Kevin in the role of Alcibiades or Phaedrus, a role which, let us suppose, 
Kevin is willing to accept.  Thus Joseph preserves a valuable friendship while avoiding a 
more passionate relationship that might well (although we cannot be sure of such things) 
have ended in mutual hatred.  His decision is not merely to observe the Law of Moses, but 
to take his situation as an opportunity to realize a good not otherwise attainable. 
2. A Scriptural text of persistent interest to philosophers is the prophet Nathan's rebuke to 
King David for his adultery with Bathsheba and his murder, under cover of battle, of her 
husband Uriah the Hittite (II Samuel 12).  Nathan does not charge David with violations of 
the Ten Commandments; rather he tells him a story of the theft of a ewe lamb, and thus 
secures David's repentance. As an example of the principle, Treat like cases alike, this is 
rather poor.  Wives unlike ewe lambs have developed preferences of their own; moreover 
no one in the ewe lamb story claimed the privileges of royalty.  On the other hand, the ewe 
lamb story did not involve murder.  What Nathan did was to get David to see his behavior 
as the gratification of passion at another's cost.  Nathan did not show any special insight in 
condemning David's behavior -- about that there was really no question.  Rather he showed 
prudence in the always-hazardous task of reproaching the powerful.  
3. The evaluation of rival candidates for an academic position involves incommensurable and 
overlapping considerations:  scholarship, teaching, and a candidate's "fit" with a particular 
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 department and institution -- even apart from more controversial issues such as those 
involved in affirmative action.  It is also necessary to interpret ambiguous information, for 
example a letter of reference, which describes a candidate as "excitable."   Somehow a 
committee (and each member of it) must bring all these considerations together into an 
intuitive judgment that some particular man or woman is the right one for the job. 
4. Artists sometimes request public support for works offensive to the moral or religious 
sensibilities of many of their fellow-citizens.  On the one hand, art is good, and requires 
liberty:  many great works have offended the more prudish of the artists' contemporaries.  
And artistic experience should not be the monopoly of the wealthy and their protégés.  On 
other hand, it is not acceptable to ask citizens to be indifferent to the way their tax dollars 
are spent, or to demand that hard-pressed working people subsidize crude assaults on what 
they hold most dear.  (Imagine a publicly supported festival of anti-Semitic art, uncritically 
presented, or the use of public money to support a vacation in Tahiti or a meal at an 
expensive restaurant, presented as a form of "concept art.")  The needed aesthetic judgments 
inevitably have moral and even political overtones; apolitical aestheticism is among other 
things a political ideology, designed in part to protect existing institutions against some 
forms of criticism.  The attempt to resolve the problem by ceasing public support for the 
arts threatens all governmental support for high culture, even public libraries, leaving 
television in undisputed possession of our common culture.  What we need are arts 
administrators with a firm sense of the difference between art and trash (tacky lawn art for 
example), which should not receive public money even if it offends no one. They also 
require a sense of a difference between what a society tolerates and what it encourages and 
supports; not everything that ought not to be made a crime deserves to be celebrated as 
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 good.  Such administrators will be able to distinguish challenging and even disturbing art 
from mere crudity, and to judge when a controversial work is good enough to risk public 
outcry.   
5.1.02 Aristotle 
` The Aristotelian tradition insists that prudence is not a morally neutral quality, that the 
practical wisdom of the virtuous is different from the craftiness of the wicked.   At the same time, 
Aristotleiv thinks of prudence as pre-eminently the political virtue -- what we expect, but do not 
always get, from our leaders, even if we are out of sympathy with them ideologically.v But this sort 
of virtue is consistent with even the wicked projects; Hitler would have been more prudent to 
postpone (or abandon altogether) his invasion of Russia, and to content himself with a smaller 
empire in which to do his evil deeds.   
Aristotle writes that "virtue ... consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is 
defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it."vi But 
he never sorts out the discernment necessary to deciding, e.g., how to deal with a difficult family 
member, from the technical judgments a person must make in carrying out his morally worthy 
projects.  A physician must use prudence in deciding on a course of treatment even when there is 
no question about the wisdom of attempting to prolong the patient's life.  But it is characteristic of 
personal relations, except of the crudest sort, that their ends are not fixed, so that prudence in such 
cases cannot be reduced to means-ends judgment. 
Aristotle sometimes describes finding the mean as hitting a target, and remarks that, in 
difficult cases, "the decision rests with our (moral) sense" -- a formulation that does not support talk 
about calculation.  But he elsewhere remarks, "Deliberating and calculating are the same thing."  
And St. Thomas Aquinas bafflingly observes:  "For though keeping the mean is the aim of moral 
 
The Search for Moral Absolutes  92  Philip E. Devine 
 virtue, it is in the correct marshalling of the means to the end [eorum quae sunt ad finem] that the 
mean is to be found."vii  
The aim of Aristotelian ethics -- a life of active virtue -- is not specifiable independently of 
the moral quality of the acts that contribute to it.  Hence one way of understanding Aristotle's 
conception of prudence is as follows.viii Learning to perform well in a sport or game is partly a 
matter of learning principles, but more importantly a matter of constant practice under the tutelage 
of an acknowledged master.  And since mastery includes knowing when to break the rules as well 
as when to adhere to them, prudence so understood can be at the same time conservative and 
progressive.   Happiness (or more exactly eudemonia) is victory in the game of life, and prudence 
tends to bring about victory of this sort (though chance can always interfere). 
But applying this conception of prudence runs into two major difficulties.  First, in games 
and sports, we know when departure from the rules has won; in life there is no criterion, this side of 
Jordan, by which such questions can be decided.  Nor do we have a shared conception of happiness 
by which various strategies of life can be assessed.   Second, and connectedly, there is no 
agreement about who the masters of the art of living are.  The break-up of the polis, the rise of 
Christianity, and the development of a post-Christian civilization, have left us with a plurality of 
incompatible models, and our continuing disputes about the reputations of the famous and the 
infamous testify to our bewilderment on such issues.  Even in Athens, whether one accepted 
Pericles as a model of prudence might depend on one's political sympathies.ix 
 
 5.1.03 Some Modern Writers 
Perhaps some more recent writers will prove more useful in helping us reach an 
understanding of prudence.  We begin with two writers strongly influenced by St. Thomas Aquinas. 
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 Joseph Pieper identifies prudence with situation conscience:  "It includes," he writes, "above all the 
ability to be still in order to attain objective perception of reality."x   And we may agree that 
attentiveness to the situation as it in fact is, and not (for example) as it might please our amour 
propre to suppose it to be, is an essential element of sound situational judgment.  And attentiveness 
to the still, small voice of conscience is part of prudence as many people experience it.   
But we still need to know a lot more about how prudence (or situation conscience) works in 
practice.  Daniel Nelson has recently interpreted St. Thomas's ethics, so as to emphasize the priority 
of prudence, especially over natural law as standardly understood.xi If we accept this interpretation, 
we must ask how prudence is to be recognized.  And the best Nelson is able to say is that 
judgments of prudence depend on the common sense of some community.  Nonetheless, “The 
community can be wrong, and our culture knows of instances in which critics were able to persuade 
a community of its corruption ... but in order to make the case the critics have to appeal to publicly 
available criteria of judgment.”  But this formulation raises the specter of relativism, since different 
communities will have different standards, and these differences will persist however much they 
reform their practice. 
In the "analytic" camp, Martha Nussbaum (following Henry James) proposes a corrective to 
the excessive intellectualism of the Aristotelian tradition. 
Moral knowledge [she suggests] is not simply an intellectual grasp of propositions; it is not 
even intellectual grasp of particular facts; it is a perception [and here she cites Aristotle].  It 
is seeing complete, complex reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is taking 
in what is there, with imagination and feeling.xii 
Such knowledge includes awareness of the character and motives of all those concerned, 
including that of the agent himself (who needs to know what sources of distorted judgment he 
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 needs to fear).  Yet Nussbaum's account is in one sense not rich enough: it excludes the role moral 
rules play in the judgments of even the most sensitive agents.  She describes a difficult situation in 
the relationship between a woman and her father, but their sensitive resolution of this situation 
would not have been possible if incest were a possible solution.  Concentration on the complex 
ways in which the various sides of human life interact in real situations is a valuable exercise, but 
carried beyond a certain point it paralyzes moral (and political) judgment.   
Thus Hilary Putnam insists against Nussbaum that moral rules must be taken seriously.  
They "are important because they are the main mechanism we have for challenging (and if we are 
successful, shaping) one another's consciences."xiii  He offers two metaphors for what we are to do 
when the rules are ambiguous or in conflict:  adjudication and reading.  Both adjudication and 
reading, he argues, are 
By [their] nature provisional -- not in the sense that there must be a better perspective, a 
"true" reading (or a truer reading) which we will all someday get to if we are lucky, but in 
the sense that (for all we know) there may be.  Some things which were once problematic 
are now issues for condemnation or approbation and not adjudication.  Human slavery is no 
longer problematic; it is just plain wrong,xiv   
Both adjudication and reading get their credibility "from a shared sense of what is and is not 
reasonable, from people's loyalties to one another, and a commitment to 'muddling through' 
together."xv But the persistence of injustice in our world means that we are unable always to 
muddle through in tolerable fashion. 
Putnam's examples of rules are the Ten Commandments and the Equal Rights Amendment; 
his example of an adjudication or reading the Supreme Court's abortion decision in Roe v. Wade, 
and his diagnosis of the impediments to successful "muddling through" a moderate form of Leftism 
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 critical of both Marxism-Leninism and neoconservatism.  In other words, his examples of binding 
rules include both an ancient text believed to have come from God and an unsuccessful attempt to 
amend the American Constitution, while his example of adjudication is a judicial decision of the 
most controversial (not to say explosive) sort.xvi  And, in his broader analysis of our woes, Putnam 
neglects the fact that we suffer not only from injustice but also from a number of other problems as 
well.   
These include lack of agreement about what justice requires (or even the creatures to which 
it is due), from the absence of what Charles Taylor calls a "moral source" capable of motivating 
people to bring about social justice, and from deep disagreements about the broader conceptions of 
human nature and flourishing that are needed to support our conceptions of justice and provide 
them with their motivating power.  Nor is it possible to mend matters by adducing other examples, 
or providing a different political analysis:  any judgment with substance will be controversial in the 
ways Putnam's judgments are.   
Stanley Hauerwas adds an important dimension to the discussion of the nature of prudence. 
Our moral reasoning [he writes], especially in cases of moral doubt, is not deductive 
but analogical.  That is to say, we do not find what we ought to do by having an 
abstract principle from which can be deduced the "right act."  Rather, what we do 
when we engage in moral reasoning is, by comparing cases, to find out what is 
common to the situations.  ... In this sense moral reason is more dependent on 
imagination than strict logical entailment.xvii 
On such a view, moral notions such as murder, theft, and adultery define classes of 
relevantly similar acts:  they "are concepts that help us define areas of significance for our life 
together."xviii  Thus moral discernment consists in the ability to discover, for example, whether the 
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 analogies between abortion and infanticide are more important than the differences between them; 
or whether discrimination against white males is essentially the same as, or importantly different 
from, discrimination against women and black people.   
Our judgment calls in these and other cases are affected by our background picture of self, 
society, and world.  Hence Hauerwas also writes: 
Universal ethical principles become ethically significant only as we learn their meaning in 
stories. ...  Modern moral philosophers have failed to understand that moral behavior is an 
affair not primarily of choice but of vision.xix 
Thus our entire sensibility is thus at work in a judgment call. 
Let us remember that judgment calls involve the interpretation of a cultural tradition, and its 
application to complex situations.  We then can see that Putnam has very well expressed the reason 
for the phenomenon described by Hauerwas:   
Not only is interpretation a highly informal activity, guided by few, if any, settled rules or 
methods, but it is one that involves much more than linear propositional reasoning.  It 
involves our imagination, our feelings -- in short our full sensibility.xx 
Our sensibility is formed, in significant part, by the social world in which we live.  And the 
interpretation of situations is an essential element of prudential judgment.  Hence Hauerwas's ethics 
requires a homogeneous community to sustain its judgments.xxi 
A sentence by David Wiggins makes clear the central issue.  "The man of highest practical 
reason," he writes, "is the man who brings to bear upon a situation the greatest number of genuinely 
pertinent concerns and genuinely relevant considerations commensurate with the importance of the 
deliberative context."xxii But if anyone tried to take into account every possible consideration, or 
even any consideration someone might think relevant, before making a judgment, the result would 
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 be paralysis.  Emphasis must therefore fall on the expressions genuinely pertinent and genuinely 
relevant.   
We have some fairly clear notions of what is relevant to moral decisions in particular cases -
- for example, that a consideration of the abortion issue that ignores the facts of embryology is 
inadequate.  But it is in general a matter of prudence to decide what sorts of fact need to be taken 
into account in making moral and practical judgments.  Everything depends on how we represent a 
situation to ourselves:  what aspects of it we deem of crucial relevance and what aspects of it we 
deem peripheral or irrelevant. 
In fact, prudence, particularly in decision making on behalf of some community, places 
limits on the questions of fact a decision maker investigates, excluding material of borderline 
relevance that might raise irrelevant emotions.  For example, if two of my colleagues have a long-
standing quarrel, of whose origins I am ignorant, I might deliberately choose not to investigate 
them, on the grounds that knowledge of it could only create confusion. 
 
5.1.04 A Synthesis 
We all make prudential judgments in our personal, professional, and civic lives.  And 
though judgment calls may be difficult to make and evaluate, it is easy to discern imprudence or 
want of judgment, at least in others.  In the same way, though it may be hard to discover the 
Aristotelian mean, it is easy to identify people who habitually run to extremes.   
Every attempt to give such a general account of how prudence works has failed, and the nature of 
the prudential task does not encourage theoretical optimism.  Mere abstract reasoning will never 
grasp the complexity of lived experience, whereas immersion in the present moment in all its 
concreteness fails to guide action; somehow these heterogeneous sorts of reasoning need to be 
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 combined.  On the other hand, we need to avoid the sort of prudential nihilism suggested by many 
critics of the rationalist tradition, which celebrates the unpredictability of human events and the 
quasi-mystical perceptions of some political actors, and reduces the concept of good political 
judgment to the capacity to persuade others by fair means or foul.xxiii 
 Prudential judgment does not centrally address the question, "Is act A right or wrong?"  It deals 
with the open-ended question, "What is to be done?" as well as, though less centrally, with the 
question "How shall I respond to what Jones has done (or is doing)?"  It constructs an imaginative 
representation of the situation -- or in cases like Nathan's of the act to be evaluated -- which so 
arranges its features that the proper course to follow (or the proper judgment) becomes apparent -- 
or so one hopes.  No subjectivism is implied here:  the features of the situation to which the prudent 
appeal, and quite possibly the order they discern in them, exist in the world before they make their 
judgments.  Still, considerable activity of mind is involved; in this respect prudence is to be 
contrasted with intuition, conceived of as "gut" feeling reflecting the agent's cultural background.  
Lastly, prudence involves trained attentiveness, of the sort needed by an artist or writer who needs 
to know when his work is finished. 
A certain effort at detachment is involved in prudential judgments.  They nonetheless 
engage the whole personality.  Thus one of the most difficult problems for prudential judgment is 
balancing the detachment characteristic of moral judgment with the identification with a given 
community our dependence on a moral tradition implies.xxiv  Prudence is, in any event, as far as 
possible removed from decisions "under the veil of ignorance" in the manner suggested by Rawls. 
But the considered judgments he takes as data will require prudence; otherwise we would never 
know when we had moved sufficiently beyond off-the-cuff responses. 
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 Prudence is associated with conservatism in the sense of risk avoidance, though not 
necessarily with conservatism as a political philosophy.  It involves as awareness that we live in a 
world we only imperfectly understand, and that our actions may set in motion trains of 
consequences that we cannot control, and which we may well come to regret.  But prudence 
sometimes requires boldness -- on what occasions is itself a matter for prudential judgment.   
Prudence replaces "probabilism," and every other attempt to provide general rules for dealing with 
moral uncertainty. 
Among the other virtues that tend to prudence, the most important are those, such as 
patience, necessary to the maintenance of a marriage or other long-term commitments.  The reason 
is that such commitments require one to attend to the less obvious consequences (and more broadly 
the less obvious aspects) of one's actions, and that this sort of awareness is an important element of 
prudence.   
We are in possession of rules and principles of varying degrees of stringency, including 
what can be described as "rules of prudence."  An example of this sort of principle is Do not go to 
the limits of the permissible except for compelling reasons.  But it is also part of prudence to know 
when to go to the limit, just as it is part of prudence to know when it is necessary to undergo 
martyrdom.  In any event, such principles are not substitutes for prudence; they help the already 
prudent person to decide what is to be done.   
Prudence is directed to a comprehensive good, i.e., the flourishing of human beings in a 
good society.  This good permeates the means a prudent person chooses to attain it:  it is for 
example incoherent to suppose that one can build a just society by massively unjust means.  
Prudence compares and mixes goods in a way that respects their diverse and partly 
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 incommensurable character, without freezing us into an impracticable rigorism.xxv  Yet there are 
reasons for dissatisfaction with this result.  Wiggins has observed: 
I entertain the unfriendly suspicion that those who feel that they must seek more than all this 
provides want a scientific theory of rationality, not so much from a passion for science, 
even when their can be no science, but because they hope and desire, by some conceptual 
alchemy, to turn such a discipline into a regulative or normative discipline, or into a system 
of rules by which to spare themselves some of the agony of thinking and all the torment of 
feeling and understanding that is actually involved in reasoned deliberation.xxvi 
But this suspicion is not just unfriendly, but also a bit unfair.  For prudent moral agents are 
well aware of their need for rules and principles, lest their actions be altogether chaotic or 
opportunistic.  And practical wisdom includes an awareness of one's own failings, including one's 
disposition to rationalize misbehavior.  Hence prudence can lead, not just to modifications of 
received moral rules, but also to support for moral rules of a strict (and possibly even absolute) sort. 
 5.1.05.  The Limits of Prudence 
In a heterogeneous moral tradition, some persons -- and some aspects of each person -- will 
stress one aspect of our shared moral ideas at the expense of others.  Once admitted as legitimate, 
prudence tends to claim for itself a hegemonic role.  And, as Paul Ramsey has put it, 
"proportionality's 'constitutional monarchy' within the kingdom of morality threatens to become a 
despotism."xxvii   But there can be no question of regarding prudence as the sole or sovereign 
method of moral judgment, to the exclusion of moral rules and principles. 
First, it is not possible to be "finely aware and richly responsible" towards all the features of a 
situation every time one makes a decision; the method must be reserved for situations perceived on 
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 independent grounds as difficult.  And prudential judgment is impossible unless some proposed 
solutions are antecedently excluded.   
Second, it is possible to offer a prudential argument against always expecting a firm 
prudential judgment.  A way of conceiving the situation that supplies a wholly satisfactory 
resolution of a problem may not always be available.  Sometimes we must slog along, observing 
some moral constraints at least, without being entirely resolved or at peace.    
Third, the representations of situations employed in prudential judgment include both not 
only personal but also historical and even world-historical narratives.  In the writings of John 
Noonan,xxviii for example, it looks as if in order to make up one's mind about some moral issue, it is 
necessary to know the whole history of the human race, both as it concerns the form of activity in 
question, and as it concerns allied issues in, for example, theology.  Thus his exploration of bribery 
quickly entangles him in the complexities of the theological doctrines of grace and redemption.xxix  
All our narratives are highly contested, the world-historical one most visibly so:  where some see 
progress, others see decadence.  Hence there is no reason to suppose that people who attempt 
prudential judgments will reach compatible results, especially in an age where the privilege of 
strategic moral judgment is no longer reversed to a select few. 
Fourth, there are incommensurable considerations that resist even trained moral judgment.  
One of these is between death, thought of as the annihilation of the self, and continued life however 
miserable.  (Death thought of as the door to eternal bliss or woe is also incommensurable with 
earthly life, though in a different way.)  To speak of "incommensurable considerations" here is 
dangerous, since we are dealing, not only with a difficulty in measurement, but with an obstacle to 
the imagination that inhibits moral reflection of all sorts.xxx The obstacle can be evaded only by 
treating death, not as the fate of a unique individual, but entirely from a third-person perspective -- 
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 in Kierkegaard's language as "something in general";xxxi or, in technical philosophical contexts, a 
comparison among possible worlds.xxxii    
Fifth, we must be concerned with the question, how prudential judgment is to be 
distinguished from rationalizing what one wants to do.  This concern is particularly acute in public 
contexts, where necessity has always been the tyrant's plea.  Sometimes the exclusion of 
proportionalism rests on a deeper proportionalist judgment, that the risks of proportionalism in this 
context exceed its benefits.xxxiii  But it is not necessary, and quite possibly dangerous, to conclude 
that judgments of proportion, rather than the unconditional demands of certain human goods, 
support all our moral judgments at the deepest level. 
Sixth, we must examine the question, to what extent judgments of prudence can be restated 
in straightforward inferential terms.  We may take it for granted that, at the time of decision, 
prudential judgment goes beyond what can be argued for.  But the possibility remains of rationally 
reconstructing prudential decisions as applications of some principle; for example, Choose that 
action which is most coherent with one's commitments, or those of the group for which one is 
acting.  As Peter J. Steinberger has put it, "Intelligent performance is at least prospectively 
propositional."xxxiv 
The principle of coherence is not an exception to the opacity of prudence.  It seems to us 
self-evident, in retrospect, that abolishing slavery was the right way to establish (relative) 
coherence in the laws and customs of Jacksonian America.  But, at the time, the way forward was 
not so clear:  defenders of slavery argued for a rejection of the individualist premises of the 
Declaration of Independence, for the exclusion of black people from their scope, or for the 
recognition of two different national communities embodying differing understandings of justice.  
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 Our own judgments on this matter inevitably reflect a decision already made, and sealed by a 
bloody civil war.   
This argument has implications for Steinberger's attempted resolution of the dispute 
between Jürgen Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamerxxxv concerning the role of "prejudice" in 
interpretation. Prejudice is not here derogatory:  some prejudices are confirmed rather than rejected 
upon reflection.  
Gadamer maintains that it is impossible to get beyond prejudice (though our prejudices can 
and do change); Habermas responds that a once we are aware of a prejudice we are also 
aware of the possibility of thinking outside it.  Steinberger attempts to split the difference, 
concluding that Prejudices are typically in the background and are invoked 
intuitively, immediately, and unreflectively [in judgment].  But ... prejudices can be most 
certainly can be uncovered and subjected to a systematic analysis, and it seems impossible 
to deny that this kind of analysis dramatically alters their status. ... What was merely an 
implicit knowing that becomes explicit and ... is suddenly eligible for evaluation and 
revision.  [Yet] any such analysis will itself depend on further prejudices.xxxvi 
«This last sentence, however, gives the point to Gadamer, at least once he admits that prejudices 
can and do change, and that what once was prejudice can be rejected or turned into a considered 
judgment.xxxvii  For at crucial points the issue will not be, how good an agent's articulate reasons 
are, but whether he has the ability to make the required sort of judgment. 
 
5.2 Back to Moral Absolutes 
We now need to consider and examine a principle that lies in the background of much 
philosophical discussion of morals.  It may be called the Discontinuity Thesis -- that there is a sharp 
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 break between moral and "merely prudential" decisions.  We may grant that the decision whether to 
take one's own life or that of another is graver than a choice between vanilla and chocolate ice 
cream, but this remark does not yet amount to sharp moral/prudential distinction.   
Kant divides the field of decisions between questions of duty and other questions that have merely 
to do with the choice of appropriate means to one's ends.  There is no such distinction in Aristotle:  
his table of the virtues includes those qualities conducive to giving a good party and to being an 
entertaining companionxxxviii alongside those which a modern reader is likely to regard as moral 
virtues.  In a Kantian mood, one might be tempted to identify the moral with those decisions to 
which prudential reasoning is inappropriate.  But this way of drawing the distinction will not work.  
A survey of examples of prudence, including the question of how a conscientious official should 
resolve a controversial issue, produces many issues that at least feel moral.      
Stuart Hampshire defines the sphere of the moral as follows: 
Morality ... might be defined by reference to its central topics, and not by the alleged logical 
peculiarities of moral judgments. ... It is a system of prohibitions and injunctions concerning 
justice in social relations, the control of violence, about war and peace, the regulation of 
kinship, the customs of friendship and family.xxxix 
If we accept this definition, we will find prudential judgments everywhere within the moral realm.  
I conclude that, while some decisions are worth more agony than are others, the Discontinuity 
Thesis cannot be sustained. 
The picture of moral reasoning that arises from the discussion so far is as follows.  
Sometimes proportionalist, even consequentialist, reasoning is appropriate.  Sometimes, however, 
such reasoning is dangerous to essential features of a good human life.  Moralists need to learn to 
respect the differing qualities of the moral terrain, as agriculturists need to learn to respect the 
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 differing qualities of the soil, some parts of which are in greater need than others of what Wendell 
Berry calls "kindly use."   
It is the task of prudence to mediate incommensurables.  In the simplest cases, we need to 
decide between incommensurable goods; in more complex cases we are deciding between radically 
differing ways of understanding the same the same situation:  whether adultery, for example, is to 
be understood as an adventure or a breach of a sacred obligation.  The best we can do is to make the 
needed judgments, without hoping to understand them very well.    
Nonetheless, the complexity of human situations does not require situationism, but implies a 
need for moral rules.  Odysseus, when he wanted to hear the Sirens, had himself bound so as to be 
unable to follow their voices to his doom; in the same way a husband or wife may accept a moral 
rule prohibiting adultery for the sake of a successful marriage.  And some of these moral rules may 
even be absolute.  But what moral rules we accept, whether any of them are absolute, and if so 
which, are matters of prudential judgment and as such opaque to philosophical understanding.   
We can, however, still make the judgment that our society is now insufficiently sensitive to 
the rough texture of the terrain of value, and tends to reduce all considerations to pleasure and pain 
(or to dollars and cents).  Hence it may be the case that, under some circumstances, the best we can 
do is follow received moral rules and not trouble ourselves about outcomes overall.  The place of 
moral absolutes in this picture will be our next question for consideration. 
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6 
ABSOLUTES 
Any discussion of the question of moral absolutes must meet some formidable tests.  As 
Richard A. McCormick, S.J., has put it, "One is asked to be both theoretically consistent and 
practically sensitive to the complexity and intransigence of reality -- in other words to plug all the 
loopholes in a prudent and persuasive way."i I begin by attempting to define clearly what a moral 
absolute would be, then assess both the case against such absolutes and the case for them.   
6.1.  Doing Evil to Achieve Good 
The traditional phrase never do evil that good may come suffers from many ambiguities.  
The first of these is whether the phrase "that good may come" is redundant:  if, as the scholastic 
tradition tells us, everything we choose we choose sub ratione boni, then there is no other way of 
doing evil.  Fr. McCormick denies the scholastic doctrine, and holds that "even a disvalue which 
has no necessary causal relation to the good can be, perversely indeed, desired."ii  My students 
agree with McCormick: they believe in the possibility of unmotivated malice.  It still seems to me, 
however, that the traditional doctrine is sound, so long as one pays sufficient attention to the range 
of goods that motivate choice (though the question is admittedly a close one). 
In cases of seemingly pointless wrongdoing -- say the young St. Augustine's theft of 
inedible pears -- the agent is moved by a desire to assert his independence, to establish a sphere 
where he and no one else makes the rules.  Within limits -- say in dealing with a domineering 
parent -- this motive is even legitimate, though its excess is demonic pride.  For a person can also 
be deficient in self-assertion, as are those who submit to authorities so completely as to do evil at 
their behest.  And malignant envy, of the sort felt by Melville's Claggart for Billy Budd, arises out 
of a warped respect for virtue and a warped regret that one falls short of its requirements (as well as 
  
a warped admiration for Billy's other admirable qualities).  In simple terms, Billy's beauty and 
virtue make Claggart feel ugly and evil, and for that reason Claggart tries to release the tension by 
destroying Billy.iii 
One interpretation of the phrase never do evil (that good may come) is that one ought never 
to do (what one oneself regards)iv as moral evil, to achieve any end whatever; or in short: 
(W) In no circumstances must one do wrong.v 
The denial of W is incoherent; as Thomas Nagel has put it, 
The notion that one might sacrifice one's moral integrity justifiably, in the service of a 
sufficiently worthy end, is an incoherent notion.  For if one were justified in making such a 
sacrifice (or even morally required to make it), then one would not be sacrificing one's 
moral integrity by adopting that course; one would be preserving it.vi 
St. Paul, when he counseled against doing evil that good might come of it, was centrally 
interested in the sacrifice of one's moral integrity for the sake of spiritual benefit:  sinning more that 
grace might abound (see Romans 6:1).  (Another version of the same idea is doing evil in order to 
release one's creative powers.)  Though a repentant sinner might rejoice, after the fact, in sins that 
brought him grace, to advance this justification before the fact is to affirm that the same act both is 
and is not a sin.   W does nothing, however, to tell us what acts are right and what wrong. 
But is it not possible to violate one's moral integrity by undertaking to deceive oneself about 
what is right and wrong?  The most common way of doing this, engaging in habitual wrongdoing, 
directly violates `.  Those who undertake courses of indoctrination, or habitually lie about moral 
issues in hopes of persuading themselves, treat their future selves as persons other than themselves.  
Their conduct thus falls under the principle to be discussed next. 
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When one is dealing with other people's moral integrity, some distinctions have to be 
drawn.  If it is wrong to do an act, it is wrong to intend that another do that act on one's behalf.  If it 
is wrong for me to kill a colleague, it is also wrong for me to put out a contract on him.  Hence -- so 
long as my agent and I are in agreement on the pertinent moral question -- the question of one's 
own integrity and that of others turns out to be the same. 
If my agent and I differ in moral judgments, two cases need to be distinguished.  I may 
believe the act in question is wrong, while my agent has no scruples about doing it.  (I employ a 
hired killer for whom business is business trumps even the rule against murder.)  In that case I 
remain guilty of murder, but at least I have not corrupted anyone.  In the other case, I believe the 
act in question innocent or obligatory, but my agent regards it as wrong.  A doctor, let us say, 
strongly urges a Jehovah's Witness to have a blood transfusion to save his life, or even invokes 
coercive means to get him to do so, while the Jehovah's Witness believes that receiving such a 
transfusion is a major sin.  The doctor may (1) hope to persuade his patient that his religion is, at 
least in this respect, unreasonable, and so to consent in good faith to the transfusion.  Or he may (2) 
hope that, by being pressured into violating his convictions -- and perhaps by being convinced that, 
if his religion were true, there would be no hope for his salvation -- the patient would be led to 
renounce the Jehovah's Witness faith in favor of, say, liberal Protestantism.  Or he might (3) be 
indifferent to the effect of his behavior on the patient's soul, so long as he manages to do the 
transfusion.   Finally, he (4) may believe that the strength and sincerity of the patient's opposition to 
blood transfusions may legitimately be tested, so that if it turns out to be merely conventional he 
will be able to save the patient's life, while if it is sincerely held he will admire him for his integrity 
while watching him die.  
 
The Search for Moral Absolutes  113  Philip E. Devine 
  
The doctor's behavior in case 4 is easiest to defend:  there need be, on his part, no intention 
that the patient act against his own convictions.  Case 1 is somewhat harder:  since persuasion in 
religious matters is notoriously difficult, it merges into the other and more difficult cases.  Case 3 is 
harder still: indifference to the patient as a moral being, and concern for him only as a diseased 
body, is one of the banes of contemporary medicine.  Hardest of all to defend is case 2: playing 
with another soul in this fashion shows many of the marks of satanic evil. 
In any event, we have a principle, which can demand acceptance as absolute if such things are 
possible: 
(S) It is always wrong to intend that a person do what he himself regards as wrong 
The violation of this principle is called scandal; it reflects the fact that a person's moral integrity is 
a good of a different order than the other goods he may also pursue.   
We must distinguish scandal in sense of S, however, from the sort of scandal that involves 
doing an action with morally corrupting effects.  One possible example of scandal in the second 
sense is proudly telling people about actions of one's own that they regard as wrong; another is 
saying "Follow your conscience" under circumstances when this remark is likely to be taken as an 
endorsement of moral subjectivism.vii   
In such cases, however, the danger of scandal must be weighed against other possible bad 
effects, including other sorts of scandal.  To take the case of the moral adviser:  the inquirer may 
have a genuinely confused conscience, without being in a position to accept what his moral guide 
believes to be the correct moral view.  Or he may be driven away from observance of all the 
requirements of morality by his guide's insistence on a view that he cannot articulate in a way 
satisfying to the inquirer's intelligence.  (John Mahoney calls this last possibility "scandal of the 
strong.")viii  
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But it would be rash to conclude that, by formulating the principle forbidding scandal, we 
have completed, even provisionally, our search for moral absolutes.  For the concept of scandal 
presupposes a body of standards other than the principle itself; it belongs among what Alan 
Donagan has called the "second order precepts" of morality.ix  If we hold a view of morality 
according to which exceptionless first-order principles are impossible in principle, then at some 
point we will be reluctant to attribute such principles to others.  For if we regard an alleged moral 
conviction as unreasonable beyond a certain point, we may regard it, instead, as an emotional 
aversion or social prejudice.x In order to gain the respect of others, a scruple of conscience need not 
be exceptionless, at least not in the simplest possible way.xi A conscientious objector to a particular 
war may accept wars in defense of the homeland, or pre-modern wars, or wars directly commanded 
by God, or wars that meet the stringent tests of a just-war theory, or possibly even wars he deems 
progressive.  But if a person's judgment of conscience is responsive to any changes in circumstance 
however small, we cannot expect those who have the power to change the circumstances of his 
choice to have much respect for scruples that stand in the way of what they regard as politically or 
even morally imperative projects. 
We have so far been able to make some sense of the maxim, Do not do evil that good may 
come.  But it is absurd to refuse ever to do evil to achieve good, if doing evil means doing an act 
with some bad aspect or consequence.  For there are many circumstances in which whatever we do 
is bad in some respect, if only by causing some people emotional pain or defeating their legitimate 
expectations.   
In order to gain further precision on this issue, let us consider the following sentence from 
Pope Paul VI's controversial encyclical on contraception. 
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(V) It is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it -- in 
other words, to intend directly something which by its very nature contradicts the moral 
order.xii  
Let us especially consider the phrases something which by its very nature contradicts the 
moral order and to intend directly. If by "something which by its very nature contradicts the moral 
order" is meant moral evil, we have here W or S -- principles that yield no specific results about 
contraception or any other first order moral issue.  If it means something non-morally bad in itself, 
for example a disease, two difficulties arise.  First, it is sometimes right to infect a person with a 
mild case of a disease in order to prevent a severer one later on (the process is called inoculation).  
Second, it is not a bad thing that a couple should have intercourse without procreating, that a 
woman should be temporarily sterile, or that a spermatozoon should be ejaculated without 
fertilizing an ovum.  This last event takes place massively even in fertile intercourse. 
Nor is it clear what it is to "directly intend something."  Do homosexuals directly intend the 
sterility of their relations?  Do those who practice artificial insemination by husband, or versions of 
in vitro fertilization employing the husband's semen, take as the object of their intentions something 
different from married people desiring offspring who have intercourse with the specific intention of 
producing an heir?  What do those who practice Natural Family Planning intend directly, if not to 
enjoy the other goods of sexual intercourse without producing offspring?xiii There are cases where 
we cannot answer the questions of intention, and of the moral acceptability of what is intended, 
except by way of a moral judgment on the form of activity in question.  In the cases where an 
independent moral judgment is required to apply V, it is not functioning as a moral criterion, but as 
a way of expressing a conclusory moral judgmentxiv 
6.2.  The Search for Moral Absolutes Continued 
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Let us therefore begin afresh.  To say that a norm is a moral absolute is to say, in part, that it 
is never permissible to breach it, no matter what the circumstances.  But not every norm that meets 
this requirement counts as a moral absolute in the relevant sense.  
For consider the following principles:« 
(D) One ought always do one's duty. 
(F) One ought never to engage in sexual immorality (in one sense of that word, fornication). 
(L) One ought never to engage in wrongful deceit (in one sense of that word, lying).xv 
(M) One ought never to engage in wrongful killing (in one sense of that word, murder).xvi  
There are ways of reading these standards that give them some content.  Thus duty in D can 
be read in the sense of "my station and its duties," and immorality in F in the sense of breach of 
conventional moral standards.  But, taken in their most straightforward sense, these standards tell 
us nothing about, for example, which sorts of deceit are morally acceptable and which not.  At most 
they point out zones in which transgression is likely and dangerous. 
Consider, second, the moral axioms discussed in chapter 3, for example: 
(A1) One ought always do good and avoid evil. 
These axioms can be specified further, without gaining significant content; for example: 
(A1m) In medical practice, do good and avoid evil. 
If these axioms are true, one ought never to break them.  And they are not completely 
trivial, since they at least make some moral arguments easier and others more difficult.  A1, for 
example, directs our attention toward non-moral goods to be promoted, preserved, or respected in 
our actions, and away from an ethics of duty for duty's sake.  But the sorts of absolutes with which 
moralists are concerned give far more guidance in decision making than, on the most optimistic 
assumptions, a moral axiom can do. 
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A more difficult case is: 
(P) It is wrong to inflict serious pain just for one's own or another's pleasure. 
P seems to be both true and exceptionless, but does not satisfy the demand for moral absolutes.  It 
fails to do so, I think, because there is no so such thing as doing something merely for pleasure:  
there is always something else that pleases one in one's action, for example emotional release or the 
exercise of power.  And the desire to please another involves either the expression of love (at least 
in the sense of affection) or some ulterior end, such as placating someone in power. 
 Also tricky is the following: 
(H) One ought never act out of hatred for a person.xvii 
In order to make this example plausible, it needs to be read as: 
(H*) One ought never to act only out of hatred for a person. 
For it may be morally necessary to kill or otherwise injure someone.  And, in doing so, some 
feeling of hatred may be inevitable.  In that case hatred is regrettable, but not, if involuntary, 
morally wrong.  (A harder case is where hatred is deliberately stirred up, say in soldiers before a 
battle.)  But H* implies that one has no sufficient reason, other than hatred, for injuring (or 
attempting to injure) a person.  It is thus only apparently a moral absolute. 
Another tricky case is: 
(K) It is wrong to kill your boss because he has refused you a promotion, where you have 
been working at your job with reasonable but not extraordinary diligence for less then three 
years and need the money to buy a second yacht, where neither you nor your boss are 
members of caste in which killings of honor are an accepted custom ... (and so on for a 
complete description of the action in question). 
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Such statements, if true, have no exceptions.  Nor do the descriptions they include contain an 
adverse moral judgment by way of logical implication.  Nor do they restate moral axioms.  Yet they 
do not count as moral absolutes in the needed sense, since they do not enable one to conclude that 
an act is wrong independently of a complete evaluation of the situation. 
 There are also moral standards that are in no sense absolute, but nonetheless give real 
guidance.  An example is: 
(B) Gratitude is due to benefactors. 
Another is:  
(O) In an imperfectly just society,xviii do not violate the civil law. 
Both of these principles are guides to virtuous conduct, though neither plausibly holds no matter 
what. 
Many moralists have asserted the following non-trivial principle as absolute: 
(A) One ought never to commit adultery. 
Many people who hold A also hold, independently or as an instance of it: 
(F*) One ought never have sexual intercourse outside marriage -- what is in the other 
principal sense called "fornication." 
But in my discussion of adultery I shall leave open the question both of the truth of F*, and whether 
A includes or entails it. 
Consider now the following cases: 
(C1) Abraham lives in a society in which it is customary for a man to have more than one 
wife.  He marries Sarah, and when she proves barren, Hagar. 
(C2) Bertha lives in a society in which it is customary for a woman to have more than one 
husband.  She marries Sam, and when he grows old, Henry. 
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(C3) Charles lives in a society in which marriage is monogamous, but in which men who 
are faithful to their wives (but not women who are faithful to their husbands) are looked 
down upon, even by their wives, as insufficiently macho.  He marries Mary, and has affairs 
with Jane and Jill. 
(C4) Deborah lives in a society in which marriage is monogamous but in which both 
married men and married women who fail to have extra-marital affairs are looked down 
upon, even by their spouses, as prudes.  She marries Martin, and has affairs with John and 
Philip. 
(C5) Edward and Frieda live in a society in which serial polygamy is customary; in which 
marriage, though exclusive, is understood by all concerned to be dissoluble.  They get 
married, and thereafter abstain from sexual relations with others.  But, after their marriage 
breaks down and they are legally divorced, Edward marries Linda, and Frieda Carlos. 
(C6) In the same society, George and Hilde get married and then divorced, after which they 
marry Susan and John.  But they have sexual relations with their new partners before their 
divorce papers are final. 
(C7) Isaac and Justine are living together in an informal relationship, understood by both of 
them to be exclusive so long as it lasts.  But Isaac has an affair with Roberta, which he 
conceals from Justine just as an erring conventional husband would do. 
(C8) Karl and Leonard are also living in such a relationship -- homosexual marriages not 
being legally recognized in their society.  Karl has an affair with Joseph, concealing his 
affair, as would a conventional erring husband. 
(C9) Martina and Nancy likewise have a homosexual "marriage."  But Martina has a covert 
affair with Kingsley, whom she subsequently marries. 
 
The Search for Moral Absolutes  120  Philip E. Devine 
  
(C10) Oliver and Paula are Roman Catholics, and understand their marriage as indissoluble.  
But Oliver leaves both the Church and Paula, and marries Dorothy in a civil or Protestant 
ceremony.  Until his marriage to Paula, Dorothy regards Oliver as still her husband, but 
afterwards feels free to marry William (and does so). 
(C11) Quentin and Roberta are also Catholics.  After their marriage fails, Quentin 
dishonestly obtains an annulment and remarries Lucy in the Church.  Roberta then marries 
Richard. 
(C12)  Steven and Theresa are divorced and Theresa marries Jonathan.   During her 
marriage to Jonathan, Theresa has an affair with Steven.xix 
There are more questions one can ask about such cases than "are these acts right or wrong?"  
What I am concerned with here is whether the behavior of Abraham and the others constitutes 
adultery.  In giving our answer to this question, we must also ask to what extent our 
characterization of an act as adulterous, if we in fact so characterize it, is a result of a prior 
judgment that it is reprehensible -- or, rather, that it is reprehensible in the way adultery is thought 
to be by those who hold A.   
There is a lurking ambiguity here.  If an act is reprehensible in precisely the way, and 
precisely for the reasons, adultery is, it is a case of adultery.   Still, there is a difference between 
saying action-kind X is wrong for the same sort of reasons as action-kind Y, and saying, straight 
out, that X is a subset of Y.  There are forms of betrayal, which are wrong for some of the reasons 
adultery is, without being themselves adulterous.  But to the extent that the judgment "Abraham is 
(or is not) guilty of adultery" rests on an independent judgment of his act, A has become a spurious 
moral absolute, to be spelled out perhaps as follows: 
(A*) One ought never, by one's sexual conduct, breach the obligations of (true) marriage. 
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Thus Finnis moves too quickly when he writes:  "where, as in most cases of adultery, there 
is no doubt that the one party, if married, is not married to the other, then the Lord's precept applies 
exceptionlessly, whatever the other circumstances."xx For if he were casuistically minded, D.H. 
Lawrence could have argued that Mellors and Lady Chatterley were not adulterers.  For Sir 
Clifford's failure to relate his will appropriately to the goods at stake in marriage, he might have 
argued, invalidated his supposed marriage to Lady Chatterley, whereas she and Mellors (at least 
relatively speaking) related their wills to these goods in an appropriate way.xxi And a couple one or 
both of whom has a divorced spouse still living can have intentions that are in the fullest sense 
marital, e.g., to procreate and rear a child as an expression of their mutual love. 
The question whether a person relates his will appropriately to the human good, and 
whether his conduct is morally appropriate, cannot be distinguished in practice.  If I am right in this 
assertion, then Finnis has turned A into the following spurious absolute: 
(A**) One should never engage in sexual behavior that relates one's will to the goods at 
stake in sexual intercourse in an inappropriate way. 
One source of difficulties here, and many other difficulties about sexual ethics, is that 
marriage has multiple aspects, and that these sometimes fail to coincide.  Marriage is a sexual (and 
otherwise intimate) relationship between the spouses.  It also is a civil relationship, connected with 
property relations and responsibility for the rearing of children.  It is also a link between families 
and groups of friends  -- as can be observed at a conventional wedding.  Finally, it is a religious 
institution, important among other things for what it symbolizes.  There are acts that are in breach 
of marriage in all four dimensions, which are therefore uncontroversially adulterous.  But these are 
difficult to specify, and in any case represent a far narrower range of behavior than adherents of A 
usually intend. 
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Another common example of a moral absolute is the rule against murder.  Murder is often 
defined as the intentional killing of the innocent.  But the term innocent is ambiguous:  it ranges in 
meaning from "not at fault morally" to "not harming," with all the ambiguities of the word harm.  
Consider the following cases: 
(M1) the execution of a killer for a legacy now rendered harmless;  
(M2) the killing in war of an enemy soldier, who may or may not believe in the justice of 
 his own cause; 
(M3)  the killing of a prisoner, in a war in which we regard our enemies not just as wrong 
but as criminal. 
(M4) the abortion of a fetus or unborn child whose growth threatens his mother's life (even 
if we regard fetuses as in every sense human beings or persons). 
(M5) the shooting of an insane person who is on the verge of shooting someone else;  
(M6) the killing of an infant rival to the throne; 
(M7) the exposure of a child whose existence threatens a country with overpopulation or a 
family with destitution. 
Reasoning about M1- M7 will illustrate how much moral judgment goes into designating a person 
as innocent, in order to declare killing him murder. 
The views of St. Thomas Aquinas on paradoxical episodes in the Old Testament such as the 
(almost-) sacrifice of Isaac illustrate further the difficulties that afflict the search for moral 
absolutes.xxii  St Thomas argues as follows.  When God commanded Abraham to slay Isaac, He 
changed the species of the act from murder (or unjust killing) to sacrifice (or just execution).  This 
change was possible because, as a result of original sin, Isaac deserved to die "the death of nature."  
Murder and sacrifice (like adultery and marital intercourse) are thus physically similar, but morally 
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different, sorts of act.  And this distinction does not mean only that the one sort of act is right and 
the other wrong.   
St. Thomas does not invoke the principle of double effect in such cases:  he does not argue 
that Abraham does not intend Isaac's death, but only accepts it as a side-effect of his religious 
obedience.  Rather he argues, in Lee's words: 
The direct object of Abraham's act here is the justice God intends in the act, even if 
Abraham does not understand how it is just.  That is, Abraham does not do anything, or 
intend anything, other than to execute God's intention. ... The executor of a superior's 
project (intention) has no project of his own distinct from that of the superior. 
There are circumstances where such an analysis is possible, even for people who have come 
to distrust the defense of superior orders.  Socrates, who condemns suicide before drinking the 
hemlock, intends only to obey the decree of the Athenian court.  But this analysis will not work for 
Abraham:  he must form plans and intentions of his own to carry out what he believes to be God's 
will; for example he must secure Isaac's compliance or at least acquiescence. 
If we set aside the implausible claim that Abraham did not intend to kill Isaac (and, had he 
killed Isaac, would not have done so intentionally), the supposed moral absolute at stake here 
would seem to be: 
(K*)  One ought never to kill a person unjustly. 
This principle might have some content, insofar as it excludes killing someone on grounds of public 
or private benefit deemed to overrule considerations of justice.  But St. Thomas's argument requires 
him to understand K* as permitting the killing of anyone except Jesus Christ (and, given later 
theological developments, the Virgin Mary), at the behest of God, Who, as author of Nature, is 
 
The Search for Moral Absolutes  124  Philip E. Devine 
  
entitled to exact the penalty for original sin and to authorize others to act on His behalf.  This is not 
what is usually meant by an absolute prohibition against murder. 
Moreover, K* is a special case of 
(U) One ought never act unjustly. 
And U is very close to the tautology: 
(W) Under no circumstances must one do wrong. 
U and W are different because injustice is not the only species of wrongness.  An act, even 
one of killing, can be wrong, not because it is unjust but because it is cowardly or cruel.xxiii  But, 
since any justification a theist might offer for homicide could be understood as an attempt to show 
that it is agreeable to the will of God, and for that reason not unjust, the distinction between U and 
W is of no practical importance.   
It still seems possible to formulate some standards that are absolute if any standards are. 
(G) It is wrong to kill people by reason of their ancestry (genocide). 
(R) It is wrong to engage in sexual activity with a person without his or her consent (rape). 
(T) It is wrong to torture a person.xxiv  
Despite the ambiguities about consent that sometimes afflict R, and the blurry line between torture 
and beating someone up or threatening him that afflicts T, it seems that these propositions are both 
true and exceptionless.  (I leave it to the reader to find possible ambiguities in the rule against 
genocide.)  Or rather only an a priori conviction that all moral rules have exceptions can lend 
credence to the possibility of sometimes justifying their breach.  Yet those who are committed to 
finding exceptions to all moral rules will no doubt be able to develop plausible exceptions even to 
G, R, and T.   
 6.3.  The Case Against Moral Absolutes 
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It is not possible to settle the question of moral absolutes by formulating putative absolutes 
and testing them against intuition with the help of real-life or ingeniously constructed examples.  
For any morality will involve hard cases, i.e., cases about which individuals and communities are 
ambivalent.  And all plausible exceptions to plausible absolutes will fall into this class. 
Nor is it possible to settle the issue by invoking the refusal of admired persons to break 
moral rules when the consequences of adhering to them were grim.  Examples include Socrates’ 
refusal to "fetch Leon of Salamis from his home for liquidation"xxv and St. Thomas More's decision  
Knowingly [to incur] the traitor's penalty of life imprisonment and confiscation of all his 
goods, ... not because the oath [demanded of him] was against the faith... but because 
swearing that he believed a marriage invalid when he judged it valid would have been a 
lie.xxvi 
Those who accept the correctness of Socrates’ and More's judgments in these cases could 
still argue they would have acted otherwise if the consequences of what they did had been worse or 
more certain of occurrence.  (Socrates was not in fact punished for his refusal.)  Or they might 
argue that they would have behaved otherwise if broader circumstances rather than immediate 
consequences had been different.  (More was a respected lawyer whose judgment on Henry VIII's 
marital shenanigans had special weight; moreover as a lawyer he had a special interest in the 
integrity of his own judgments.)  Accordingly, I approach the question of moral absolutes as an a 
priori issue.  I here state the case against absolutes, postponing the case for them and the drawing of 
my conclusions until the next section. 
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the moral legitimacy of an act is a function of 
the intentions of the agent and the foreseeable consequences of his act -- that the other dimensions 
of situations (the symbolic dimensions of acts, for example) can be reduced to these two.  If so, an 
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absolute would be an independently specifiable class of acts such that, for any member of that 
class, its intentions, its consequences, or both together, render it impermissible.  But each human 
action is different.  Each has a unique set of (expectable) consequences; in each case the agent 
displays a unique set of evaluative priorities and patterns of practical reasoning.  Nor is there any 
reason that human acts will seem other than unique when dimensions other than intentions and 
consequences are taken into account. 
Now consider action kinds to which there attaches a moral stigma, such as adultery, theft, 
and murder.  The language by which we describe such conduct is open-textured:  there are more 
central and less central cases of each, and moralists sometimes extend or contract their range of 
application in surprising ways.  Moreover, people sometimes propose to retire a morally 
stigmatizing word from circulation -- as for example miscegenation -- or re-describe what would be 
called by condemnatory terms such as mass murder in neutral terms such as the final solution.  
Some of these proposals are horrible, and others legitimate, but our evaluation of them rests on a 
prior set of evaluative commitments not supportable by conceptual analysis. 
The defense of moral absolutes not reducible to a moral axiom or to a tautology, therefore, 
requires either (1) a complete survey of the possible consequences of, or of the possible intentional 
structures accompanying, a given sort of act; or (2) an essentialist ontology of actions 
corresponding to the action-kinds recognized in ordinary English (or medieval Latin).xxvii  An 
understanding of some tradition as fixed at say 1300, or of the symbolic significance of actions as 
immune to changes in the understanding of both agents and their neighbors, might also accomplish 
the same task.  All these enterprises face formidable obstacles. 
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There is still room, on this view, for moral rules of thumb.  But we must always keep in 
mind the possibility that any situation, if we look at if with sufficient care, will disclose features 
unique to it that require a modification of stock moral judgments. 
 
6.4.  The Case for Moral Absolutes 
Many absolutists are aware of the central premises of the case against moral absolutes.xxviii  
And it is possible to combine a belief in moral absolutes with recognition of the open-texture of 
moral concepts (including crucial concepts such as intention).  In order to see how this is so, let us 
ask how things would be if the arguments for situationism were given their fullest rein. 
That evaluatively laden language is open to interpretation, and that diverse agendas will 
produce diverse interpretations of crucial terms, is a commonplace among those familiar with the 
history of literary criticism, theology, and law.  But if situationists are right, there are no constraints 
on the interpretation of a word such as murder:  what other people call murder can be reinterpreted 
as population control, the vindication of one's honor, or the destruction of the Queen's enemies.  
Conversely, the slaughter of animals for the human table can be re-described as murder.  Moreover, 
even if it is conceded that a proposed act is one of murder, the possibility always exists for 
situationists that murder is necessary under the circumstances -- even that it is the most loving act 
possible.  And what these circumstances are cannot be specified in advance:  they are left solely to 
the discernment of morally responsible persons.  But a clause exempting us from observance of all 
moral rules in cases of necessity is unlimited in its application, unless we restrict it in ways that 
produce a new, formally exceptionless, rule.xxix   Or the very word murder, like blasphemy in many 
circles, may pass out of use or be sidelined.  In that case, whatever restraints there might be on the 
taking of life will be conceptualized in radically different ways, and many kinds of killing now 
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regarded as out of the question will be routinely open for consideration.   And what is true of 
murder is true of all other crucial moral concepts, such as torture, fraud, and incest. 
Situationists do not conceive of themselves as promoting moral anarchy, but as advocating a 
higher ethics based on the Greatest Happiness Principle, or on the Law of Love.  But happiness and 
love are also open to interpretation:  people dispute whether a state of drug-induced euphoria is one 
of happiness, or killing another human being can be an act of love.  Hence whatever hermeneutical 
maneuvers are available for murder are available for these moral notions as well, and indeed for 
any concept that one might invoke in moral argument. 
One can also appeal to moral paradigms to place limits on the vagaries of moral judgment:  
the Nazis, we can all agree, were evil, and behavior that resembles theirs is to be avoided.  But we 
can re-describe the Nazis as moral pioneers, and their opponents as fuddy-duddies deluded by 
illusions of an objective moral order.  Or we can distinguish our "liberal" euthanasia campaign, 
designed to deal with the stresses of a superannuated society that spends too much of its resources 
on health care, from the Nazis' "reactionary" program, infected with racist, sexist, and homophobic 
notions. 
The argument just made might be dismissed as a "parade of imaginary horribles" or 
"slippery slope."  "You ignore," a critic might argue, "the good sense of human beings, and their 
capacity to make necessary moral distinctions."  But slippery slopes do occur, the social fabric does 
break down, and atrocities of every variety are a frequent occurrence in human history.  (Indeed, 
there are reasons to fear that our own society is on such a slope, and about a number of issues.)  No 
doubt such events have economic and political as well as cultural causes, though these sorts of 
causation can only be distinguished to a limited extent.  But I am not here concerned with political 
strategy, however broadly conceived, but with a problem in the logic of morals:  how to constrain 
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the human capacity to defend a wider and wider range of behavior by discovering and exploiting 
ambiguities in our shared moral code. 
At this stage of the argument a critic will invoke the ethics of virtue.  A virtuous person will 
know what analogies and distinctions are legitimate and what mere sophistry.  The most important 
virtue in question here is called prudence (§ 5.1).  But living in a corrupt society can undermine our 
prudence, and discerning which societies are corrupt and which virtuous itself requires judgment.  
Hence we require principles beyond situational prudence (though not of prudence in the widest 
sense), which can support the promulgation of moral rules.   
Many writers appeal at this point to the concept of human nature, as placing limits on the 
possible vagaries of moral language.  Thus in a striking passage, Thomas Fleming writes: 
The laws and decrees enacted by human government are mutable and sometimes tyrannical, 
but the laws of human nature, curled tight within the spiral of the genetic code, are 
unchanging and just.  More than just, they are justice itself, in this sublunar sphere.xxx   
Some sorts of acts, such people argue, are bad for human beings, both those who perform them and 
others.  And what particular acts fall into these sorts is itself determined by the features of human 
nature that make actions of such sorts bad.   
But human nature itself is a highly contested concept, and the appropriate relationship 
among the intellectual, social, emotional, and physical sides of our nature is much debated.  For 
that reason, defining the classes of forbidden acts will pose considerable difficulty.  And naturalists 
like Fleming have a hard time explaining how institutions and forms of behavior he regards as 
unnatural in fact take place. 
The argument of this section and that of the last are consistent with one another.  For the 
previous argument calls into question our ability to discern moral absolutes, while this argument 
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concludes that some absolutes are necessary to a functioning morality and thus also to social life, 
however difficult it may be to discern them.  I have, in short, defended the commonsense claims 
that "there are limits," that there is such a thing as "going too far," that it is necessary to "draw the 
line somewhere."  But the question, where exactly we should draw the needed lines, remains 
unanswered.   
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THE CONCEPT OF THE SACRED 
The final stage in the argument of this book is to place the conclusions reached so far within 
the context of the larger questions of worldview that perplex men and women of our time, and to 
try at least to roughly locate the moral absolutes whose possibility in principle I have argued for so 
far. 
7.1 Cultural Left and Cultural Right 
Irving Howe has protested the use of the expression cultural Left`i to refer to a movement 
that has little in common with the traditional political Left except some rhetoric and an ad hoc 
alliance.ii  But no better language suggests itself -- Howe’s "insurgents" has problems of its own, 
since the insurgents are sometimes in control.  And the Right-Left continuum in culture is more 
stable than the corresponding continuum in ordinary politics.  The issue, how much the fortunate 
owe the unfortunate, and to what extent this obligation may be enforced by civil law, remains 
important.  But after Rawls and Nozick, the best that can be said about distributive justice 
theoretically is that divergent positions represent rival understandings of the same moral and 
political tradition.iii The most serious problem is motivating people to make the sacrifices required 
by even the most undemanding requirements of social justice. 
One source of difficulty is that words like liberal and conservative, and even supposedly 
more precise expressions like neoconservative, designate primarily not systems of ideas, but groups 
of people brought together by the contingencies of political alliance and enmity.  Alliances of this 
sort have an impact on the life of the mind; since people tend to accept their friends' views on 
questions they are unable to investigate for themselves, including disputed questions of fact.   
  
It is nonetheless possible to indicate, in broad terms, the issues that divide the cultural Right from 
the cultural Left.  The cultural continuum ranges from Alasdair MacIntyre to Paul Feyerabend 
among mainstream English-speaking philosophers, from the Ayatollah Hominy to Michel Foucault 
among other intellectuals, and among non-intellectuals from the Russian Old Believers to groups 
such as Queer Nation.  It concerns the question, to what extent human life can be governed by 
stable norms, and to what extent it is a matter of continuous and idiosyncratic adaptation, so that 
any attempt to constrain the way of life that emerges from the practice of an individual or group is 
oppressive.  This issue applies also to intellectual questions, e.g., the legitimacy of nonstandard 
ways of investigating the human mind and body and treating their ills. 
A representative of the hermeneutical school, Manfred Frank, suggests another way of 
characterizing the difference between the cultural Right and the cultural Left. 
The model that underlies both the structural theory of language and texts, as well as Searle's 
"taxonomy of speech acts" is ... the crystal lattice in which all the molecules are immovably 
fixed in their positions, if the temperature is sufficiently low, separated from all the others, 
but also connected with them.  In contrast with the elemental world, the historical-cultural 
world cannot simply be cooled down to the absolute freezing point. ... Language and 
literature thrive only in a certain warmth that permits flux:  the exchange and reconstellation 
of signs.iv  
If we accept Frank's analysis, we need to ask whether the prospect of conceptual meltdown 
is a promise or a threat, and how we are to deal with the resulting theoretical and practical 
decisions.  Those who find such a meltdown liberating belong to the cultural Left, while those who 
find it threatening belong to the cultural Right. 
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A line of thought that has had much influence on the cultural Left goes as follows.  God is 
dead.  Religion continues to be practiced, of course, but honest would-be believers can be brought 
to acknowledge that they are going through the motions, for the sake of the children perhaps.  And 
the death of God means more than the end of religion:  it means the end of an intellectual and 
cultural tradition centered on claims to objective truth, and hence also of philosophers' logical 
scruples about saying that God once existed and now does so no longer.  This supposed insight is 
not an axiom from which the rest of the argument follows deductively, but rather a perspective that 
informs the interpretative and dialectical methods of its adherents. 
The most thoroughgoing version of cultural Leftism is called "postmodernism."  
Characteristic of the postmodern sensibility is the juxtaposition of concepts and images drawn from 
discordant universes of discourse, without any attempt to establish even the appearance of 
coherence or consistency among them.  Much contemporary literature expresses a postmodern 
sensibility,v and the "real world" persistently produces postmodern phenomena as well.  The New 
York Times coverage of the recent Middle East peace negotiationsvi heavily emphasized the color 
of President Clinton's tie.  In its most consistent forms  -- not that postmodernists value consistenc
highly --, postmodernism is apolitical, is devoted to a merely expressive form of politics, or accepts 
the status quo and exposes the absurdity of all attempts to improve it.  But an important variant, 
called "political correctness," tries to turn postmodernism into a "progressive" political dogma. 
y 
Some of our contemporaries attempt to stop the slide into chaos by embracing the status quo:  the 
end of history is, if not their belief, then at least their hope and their goal.  We must live with 
injustice, they argue, or better yet redefine our conception of justice so that persistent injustice 
ceases to count as such.vii These writers dismiss the egalitarian strain in our tradition, despite the 
Declaration of Independence, as a product of envy.  But too many people find the status quo 
  
intolerable, for reasons recognized as legitimate by our cultural and political tradition, to make this 
strategy acceptable.   
I have dealt with the roots of the cultural Leftist argument elsewhere.viii  Arguments for the 
existence of God are useless here, since such arguments suppose that God is a coherent concept, 
which a cultural Leftist will deny.  But if there is no way of proving the coherence of the concept of 
God, there is no way of disproving it either, at least in the absence of a criterion, such as the 
positivist Principle of Verifiability, which the advocates of deconstruction cannot admit.  Hence we 
may postulate the falsity of Nietzsche's maxim, and proceed from there.  
Despite their propensity to use dogma and metaphysics as terms of abuse, the cultural Left 
does what dogmatic metaphysicians have always done:  they take certain features of our experience 
as the key to reality.  As Plato took mathematics, Aristotle biology, and Kant the claims of duty, so 
the cultural Left takes historical change and malleability of language as their key to how things are.  
It is a dogma of the cultural Left that no norm or standard of any sort can be taken as more than 
provisionally binding.  We may call this dogma the metaphysics of universal contingency; its 
slogan is Never say never.   
One application of this dogma is the situationist denial of exceptionless moral rules:  others 
include the denial of infallible moral and spiritual authorities, the rejection of necessary 
propositions with interesting content, and belief in the possibility of a completely open mind.  
These are stock beliefs among intellectuals; only lack of caution distinguishes postmodernists from 
many liberals, and only dogmatism and intolerance distinguishes the politically correct from much 
of the rest of academia.  The attempt to use relativism to resolve social issues is widely accepted, 
even among the bitterest opponents of the politically correct. 
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The metaphysics of universal contingency is self-destructive.  If it is true, it is false (or on 
another interpretation, we have no right to assert it).  Nor does it help to limit its scope to (first-
order) principles, while designating it as a meta-principle.  For whatever reason one might have for 
asserting it would also appear to be a reason for asserting a broader principle (call it a meta-meta-
principle) which applies to the metaphysics of universal contingency itself.  And, if we decline to 
make this move, there is no way of excluding the possibility of another meta-principle, likewise 
absolute in character, having interesting implications at the level of principle, such as one requiring 
certain conditional principles to be treated, for practical principles, as absolutes. 
Nor can one save the metaphysics of universal contingency by limiting its scope -- say by 
reducing it to the claim that all non-tautological principles are contingent.  This modification limits 
the metaphysics of universal contingency in two ways:  (1) some necessities are admitted, i.e., 
tautologies; (2) among contingent truths, some may be exceptionless (and even have the quasi-
necessitarian status of laws of nature).  But this principle -- call it the empiricist principle -- is 
neither a tautology nor is it treated by its adherents as contingent. 
On the other hand, the attempt, characteristic of the cultural Right, to avoid prudential 
accommodations to the world of one's experience is self-destructive.  Sometimes, to be sure, an 
unbending attitude is appropriate:  the Hasidim who went to the gas ovens chanting, "I believe in 
the coming of the Messiah, and, though he tarry, yet I shall wait for him," fared better, even in 
worldly terms, than those of their fellow Jews who went to their deaths cursing God.  But at an 
earlier stage of the Holocaust, when there was reason to hope that wise decisions would enable the 
Jews to escape the gas ovens, the use of prudence to protect oneself and one's family was 
obligatory.  Moreover, the attempt to specify what aspects of our culture represent the "permanent 
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things," and are for that reason immune to challenge, runs into persistent difficulties, some of 
which we have explored in this essay (§ 6.2). 
Both the cultural Left and the cultural Right, in their extreme forms, are guilty of a 
Manichean revolt against the created order, which includes elements of both permanence and 
change.  In more mundane terms, both cultural Rightists and cultural Leftists ask us to feel guilty 
about being human -- about adapting to circumstance while at the same time refusing to regard 
every aspect of our lives as open to radical revision. 
Neither the cultural Right nor the cultural Left can possibly win, though both of them can 
do much damage (and conceivably some good) in the process.  The cultural Right cannot win 
because the world changes.  There is no such thing as an unchanging society, and our society 
contains within itself many internal sources of change  -- technology and a market economy, for 
example.  And when the world changes, people will ask whether the old rules still apply -- and the 
right answer will sometimes be No.  The cultural Left cannot win because a society in which 
nothing is constant cannot survive from one generation -- or even from one moment -- to another.  
The idea of progress disappears unless there are constant standards by which we can distinguish it 
from degeneration (or pointless change).  Nor can one speak of development, as opposed to 
discontinuous change, unless there is something constant that undergoes it.  Hence traditional moral 
standards cannot be questioned all at once:  even apologists for Michel Foucaultix hasten to assure 
us that he did not deliberately infect other people with AIDS -- as distinct from risking the 
transmission of the disease.    
  One source of the cultural Left is a desire to defend the conclusion either that our ancestors 
were wrong about important moral issues -- let us say slavery --, or that changed circumstances 
mean that we are no longer bound to follow their views.  But unless there is some constant 
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principle linking them and us, such judgments represent nothing more than an irrational "paradigm 
shift," which can be imposed by force but not established by reason. 
We have two ways of seeing our beliefs, including our moral beliefs, which do not fit 
together very well.  One is as a set of propositions that exclude their contradictories, which we 
normally claim are true but sometimes doubt; let us call this the "truth and error perspective."  The 
other is as a product of our interaction with our natural and social environment, and that of our 
physical and spiritual ancestors -- an interaction that will continue after we are dead.  Let us call 
this the "historicist perspective."   
There is no formal inconsistency between these two perspectives:  our beliefs are both true 
(or false) propositions and cultural-historical products.  But each of these perspectives, when 
pressed to the limits of its logic, crowds out the other.  Our bitterest opponents' positions quite as 
much as our own, are products of the interaction of traditional ideas with their natural and social 
environment.  And the rise and fall of intellectual systems, that has entered in to the outlook of both 
ourselves and our opponents, is only in part the result of reasoned argument in any sense:  
sometimes war and conquest decide the issue, and sometimes a way of thinking loses its grip on its 
adherents in a way that cannot be rationally reconstructed. 
The truth and error and the historicist perspective share a common root, in our capacity to 
step back and examine our beliefs, first to ask whether they are true, and second to notice that they 
differ from those of their ancestors.  To make them cohere fully would require a sort of radical 
transcendence of which human beings are not capable:  not just the limited transcendence involved 
in asking where the truth lies in some contemporary controversy, or making sense of some portion 
of our history, e.g., the history of philosophy, but a "God's eye point of view" in the fullest sense.   
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The writings of John Noonan illustrate the central issue.x  Noonan has strong moral beliefs.  
He condemns bribery as he condemns many other traditionally condemned activities.  He finds his 
criterion of moral judgment in "the satisfaction of true human needs," and supports his judgments 
by moral arguments of the customary sort.  But in his historical and sociological perspective, the 
distinction between bribery and the other reciprocities that form the ordinary stuff of social life 
turns out to depend on the discretion and felt necessities of the authors, interpreters, and enforcers 
of law.  Our understanding of bribery, as of other moral issues, will develop or degenerate as the 
history of our civilization unfolds, but there is no reason to suppose that such developments will 
eliminate the element of historical contingency in our morality.  Noonan's innocence of any 
deconstructive intent only makes more urgent the question of the relationship between history on 
the one hand and the categorical requirements of morality on the other. 
The question of our right to accept our inherited beliefs, as reformed by dialogue with one 
another, encounter with other traditions, and interaction with our shared environment, is another 
version of the question of our right to trust our faculties.  Any argument we might make against 
"demon" skepticism supposes that we are able to know its premises and that they support its 
conclusion.   Thus our trust in our faculties must of necessity be a matter of (rational) faith. 
7.2.  The Concept of the Sacred 
The thought that informs my reasoning in this essay is as follows.  The cultural Left is 
correct in asserting the diversity and complexity of human life.  Each friendship is, for example, 
unique, because each person, and each history of interaction between two or more people, is 
unique.  And the same is true of every marriage. 
Yet those who celebrate chaos underestimate human complexity.  For one persistent human 
desire is for an orderly life, in the teeth of the many internal and obstacles to achieving it.  And it is 
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arbitrary for the votaries of openness to close themselves to this desire, alone among the galaxy of 
human desires.  We need an understanding that enables us to see both the threat of chaos, and the 
dangers of the wrong sort of order, while allowing individuals and groups to seek order in 
appropriate ways. 
Leszek Kolakowski undertakes "to speak in defense of the conservative spirit,” 
However, [he writes] it is a conditional conservative spirit, conscious not only of its own 
necessity but also the necessity of the spirit that opposes it.  As a result, it can see that the 
tension between rigidity and structure and the forces of change, between tradition and 
criticism, is a condition of human life. 
This conservative spirit would be a vain and empty satisfaction were it not constantly aware 
of itself and mindful of the extent to which it was, is, and may continue to be used in 
defense of irrational privilege; and that it may be used in this way, not as a result of 
irrational privilege; and that it may be used in this way is the result, not of contingent 
circumstances, not of occasional abuse, but of the very nature of the conservative spirit.  
This conservative spirit knows the difference between the conservatism of great bureaucrats 
and that of peasants, just as it knows the difference between the revolt of a people who are 
starving or enslaved and the purely cerebral revolutionism that reflects an emotional void.xi 
There is considerable ambiguity in this "conditional conservatism"; for example, it is not 
clear, on Kolakowski's showing, whether we are to prefer the conservatism of bureaucrats or that of 
peasants.  But for present purposes his most important observation is the following: 
The sacred order, which encompassed the realities of the secular world, never ceased to 
proclaim the message, "This is how things are, and they cannot be otherwise." ... We live in 
a world in which all our inherited forms and distinctions have come under violent attack; 
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they are attacked in the name of homogeneity, which is held up as an ideal with the aid of 
vague equations purporting to show that all difference means hierarchy, and all hierarchy 
oppression. ...  Sometimes it seems as if all the words and signs that make up our conceptual 
framework and provide us with a basic system of distinctions are dissolving before our 
eyes, as if all the barriers between opposing concepts are gradually being torn down.xii  
One feature of many moral rules held as absolute is that they mark out the difference 
between socially important categories, say between human beings and brute animals.  One drowns 
superfluous kittens, but not superfluous infants; one eats the flesh of beasts but not that of human 
beings.  And when some people defend their moral judgments by saying -- rightly or wrongly -- 
that human life, marriage, or private propertyxiii is sacred, and others reject such appeals as 
irrelevant and oppressive, the resulting debate is best understood in terms of Kolakowski's 
observations. 
Another feature of moral absolutes is that they have a motivational dimension:  a virtuous 
person will not merely abstain from rape or torture, for example, but will have an entrenched 
aversion to such acts that will prevent him from performing them even when they appear to be 
justified.  Stuart Hampshire has provided us with a useful phenomenology of actions prohibited in 
this way:  they involve 
a sense of disgrace, of outrage, of horror, of baseness, of brutality, and, most important, a 
sense that a barrier, assumed to be firm and almost [?] insurmountable, has been knocked 
over, and a feeling that if this horrible, or outrageous, or squalid, or brutal, action is 
possible, then anything is possible and nothing is forbidden, and all restraints are 
threatened.xiv  
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We expect virtuous people to consult their heads as well as their hearts, but sometimes our heads 
will tell us that such aversions are to be cultivated rather than resisted. 
Sacredxv is not just a strong word for good.xvi  In its traditional meaning, it has the double 
sense of "holy" and "accursed."  Oedipus, just before his death, was sacred, both because he was 
polluted by patricide and incest, and because suffering for offenses committed in ignorance had 
hallowed him.  And what is holy is also dangerous:  a man can be struck down for laying profane 
hands on the ark of the Lord. 
A contemporary example is the attitude sometimes expressed toward persons with AIDS.  
One can contract a deadly disease by contact with such persons, and irrational fears of them outrun 
the real dangers.  And an HIV-positive person is marked for early death, without necessarily being, 
in the usual sense, sick.  Many such persons also have the spooky quality associated with sexual 
ambiguity.  Moreover, they are suffering, in a particularly horrible way, the consequences of a 
collective decision to take sexual matters more lightly than in retrospect seems defensible.  Hence 
they are sometimes shunned, but sometimes also they are treated with a sort of reverence -- even as 
oracles, as in Tom Wolfe's Bonfire of the Vanities.xvii Hence if we say that human life is sacred, for 
example, we mean two things.  First, human beings are valuable in themselves, and their 
destruction for that reason an evil.  Second, that the value we place on human life  -- and the moral 
restraints we attempt to place on its destruction -- are in the following sense strategic.  
Infringements are not only bad in themselves, but threaten systematically to undermine the entire 
set of moral restraints that distinguish tolerable human social life from barbarism. 
It is now time to respond to two characteristic consequentialist arguments.  Kai Nielsen 
writes: 
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The general moral principles surrounding bans on killing innocent people are strong and 
play such a crucial role in the ever floundering effort to humanize the savage mind -- savage 
as a primitive and savage again as in contemporary industrial society -- that it is of the 
utmost social utility, it can be argued, that such bans on killing not be called into question in 
any practical manner by consequentialist reasoning. 
However, in arguing in this way, the moral conservative has plainly shifted his ground, and 
he himself is arguing on consequentialist grounds that we must treat certain non-
consequentialist principles as absolute (as principles which can never, in fact, from a 
reasonable moral point of view, be overridden, for it would be just too disastrous to do 
so).xviii 
But to invoke consequentialist considerations to justify the acceptance of a moral rule need 
not involve the acceptance of the contention that it admits of consequentialist overriders, as distinct 
from the acceptance of consequentialist arguments to resolve ambiguous cases in its application.  
(The principle of double effect, which includes a clause requiring "due proportion" seems -- despite 
Finnis and Grisez -- to require a limited sort of consequentialist reasoning.)  On the contrary, the 
consequentialist argument for accepting a rule against killing the innocent is also an argument for 
resisting the making of consequentialist exceptions to it. 
Consequentialists also argue as follows.  If we regard God or Society as the author of the 
moral law, each of us may have to follow its requirements, even when they conflict with (what 
seems to be) what would produce the best consequences overall.  But if I view myself as the author 
of the moral law, as one side of the Kantian tradition would have me do, I have no reason not to set 
aside some rule when it conflicts with my obligation to promote the good.  As Conrad D. Johnson 
has put it, "to stand under external authority implies that the competence to make ... fundamental 
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revisions belongs to someone else (God, an elite, or the majority through the social conventions 
they create."xix  Hence consequentialism is the most appropriate morality for a secular, pluralistic 
society. 
But this argument, even if we accept its ontological underpinnings, proves too much.  
Unless my morality includes some sense of external constraint, I have no reason not to revise it 
when it conflicts with my own interests or even my present inclinations.  I therefore have no reason 
to prefer consequentialism to some form of moral minimalism -- whether nihilistic, egoistic, or 
extreme libertarian -- that denies that I have any obligation to come to the aid of others in their 
need.xx  
7.3. The Search for Moral Absolutes Concluded 
I thus conclude that strongly entrenched moral rules are necessary to a workable morality, 
and thus also to social life, and that these rules are to be found in domains of human life where 
enormous powers for both good and evil are at work.  The thought that there are norms whose 
reasons we may not fully understand (in hard cases, anyhow), but whose observation is necessary 
to tolerable social life, is extremely common.  But its application runs into a number of difficulties. 
First, the concept of a tolerable social life is not neutral among moral theories and moral 
positions.  If radical animal rights advocates are right, nearly all human societies are in the Nazi 
class.  Even vegetarian societies exploit animal labor in ways these advocates condemn.   
Second, the relevant causal claims are easy to make but hard to sustain, even in retrospect.  
There may be people who, starting with reading newspapers on Sunday, or the use of conventional 
playing cards, have made shipwreck of their lives.  But even in these cases it does not follow that 
the decision to play cards was the wrong turning of greatest practical importance; that may have 
come later or earlier. 
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Third, society has the ability to absorb remarkable amounts of misbehavior -- whether 
defined by its own standards or by the standards a critical moralist would defend.  But sometimes 
this misbehavior reaches a point -- call it a "Watergate point" -- at which it is necessary to uphold 
or abandon challenged standards.  But such points are unpredictable in advance; deciding when 
they have arisen is one of the most delicate tasks of prudence.   
Finally, the decay of social orders, though always risky, is not bad without qualification.  
Some social orders are unjust beyond the limits of tolerance; some, for example, require lynching 
and other evil means to keep them going.  Sometimes it is reasonable to endeavor to build a new 
society in the ashes of the old. 
Nonetheless, social disasters do occur, and at least some examples of them are 
uncontroversial, at least in retrospect.  And the path to disaster is paved by a multitude of individual 
and collective decisions, some of which at least are well intentioned.  And the hope that social 
disaster will lead, after all the bloodshed and chaos, to a better social order cannot form the 
foundation for prudent action.  The time to prevent Nazi Germany is thus during the Weimar 
period, when the social institutions of all sorts are in decay, not when the Nazis' "remedies" for this 
decay are being administered. 
The moral reasoning of an individual begins with a set of fairly simple rules, of the Ten 
Commandments variety.  But he encounters situations that make these rules seem too simple:  they 
are then modified and adapted in various ways, leading to a far more complex set of rules and 
principles.  But then he encounters a "check" -- a realization that, if one continues to loosen one's 
moral rules, chaos is a likely result.  And so he attempts to restore one's moral rules to their pristine 
simplicity, and the dialectic goes on. 
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It is therefore irresponsible, even from a strictly worldly point of view, to hold with Donald 
Evans that "the history of allegedly revealed and allegedly exceptionless rules seems to me to be a 
history of empirical error and moral evil."xxi  Rigorous moralists, even those who in the final 
reckoning are unduly so, are like a canary in a mine; they warn others of dangers that will prove 
lethal unless action is taken.  To be sure, excessive rigor about some issues may blind us to other, 
equally important, dangers, and may drive those unable to live up to the rigorists' burdensome 
standards to despair.  And rigorists may lose credibility by spreading the alarm prematurely.  But a 
moralist, for all that, needs to pay careful attention to those more rigorous as well as to those laxer 
than himself. 
In an ideal world everyone would share the same (true) moral judgments -- not because he 
was coerced or manipulated into doing so, but because the truth of these judgments was evident to 
him upon reflection.  But, as things are, when some people are too lax it is well that others are too 
rigorous, and when some people are too rigorous it is well that others are too lax.  Or rather this is 
the case so long as the extremes do not reinforce one another, as they often do. 
In technical terms, I am concerned with the acceptance-utility of moral rules (and of moral attitudes 
generally) -- the consequences, that is to say, of their being adopted by individuals and groups in 
real time.  But I do not evaluate these consequences in hedonist/welfarist terms alone; moreover the 
problem of incommensurability reappears in a particularly troublesome way when we evaluate the 
consequences of our customary standards, or of proposed changes in these standards. 
My argument diverges significantly from the philosophy of Kant and his followers, which is 
also invoked to support moral absolutes.xxii Appeal to principled consistency requires a 
specification of what characteristics of a situation are morally relevant, in order to avoid moral 
principles adroitly crafted to favor the interests of the moralist or his friends.  And the idea of 
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humanity as an end-in-itself requires an empirical content difficult to find in Kant's moral 
philosophy.  We must somehow avoid the conclusion that, since Soul is immortal, it does not 
matter whom we kill (or what sort of other damage we inflict).  It is necessary to appeal to the 
needs of human beings as natural and social, as well as rational, creatures, including their need for 
the protection of stable social formations during their periods of special vulnerability. 
A pagan would speak here of the gods, whose favor lavishes benefits on human beings but 
whose wrath is very terrible.  And the bad consequences that flow from the neglect or erosion of 
elementary moral restraints a pagan would describe as the wrath of Athena, Hera, and Aphrodite.  
In a modern philosophical context we can speak of a convergence of deontological and 
consequentialist considerations.  We are especially concerned with acts that, in addition to 
whatever direct harm they do, also may release powerful and dangerous forces our moral rules 
strive to contain.  Moral rules protecting us from such dangers also carry with them a powerful 
symbolic charge (§ 2.5). 
Rationalistic moralists have written of a morality of inherited taboos, which is an 
enlightened morality of rational principles is destined to supersede.  A plausible example of such a 
taboo is the idea that there is something particularly abominable about anal intercourse, even over 
and above any objection we might have to other deviant sexual practices.  But it turns out that anal 
intercourse carries with it a special risk of infection with AIDS, and that its prevalence among 
homosexuals contributed to the AIDS epidemic.  It does not follow that our ancestors had an 
insight into the causes of disease unknown to us.  But this sort of surprising result does counsel a 
humbler attitude toward inherited ideas than many philosophers have been prepared to adopt.  On 
the other hand, some taboos are just irrational, such as a prohibition on interracial intercourse, 
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especially where the male partner is black and the female white.  How the two sorts of taboos are to 
be distinguished in practice is a difficult question. 
Part of the argument is rule-consequentialist in a familiar way:  by accepting, teaching, and 
upholding certain non-consequentialist standards we avoid bad consequences and secure good 
ones.xxiii And the rule-consequentialist move is often enough neglected in the literature, as when 
Nielsen writes that  "A consequentialist maintains that actions, rules, policies and practices are 
ultimately to be judged by certain consequences,”xxiv ignoring the fact that rules as well as actions 
have morally important outcomes. 
Nonetheless, without some sort of non-consequentialist backing for our norms, rule-
consequentialism would lead to indeterminacy.  For the range of possible rules is indefinitely large, 
and much of the utility of rules consists in their being shared.  (Without shared rules and principles 
we could not, for example, discuss moral issues with one another.)  More broadly, rule-
consequentialists suppose that people can be brought to converge on some set of moral rules; 
otherwise his position would be utterly utopian.  And the consequentialist considerations that 
support moral rules are not themselves morally neutral:  life without friendship would be 
intolerable, and friendship includes an internal morality forbidding betrayal. 
In any event, rule-consequentialism as a general moral system is not acceptable, since no 
human being could apply it.  (Perhaps God is a rule-consequentialist, but then we would have to 
rely on revelation for His conclusions.)  In practice we avoid such difficulties by starting with 
existing morality and considering large or small revisions in it, designed to remedy the difficulties 
its adherents experience in attempting to life their lives according to its tenets. 
For suppose we are to choose between two moral codes, with differing results concerning a case we 
find difficult anyway (say when to cease attempts to prolong a dying child's life).  On rule-
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consequentialist premises, we need to ask what the effects of the adoption of these codes, either by 
ourselves as a society or each of us as an individual might be.  It is not enough to ask about the 
consequences of accepting R1, requiring us to continue life support, and R2, requiring us to cease it.  
This move would collapse into act-consequentialism, since one could always fashion a rule valid 
"for this day and this train only."  Moreover the consequences of one rule depend on the other rules 
in the system. (A rule prohibiting direct euthanasia will have different consequences if we are fairly 
lax about prolonging life, than if we are required to prolong each and every life, whatever the cost.)  
They also depend on the moral and semi-moral attitudes that surround the code aspect of one's 
morality,  (A stringent moral code will have different consequences if the surrounding culture 
contains efficient means for dealing with guilt, than if each person is forced to bear the burden of 
transgression in lonely silence.)   Indeed to talk about the consequences of a moral code is to talk 
about the consequences of an entire way of life. 
If I am right in my argument so far, we can now make a bit more progress in our search for 
moral absolutes.  They are to be found in those areas of life centrally important for human beings in 
society, where powers capable of doing both great good and great ill are at work.   
1.  The first of these is the domain of human life and its protection -- as well as prohibitions 
on violence of all sorts.  The goods of human life require living human beings to sustain them, and 
a license to kill leaves few if any moral constraints intact.  For if someone is causing me trouble, 
and I may kill him to free myself of his demands, I have a quick and easy way of escaping 
whatever claims he may make.  (In many cases, extortion will also get me whatever I may demand 
of him.)  The extreme possibility, that the human race should destroy itself by warfare, is not at all 
impossible, though it is less likely than it was just a short time ago. 
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Moreover, the use of violence invites retaliatory and pre-emptive violence, whether justified by our 
moral codes or not.  Even when the objects of violence are too weak to defend themselves or to 
retaliate, and are lacking in powerful protectors, the lesson that the weak exist at the sufferance of 
the strong has immeasurable costs.  The "bloody instructions argument" -- that those who defend 
violence create a world in which violence, including violence against themselves, is increasingly 
legitimate, remains sound.  On the other hand human aggressiveness cannot be condemned as an 
absolute evil:  if constrained it contributes to the good life in important ways.  Hence it is 
appropriate to speak of human life as sacred.xxv  Even if we reject pacifism as unduly restrictive, it 
is reasonable to look for absolute standards constraining the human propensity to violence.  But I 
do not see how a philosopher could claim anything more than to have approximated these 
absolutes, especially when one remembers that a moral absolute must be valid for persons of all 
times, places, and social situations.  (This remark applies to my own efforts as much to anyone 
else's.)  
The moral prohibition against taking human life is often expressed in terms of our right to 
live.  And one of the appeals of rights theories is that they attempt to give us moral and political 
guidance without opening up the endless controversies about the good life for human beings that 
other approaches to ethics invite.  But it turns out that such theories are undermined by the vices 
latent in these virtues.  Alasdair MacIntyre's dismissal of belief in rights as "at one with belief in 
witches and in unicorns"xxvi goes well beyond his argument.   But we may agree with him that, as 
Jenny Teichman has well put it, "The concept of a right isn't separate from, or above or below, the 
other moral concepts."xxvii  Hence it is not sufficient to appeal to a right to life, whose contours are 
discovered in intuition, to settle moral issues about killing,xxviii though one ought not express this 
conclusion in terms of a denial of the right to live. 
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2.  A second area in which we might find moral absolutes might is that of honesty and 
deceit.  Communication is a centrally important in human life; imagine yourself in a society where 
no one speaks your language, and in which you are unable to learn a single word of the language 
others speak.  And ingenuity in the use of language is both harmless and necessary.  It is not a lie to 
begin a letter to an enemy or stranger "Dear Mr. Smith," nor does it make an insincere letter worse 
to conclude it "Sincerely yours."  And nearly all moralists allow one to reply to a question, 
requesting information one is not at liberty to disclose, "I don't know."   
But if one could never trust another person to tell the truth, where it differed from what it was 
advantageous for him to say; or to keep a promise when so doing entailed any cost, then co-
operation among human beings would be impossible.  No more for lying than for homicide, 
however, can one, by philosophical reasoning alone, state the prohibition in such a way as to 
include all and only legitimate exceptions. 
3.  In is difficult to state the third zone of absolutes for all societies.  But in America it has 
to do with our Constitution, especially those parts of it designed to protect the individual from 
governmental tyranny.  Few Americans -- whatever their political coloration -- are prepared to 
attack the Constitution; on the contrary political disputes get transformed into questions of 
interpretation of a document written to provide maximum scope for disagreement on constitutional 
issues.xxix  Those discontented with the prevailing interpretation can always hope that a future 
Supreme Court will favor their views.   
The line between civil disobedience and terrorism, however unclear it may be in some 
cases, distinguishes those who remain in dialogue with their fellow citizens, from those who have 
withdrawn from the constitutional process in bitterness and despair.  Americans, we may say, 
regard their constitutional order as sacred, even though they hold themselves at liberty to dispute its 
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meaning.  Nonetheless, we cannot treat the American Constitution, or any other merely human 
institution, as of perpetual validity (see 1.4).  One is forced to speak here of conditional sanctity. 
The rules of all societies are in constant flux, as these societies attempt to deal with issues ranging 
from labor unrest to national and ethnic minorities to competition with foreign business.  But there 
are also background understandings that contain (they never abolish) political and social conflicts, 
and when they collapse lead to civil war.  To these understandings -- which may or may not be 
expressed in a written constitution -- the members of a functioning society accord a certain 
sacredness. 
We have not yet reached a moral absolute.  Revolution is sometimes justified, and the duty 
of loyalty to a society's institutions does not bear on everyone with equal stringency.  But 
somewhere here there are absolute obligations, whose assertion is necessary to the vitality of 
human social life.  But there seems no prospect of formulating them with accuracy with the help of 
philosophical reason alone. 
4.  The fourth arena of absolutes is the one in which intuitions vary most widely.  It includes 
that long and complex process by which generation succeeds generation, ranging from the sexual 
maturity of the parents to the sexual and social maturity of the offspring:  in other words, the whole 
contested area of marriage, sex, childbearing, child rearing, and family life.xxx   Friendship in the 
ordinary sense, as well as Platonic relationships (whatever the sex of the parties) also partakes, to 
some degree, of the emotional complexities that are generated by sexual and reproductive life.  
Camile Paglia has powerfully -- if not with complete coherence -- challenged the popular view of 
sexual activity as no more than a way of expressing affection, and has reminded us of the deep and 
powerful psychological forces at work in the sexual impulse. 
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The most extreme bad consequence possible here, that the human race should cease to 
reproduce itself and thus die out, seems unlikely.xxxi But the other evils chaos in this area produces 
are evident enough:  epidemic disease, bitterness between the sexes and the generations, abuse and 
neglect of both the old and of the young, and the exploitation of persons who are economically, 
emotionally, and physically vulnerable.  Hence we should accept the commonsense understanding 
that the sexual and reproductive aspect of human life requires firm, possibly even exceptionless, 
rules to sustain it.xxxii  What these rules exactly are is another matter, and one that the argument so 
far does little to resolve.  Nor is there much hope that philosophy will resolve it. 
Affecting all the areas where absolutes are to be sought is the following consideration.  
Some people are able to take part in deliberations concerning the rules of social life, and if these 
interests are neglected can make their displeasure felt.  But infants and small children must rely on 
the rest of us to represent their interests.  Absolutes constraining the sorts of injury that may be 
inflicted on them are therefore especially appropriate.  
I have not here suggested actual exceptionless moral rules, only provided a partial list of 
danger zones,xxxiii where both agents and moralists are well advised to proceed with caution in 
making exceptions to moral rules accepted ordinarily and for the most part.  For human beings are 
notorious for taking every possible opportunity to exploit whatever loopholes may exist in moral 
rules that obstruct their passions or the pursuit of their self-interest. 
We can, at least, hope to be able to formulate virtual absolutes.  Virtual absolutes are rules 
having three features:  (1) they are stated, in moral education (and self-education), as exceptionless; 
(2) those proposing the rules have not admitted any exceptions so far -- or else have included any 
exceptions in their formulation of the rules;xxxiv and (3) when someone raises the possibility of an 
exception -- whether in theory or in practice, whether as a general matter or in a particular case -- 
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the burden of proof rests with him.xxxv  For only such rules are strong enough to withstand the 
rationalizing tendencies of the human mind.  And we have no reason to suppose that the 
formulation of virtual absolutes is impossible; prohibitions on genocide, rape, and torture are 
plausible examples with which to begin (see § 6.2). 
The cultural relativist is right on one issue.  Granted that some sets of moral standards are 
better than others, and that some are so atrocious that no conscientious person can accept them.  
Nonetheless, there is a wide range within which any moral code, however unsatisfactory, is better 
than no code at all.  And there are important utilities in sharing a moral code with one's neighbors -- 
or at least in having one that is not so different from theirs as to create obstacles to communication 
and co-operation.  Hence one ought, in the absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary, to support 
the conventions of one's society.  And those who believe themselves to have such reasons for 
criticizing the conventions on one point ought not to widen their criticism into a general rejection of 
all inherited ideas; for example those who would criticize American institutions on the grounds that 
they authorize economic exploitation have a reason to address the rules of family life with some 
gentleness. 
7.4.  The Limits of Philosophical Argument 
Philosophers have distinguished ethics, or reflection upon the principles of conduct, from 
morals, or the principles themselves, as first inculcated by parents and others, and subsequently 
developed by agents as they grapple with moral challenges.  One implication of my discussion is 
that morals are independent of ethics.  Theoretical reflection is only one of the influences on our 
moral consciousness, and not the most important one at that. Nor is the impact of philosophical 
ethics on day-to-day morals always benign:  there is some reason to fear that the conventions of 
academic philosophy favor moral laxity or worse. 
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Literature can tell us about the complexity of human situations, and make us aware of 
claims that we have been neglecting.  But it can do very little to help resolve moral conflicts.  An 
author can punish a character for breaching a moral norm -- as Tolstoy pushes Anna Karenina 
under a train -- but novelists have no authority to impose their value judgments outside the four 
corners of their own works.  And awareness of moral complexity, unless somehow balanced, tends 
to paralyze moral (and political) judgment. 
Theology in the wide sense examines the common moral consciousness of a group of 
people -- be it Americans, feminists, Baptists, or professional philosophers -- and articulates, 
interprets, and applies the norms found there.  So long as one adheres to a group, its norms will 
have binding force, but no merely human community can assert an absolute claim on persons in 
varying degrees alienated from it.  Secession remains as a loophole to any moral standard, so long 
as it is sustained only by the consensus of a certain community. 
Every human community has an implicit picture of the world and the place of human beings 
within it, in terms of which its members understand their life together and resolve disputes.  In 
some cases, a community claims intimacy with the Author of the universe, Who has disclosed to it 
some part of His plans.  But even such communities exist in history, and for that reason their ruling 
ideas are vulnerable to distortion.   Even their most loyal members must deal with elements in their 
doctrines and practices that conflict with their reasons for adherence to them.    
"For her committed members," Germain Grisez responds, 
the Church is not a society from which they are more or less alienated.  For such people, to 
accept the Church's teaching is to be self-consistent.  To wish to be a Catholic while 
refusing to accept the Church's teaching would be rather like wishing to have a friend 
without being a friend.xxxvi« 
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But this observation is at best only part of the truth, at least so long as Roman Catholics hold with 
Vatican II that "Christ summons the Church, as she goes on her pilgrim way, to that continual 
reformation of which she always has need, insofar as she is an institution of men here on 
earth.”xxxvii   
The most important obstacle to theological understanding is the gap between the 
experienced world of contemporary people and that of the people among whom the classical 
expressions of Christianity arose.  The attempt to reflect on contemporary experience in the light of 
the Gospel constantly threatens to collapse in the face of whatever secular ideology is most 
pressing at the time.  In Protestantism the constraint on dissolution is popular disaffection, as 
reflected in shrinking church membership; in Catholicism it is Vatican pressure; in both cases it is 
external to the structure of theological discourse.  Theology has become a form of politics, and 
orthodoxy a form of political correctness rather than a form of truth.   And the concepts of 
accommodation, dissimulation, repression, secession, and submission threaten to drive out both 
faith and reason.xxxviii To require of oneself or others that they become first Century or medieval 
people (or early Nineteenth Century Americans) is to impose a burden that those who lived during 
the periods did not bear.  Possible ways of changing this situation lie outside the scope of this 
essay, but now as always the highest court of appeal on Earth is the informed conscience. 
An adequate account of the judgments of an informed conscience is one of the most 
difficult tasks of moral theory.  Information about the relevant facts, including the official positions 
of communities of which one is a member, carries one only so far.  Every moral code contains 
ambiguous, conflicted, and doubtful elements that make its mechanical application impossible.   
But act-intuitionism, which expects the conscientious person somehow to know what is right in 
every situation, without the help of rules and principles, cuts away the possibility of reason and 
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communal reflection in moral judgment.  One can seek the counsel of a trusted adviser, and those 
who believe in God naturally pray to Him for guidance.  But knowing whom to ask, and knowing 
when one has received appropriate counsel from God or man, also requires a judgment of 
conscience.  
  Nonetheless, it sometimes clear what one ought to do, even in a situation others find 
difficult.  We can adduce reasons for our judgments in such cases, though the force of these 
reasons, and their capacity to cut short reflection and demand action, goes beyond their 
argumentative force.  And those who find support for their consciences in moral rules taught as 
absolute cannot be dismissed as unreasonable.  When conscience does speak, Socrates puts the 
result to Crito, "these are the words that I seem to hear, as the Corybants hear the music of the 
flutes, and the echo of these words resounds in me, and makes it impossible for me to hear anything 
else."xxxix 
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APPENDIX 
A NOTE ON JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR (1993) 
The Encyclical is primarily a theological document, addressed to the Pope's fellow Roman 
Catholics rather than to men and women of good will generally.  But the Pope makes no claim to be 
teaching infallibly, nor any attempt to cut off dialogue.  He expresses the obligation of the faithful 
in moral matters in the language of the Second Vatican Council, to "give careful attention to the 
sacred and certain teaching of the church" (§ 64, citing Vatican Council II, Dignitatis Humanae, § 
14). i I hope that these notes will be of interest, not only to Catholic theologians, but also to readers 
of whatever religious persuasion who believe that the working out of the implications of ethical 
ideas within concrete communities is of importance for morality.ii   I consider the issue posed by 
the Encyclical as a philosopher,iii engaged in discussion with reasonable men and women of all 
sorts rather than as a theologian elaborating the standards of a community.iv The Encyclical is best 
understood as a critique of certain schools of moral theology, which, in the Pope's view, represent 
"an overall and systematic calling into question of traditional moral doctrine on the basis of certain 
anthropological and ethical presuppositions" (§ 4), rather than as advancing either concrete moral 
norms or some philosophical-theological system (see §29).  Hence, for example, when he criticizes 
proportionalism (§ 75), he must be understood as rejecting it as the sole or sovereign method of 
moral reasoning, not as giving official approval to a moral system, such as that of Finnis and 
Grisez, that rejects proportionalist reasoning altogether. 
The central teaching of the Encyclical is that moral questions are questions of truth and not 
mere individual or collective decision.  A secondary teaching -- more to the point of the present 
book -- is the defense of the negative commandments (such as those prohibiting murder and 
adultery).  They are "meant to safeguard the good of the person, the image of God, by protecting ... 
human life, the communion of persons in marriage, private property, truthfulness, and people's 
good name" (§ 13).   
Much of the Encyclical is devoted to a polemic against the belief -- common among those 
who think of themselves as modern -- that freedom means freedom from moral obligation, or from 
the claims of truth; in other words in the power of individuals or groups to create their own 
"values."   The Pope endorses the "heightened sense of the dignity of the human person and his or 
her uniqueness, of the respect due to the journey of conscience [as] one of the positive 
achievements of modern culture" (§ 31).  But he also affirms, with Newman, that "conscience has 
rights because it has duties," chief among them the duty "to seek the truth and adhere to it once 
known" (§ 34).  The Pope's view of conscience reflects conclusions he first reached as a private 
philosopher.v Conscience on this view is "not exempt from the possibility of error" (§ 62), but even 
when in error derives its dignity from truth, "if only what man subjectively considers to be true" 
(§60).vi Evil done as a result of invincible ignorance is excusable, "but does not cease to be evil, a 
disorder in relation to the truth about the good" (§63).  Moral teachings that at first appear harsh 
and external will, or so he hopes, point the way to an autonomous judgment, by following which an 
individual affirms his own understanding of how a human being should live (see § 64).    
The key question is the relationship between human freedom and concrete acts.  The Pope 
agrees with theorists of fundamental option that 
Freedom is not only the choice for one or another particular action; it is also, within that 
choice, a decision about oneself and setting of one's life for or against the good, for or 
against the truth and ultimately for or against God (§ 65). 
But he points out that "to separate the fundamental option from concrete kinds of behavior means 
to violate the substantial integrity or personal unity of the moral agent in his body and his soul" (§ 
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67).  It makes no sense to say that a person is good "deep down inside" when his every action 
evinces moral depravity. 
At this point in the Pope reiterates some traditional Catholic doctrines: 
Man does not suffer perdition only by being unfaithful to that fundamental option whereby 
he has made a "free self-commitment to God."  With every freely committed mortal sin, he 
offends God as the giver of the law and as a result becomes guilty with regard to the entire 
law (cf. Jas. 2:8-11), even if he perseveres in faith, he loses "sanctifying grace," "charity," 
and "eternal happiness."  As the Council of Trent teaches, "the grace of justification once 
received is lost not only by apostasy, by which faith itself is lost, but also by another mortal 
sin."  (§ 68) 
But the distinction between apostasy (betrayal of the faith) and other sins seems to 
disappear on this assumption.  Hence some moral theologians 
insist that the opposition to God's law which causes the loss of sanctifying grace -- and 
eternal damnation, when one dies in such a state of sin -- could only be the result of an act 
which engages the person in his totality, in other words, an act of fundamental option.  
(§69) 
But the Pope responds to these theologians: 
The statement of the Council of Trent does not only consider the "grave matter" of mortal 
sin; it also recalls that the its necessary condition is "full awareness and deliberate consent." 
... "For mortal sin exists also when a person knowingly and wittingly, for whatever reason 
chooses something gravely disordered."  (§ 70) 
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But it remains hard to understand how one can make such a choice, with full awareness and 
deliberate consent on Friday, and then sincerely repent of it on Saturday, as some forms of 
penitential practice appear to suppose. 
The Pope then turns to the question, how particular moral issues are to be resolved within a 
Catholic framework.  He rejects the claim that "in the moral life prohibitions are more important 
than the obligation to do good."  Nonetheless, he insists the negative commandments "oblige 
everyone, regardless of the cost, never to offend in anyone, beginning with oneself, the personal 
dignity common to all" (§ 52).  The answer to the question, what sorts of behavior offend the 
dignity of the human person, is found in "the moral commandments expressed in negative form in 
the Old and New Testaments" (§52).  (He also cites Councils and Popes, as well as his earlier self.) 
These commandments are always binding, but their precise application 
must be specified and determined ... in the light of historical circumstances by the church's 
magisterium, whose decision is preceded and accompanied by the work of interpretation 
and formation characteristic of the reason of individual believers and of theological 
reflection. (§ 53) 
How much latitude of interpretation the magisterium, and the individual believers whose reflection 
informs it, may recognize is left unsettled. 
The Pope rejects 
Certain ethical theories, called teleological, [which] claim to be concerned for the 
conformity of human acts with the ends pursued by the agent and with the values intended 
by him.  The criteria for evaluating the moral rightness of an action are drawn from the 
weighing of the nonmoral or premoral goods to be gained and the corresponding nonmoral 
and premoral values to be respected.  (§ 74) 
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He criticizes such theories on two grounds: 
[First,] some authors do not take into sufficient consideration the fact that the will is 
involved in the concrete choices that it makes. ... [Second,] others are inspired by a notion 
of freedom which prescinds from the actual conditions of its exercise, from its objective 
reference to the truth about the good, and from its determination through choices of 
concrete kinds of behavior.  (§ 75) 
But the Pope's own approach to ethics is, in a broad sense, teleological: it affirms that the 
"true good of the person in view of his ultimate end" (§ 82) settles moral issues.  And even a 
radically proportionalist theory of ethics can regard the rightness of actions as a question of truth, 
and include in its reckoning the fact that a person shapes himself through his choices. 
At this point the Pope's argument becomes very difficult to follow.  The consideration of 
consequences and intentions, he tells us, "is not sufficient for judging the moral quality of a 
concrete choice" (§ 77).  There is also something further:  "the 'object' rationally chosen by the 
deliberate will, [namely] a freely chosen kind of behavior" (§ 78).  Perhaps there are dimensions 
other than murderous intentions and lethal results, to which one might appeal to warrant describing 
an act as one of murder.  But we still need to know what these are, and how they contribute to the 
resolution of moral issues.   
The Pope observes in conclusion, 
Acts whose objects are "not capable of being ordered to God" and "unworthy of the human 
person" are always in every case in conflict with that good.  Consequently, respect for 
norms which prohibit such acts and oblige semper and pro semper, that is, without any 
exception, not only does not inhibit a good intention, but actually represents its basic 
expression.  (§ 82) 
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Once it is granted that a certain act is "not capable of being ordered to God" all believers 
must avoid it.  And all men and women, believers or not, who attempt to live with dignity must 
avoid acts "unworthy of the human person."  But the question, how one is to ascertain, in theory or 
in practice, what acts fall into these classes, continues to present many perplexities.  
Moral issues are questions of truth, not to be settled by public opinion or the private 
fantasies of philosophers.  Freedom properly understood is the freedom to search for truth and 
conduct one's life in accordance with what one believes to be true.  That the relationship between 
truth and freedom in moral matters is left something of a mystery is not, in a theological context, an 
objection, however much philosophers may crave greater clarity.  But the notion of an object of 
action, distinct from both its intentions and its consequences, needs much more explication if we 
are to have a persuasive way of linking these important truths to the resolution of hard cases in 
morals.  We need further discussion of these points, especially among Catholics and others who are 
neither relativists nor believers in the project of founding moral discourse anew. 
Hence the Pope's treatment of dissent in moral theology requires further development and 
refinement.  "Moral teaching" we may agree, "certainly cannot depend simply on respect for a 
process; indeed it is in no way established by following the rules and deliberative procedures 
characteristic of a democracy," let alone by "carefully orchestrated protests and polemics carried on 
in the media" (§ 113).  But it is not established by top-down hierarchical methods either, however 
much a centralized authority may contribute to the health of a community in which it is present.   
The Pope appeals to reason and tradition rather than his own brute judgments.  But insofar as he 
does so, the reason of all people, and the judgments of other persons formed in the Catholic 
tradition, cannot be just dismissed.   
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
i All citations are to the text of Veritatis Splendor published in Origins 23 (Oct. 14, 1993), 297-336.  
ii  For commentaries, see the contributions of Richard John Neuhaus and Russell Hittinger to the 
symposium, "The Splendor of Truth," First Things, 39 (January 1994), 14-18; and, in a more 
critical vein, Gerard J. Hughes, S.J., "Veritatis Splendor: The Issues," The Month, 265 (Nov. 1993), 
483-487; and John Finnis, "Beyond the Encyclical," The Tablet, 8 Jan. 1994, 9-10.  A steeply 
theological commentary is Angelo Scola, "Following Christ," Communio, 20 (Winter 1993), 719-
722.    
iii Alasdair MacIntyre’s commentary, "How Can We Learn what Veritatis Splendor Has to Teach?"  
Thomist, 58 (2) (April, 1994), 177-195, is chiefly of interest for its explanation of why its author is 
not a relativist (pp. 187-8), and for forging closer links between virtue and rule-observance than he 
has hitherto done (passim).  But it also includes an attempt -- I am afraid a question-begging 
attempt -- to explain how one can make consequentialist arguments in some contexts while 
excluding them in others (pp. 192-3). 
ivAt least as a private person, Karol Wojtyla holds that the distinctive Christian element in ethics 
arises from the acceptance of God's revealed plan for human beings rather than any special 
normative or evaluative premise.  See his Person and Community, Theresa Sandok, OSM, tr. (New 
York:  Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 105-6. 
vIbid., p. 234.  
vi Man here (translating the Latin homo) is of course to be understood as including women.   
